The Philosophy O

AKHYĀTA &
NATURE

In Observance Of

Mīmāṁsā Nyāya A
Vedic Rituals (Part

मीमांसानये वैदिककर्मसु च

आख्यात तत्त्वशोधनम्

Dr Vedula Subrahmanyam
READER IN SANSKRIT
ANDHRA UNIVERSITY

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Mīmāmsā Nyāya And Vedic Rituals. (Part-2)

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ABBREVIATIONS AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

Abbreviations used	Name of the work in full	Author of the work
1	2	3
Akv Sri	Ākhyata Vada Siromani	Raghunatha Siromani
Bhā Cin.	Bhatta Cintāmani	Gāgabhatta
Bhā Rah	Chaatta Rahasyam	Khandadeva edited by A. Subrahmanya Sastry
Kasikā	Kāsikavitti with (Nyasa and Padamañjari)	Vamana-Jayāditya Jinendrabudhi and Haradtta
L.M (kk)	Laughu Mañjūsa with Kala & Kuncika commentaries	Nagesabhatta
L M (nub)	Laghu Mañjūsa with Nagesa bhavaprakasa	commentary by Peri Suryanaryana Sastry
La Sa Se	Laghu Sabdendu Sekhara Vol ii (which comm Gudā-rtha dipika)	Nāgesabhatta
M B	Mahābhasya in three parts	Patañjali
Mi Kau.	Mimamsā Kaustubham	Khandadeva
Muktavalī	Muktavali (with Dinakari and Ramarudri)	Viswanatha
Nir	Niruktam (with Durga commentary)	Yaska
Ny Ku	Nyāya Kusmañjali with Commentary Prakasa),	Udayana
	Nyāya-kosa	Bhimacharya Jhalakikar
Nya Man	Nyaya Mañjari	Jayantabhatta
N B	Nyaya Sūtras (with Vatsyayana Bhasya)	Gautama
Nys Rat	Nyāyaratnamala	Parthasarathi Misra
P	Astādhyays	Panini
Pa. Va Ra	Padavakya Ratnākara	Gokhlnath Upadhyaya
P L M	ParmaLaghu Manjusā	Nagesa Bhatta
Pra Pan.	Prakaran Pancika	Salikanatha

CONCORDANCE

Arthavisese tātparyagrāhakatvam dyotakatvam (Nyā Man)

Abhedātiriktasambandhena prakṛtyartha prakāraka sābda bodham prati pratyaya janyopasthiterhetuttvam (Vai Bhū)

Ananyalabhyaḥ sabdārthaḥ (Prau Man)

Anyāyascnāekārthattvām (Nya Ku)

Bhāvaprathana mākhyātām (Nir)

Ekasambandhi jnāna maparasambandhismārakam (Nya Si Muk. Comm)

Kriyāvacano dhatauḥ (Ma Bh)

Kriyāvisesaka upasargaḥ Ma Bh)

Kvacittu kriyāvisesaksеapakattvam dyotakattvam (La Man Dhattvarta)

Kvacittu samabhivyāhita gata vittyudbodhakattvam dyotakattvam

Kriyanamabhi nispattau sāmarthyam sadhanam viduḥ (Va Pad Sadhana samuddesa)

Nakevala prakṛtiḥ prayoktavyā napi pratyayaḥ (Ma Bh)

Nāmārthayorbhedevanvayasyāvyutpannatvam (Bh Cint)

Nāmarthayorbhedenaiva samsargattvam (La Man)

Pratyānam prakṛtyarthānvita svārtha bodhakattva vyutpattih (Vai Bhū)

Prātipadikarthayorbhedenānvayabodhe vibhaktijanyopa sthitirhetuḥ (Vai Bhū)

Pramāṇikam gauravam na dosāya, (La Man)

Prakrtipratyayau sahārtham bṛtaḥ tayostu pratyayārthaḥ pradhānam (Tan Vā)

Prayogapratipattibhyam kila sabdārtha niscayaḥ (Nyā Man)

Pararthabhidhānam Vṛttiḥ (M B)

Samabhivyāhṛtapadīya sakti vyanjakattvam dyotakattvam (La. Man)

Sattvapradhānāni nāmāni (Nir)

1	2	3
Phil Sen Pts	Philosophy of Sentence & Its parts	Prof V Subba Rao
Pra Man	Praudha Manorama	Bhattoji Diksita
R P	Rk Pratisakhya	Saunaka
Sa Sak Pra	Sabda Sakti Prakasa	Jagadisa
Sab Kou	Sabda Kaustustubham	Bhattoji Diksita
Sas-Dip,	Sastra Dipika	Parthasardhy Misra
	Samkhyakarikas (with Tattva Kaumudi Com)	Isvara Krishna Misra
S K	Vaiyakarana Siddhantakaumudī	Bhattoji
Tat Bo	Tattvabodhins (Commentary on S k)	Jnanedra Saraswati
Tan Var	Tantravartika (Comm on Sabara bhasya)	Kumarilabhatta
Tar Sam	Tarka Samgraha	Annambhatta
Tar Tan	Tarka Tandava (parts ii & iii)	Vyasatirtha
TTv Cin	Tattva Cintamani (Part iv-Vol ii)	Gangesa
TTv Dar	Tattva Darsani (comm on Vai Bhu sara with text)	Peri Suryanaryana Sastry
V P	Vakyapadīya part 3 (1 & 2) Commentary by Hela aja	Bhartrhari
Vai Bhu Sa	Vaiyakarana Bhusana Saram (with Prabha & Darpana commentaries)	Kaundabhatta
Si Su Ni	Vaiyakarana Siddhanta Sudhanidhi	Parvatiya Visweswara suri
Vi Vi	Vidhiviveka with Nyayakanika	Manana
Vya Vi	Vyakti Viveka	Mahimabhatta
Vyu Va	Vyutpatti Vada (with Adarsa Com)	Gadadhara
	Yoga sutra (with Bhasya)	Patanjali
	Whitney's Sanskrit Grammer	W D Whitney
	Technical Terms of Sanskrit Grammer	K C. Chatterjee

GLOSSARY

Adhikaranam	Substratum
Anukūla	Congenial to
Anvaya	Agreement
Avacchedakam	(the) Determinant
Avacchinnam	(the) Determined
Avyaya	Indeclinable
Ativyāpti	Over applicability
Avyapti	Partial applicability
Anumāna	Inference
Abhava	Non-existence
Anvayavyāpti	Concomitance in affirmation
Apoha	Negatation of the objects other than the one concerned
Abhedasambandha	Non-differential relation
Arthāpatti	Presumption
Ākanksa	Expectancy
Āsrya	Substratum
Ākhyātam	Verbal affix
Ākrti	Configuration
Āvapa	Inclusion
Dyotakattvam	Suggestion
Dravya	Substance
Dhātu	Verbal root
Guna	Quality
Gaurava	Prolixity
Jāti	Universal
Jñanam	Knowledge or Cognition
Karta	Agent
Karma	Object
Krt	Primary affix forming Verbal Derivations
Kriyā	Action
Kevalānvayi	Exclusively affirmative
Laksanā	Implication or Secondary significance
Laksyārtha	Implied meaning
Lāghavam	Parsimony

Nipāta	Particle
Prakṛti	Base
Pratyaya	Affix
Prakāra	Attribute
Prātipadika	Nominal base
Prasajyapratiṣedha	Absolute negation
Pratyakṣa	Perception
Rūḍha	Conventional
Śakti	Denotative potentiality
Śabdabodha	Verbal comprehension
Saṃsarga	Syntactical relation
Samānādhikaraṇya	Having the substratum or co-existance
Sattā	Existence
Taddhita	Secondary affix forming nominal derivatives
Upasarga	Preposition
Vidhi	Injunction
Viśeṣya	Substantive
Viśeṣaṇa	Attributive
Vṛtti	Potentiality
Vyakti	Individual
Vyañjanā	Suggestion
Vyaṅgya	(the) Suggested meaning
Vyāpāra	Activity
Viśiṣṭajñāna	Qualified cognition
Vyatireka vyāpti	Concomitiance in negatior
Yaugika	Derivative
Yogarūḍha	Derivative or conventional
Yaugika rūḍha	Derivative and convention

A brief

This second part of the text deals with the semantics of Verbal Suffix 'Tin' in Sanskrit

The word Ākhyata is a synonym to the 'verb' in English In Sanskrit a verb word contains mainly two parts i e verbal root (Dhātu) and verbal suffix (Tin) In the part-I of the book, the definition of root, classification, suffix classification, etc and their semantics is discussed as propound in the three main disciplines viz Nyāya, Mīmamsa and Vyākaraṇa of Hindu scholarship There it is established the root denotes the result (Phala) and action (Vyāpara)

Besides these discussions certain fundamental concepts such as Vyapāra (action) Phala (result) Karta (agent) Karma (object) Samsarga, Abhihita-anabhihita system Transitiveness-intransitiveness etc as viewed by Indian scholars, are also investigated to the advantage of the reader

Now in this second part of the book the semantics of the Suffix Tin is discussed with respect to the three disciplines said above

I acknowledge with respect and sincerity the immence help I had from the various books both in English and Sanskrit of course it is true, that knowledge is nobody's property and more so of scholars Knowledge is God Knowledge is to be transferred continueously So I received from my predecessors and now in turn I am distributing to the needy

My thanks are to the proprietors and workers of the Nana Enterprises, who shared the labours in printing and bringing out this book from press to public.

Sincerely
The Author

Verbal Affix-Its Denotation

INTRODUCTION —

As regards the denotation of the Verbal affix too, there exists a vast diversity of opinion among the various scholars I appears as though every scholar, though belonging to the same school or to a different school of discipline, represents a school by himself No scholar is less intelligent not to project a new interpretation, or to pronounce a new thought or a different view and thus to establish the valadity of his statement over the views o others Another peculiarity is that, some times scholars belonging to a particular discipline accept the verdict of anothe scholar belonging to a different discipline [1]

The Verbal affix, that is enjoined after a verbal root to denote agent or object or Bhāvanā and time besides number person and upagraha, is called 'L' (lakrāa) Certain lakāras, in addition to time denote modalites of the speaker Such lakāras are called moods Thus to denote the subtle shades of difference in time or modalities Pnāini used ten types of Lakāras Of course, all th lakāras denote agent/object/Bhāva in common, besides the particular time or modality The verbal affix denotes the general meanings agent/object/Bhāva etc on the strength of the Sūtra P 3 4 69 [2] Thus according to the Grammarian, in the case of transitiv roots the Lakāra denotes agent in the active voice and in th passive voice it denotes object But if the root is intransitive the either an agent or Bhāva is denoted by the Lakāra Such a construction of the sentence to denote Bhāva is called "Bhāve Prayoga"

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1 Vyāsatīrtha, a Logician supports the Grammarian's theory A the latter Logicians, Mīmāmsakas and Grammarians unanimously condemn the views of Mandana and of the old Logicians.

2. Lah Karmanica Bhāve cākarmakebhyah (P 3. 4 69)

The ten Lakāras are distinguished by the use of mute letter like Aṭ' Ṅ etc The function of vowel mutes following ' L ' is to distinguish affixes enjoined for particular tenses or modality |Of the ten lakāras time denoting lakāras are only six viz Laṭ (Presnt) Liṭ (Past not witnessed by the speaker) Laṅ (Past exclusive of today) Luṅ (Past in general) Luṭ (future exclusive of today) Lṛṭ (future in general) The remaining four lakāras viz , Liṅ (optative or potential+Precative), Loṭ (imperative) Lṛṅ (conditional) and Leṭ (subjunctive) have in common future time denoted But in practice no importance is given to this time element but imporatance is given to the modality denoted by them

It is worth noting that in our actual language this affix 'L' (Lakāra) is not found after the verbal root The affixes actually used are Tip, Tas, Jhi etc These suffixes Tip, Tas Jhi etc for the grammatical purposes are considered to be the replacements of the lakāras Hence all the meanings assigned to the lakāras are really expressed by the actual endings Tip, Tas, etc Of course Pāṇini did not specifically say so, but it is so construed because of the maxim 'A replacement has the same meaning as that which it replaces'' [1]

Grammarian Kauṇḍabhatta argues the other way He says it is the suffix Tip etc has the denotative capacity This denotative function of the Tip etc suffixes is assumed to exist in the lakāra which is created for the sake of breivity [2] Thus lakāra is said to denote the agent etc by the Sūtra P 3 4 69 [3] Nāgeśa also favours this view (Vide P L M P 138)

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1. Sthānivadādeśaḥ

2 Dyotakatārūpaṃ tibādiśaktiṃ tatsthānitvena kalpite lakāre Prakalpya Lakārāḥ Kartari Karmaṇi cānena vidhīyante (Vai Bhūṣā)

3 Laḥ Karmaṇi ca Bhāve cākarmakebhyaḥ (P 3 4 68)

According to the Logician the significatory power resides in the prototype 'L (lakāra) itself Replacements like Tip, Tas etc denote the meanings agent, object etc only by recalling (bringing to mind) the lakāra that they replace This argument is advanced to serve the purpose of brevity The assumption that the singificative capacity exists in each of the replacements leads to prolixity, whereas the assumption that exists in the concerned lakāra it self, is much simpler Thus the lakāra alone has denotative capacity and the replacements can convey meaing only by bringing it to the mind

But this argument of the Logician is not acceptable to the Grammarian Only that word which is actually uttered can be said to denote a meaning It is not logical to assume that a non-uttered grammatical prototype denotes the meaning The grammarian always has held the spoken language as of paramount importance The grammatical prototypes have reality, only within the confines of grammar Further the Bhasyakāra makes it very clear, commenting on the Sūtra P 1 1 68 [1] "Meaning is understood from a word actually uttered ' [2] One may argue of achieving brevity in so far as only the original lakāra has the denotative function instead of all the replacements individually Hence more brevity exists in assuming that the replacements denote meaning immediately upon being heard rather than assuming that they first recall the lakāra to mind and then through this lakāra one gets the knowledge of agent etc This process of Naiyaiyka is a round about and inconvinient one

Now as regards the denotation of the verbal affix, it is like this The sage Pnāini enjoins 'L' as verbal affix after the root, and Tin is the substitute in its place The Sutras enjoined in this respect are Lah Karmani ca Bhāve Cākrmakedhyah (P 3 4 69) Kartari krt (P 3 4 67) etc All those scholars accept these formulas but they differ in interpreting them So, speaking in a broad and general way, to the Logician, the import of the verbal affix is primarily

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1. P 1 1 68 Svam rūpam sabdasyā sabda samjnā
2 Sabdenoccāritena arthogamyate, (Ibid M B)

kṛti, to the Mīmāmsaka it is Bhāvanā which is different from the activity signified by the verbal root But to the Grammarian the Tin suffix signifies the substratum (agent or object) of activity or result denoted by the verbal root All the scholars belonging to the differant disciplines (i e the Logician, Mīmāmsaka and Grammarian) discussed all the pros and cons of the problem on hand in interpreting the various aphorisms to suit their own doctrines and tried to establish the supremacy of their own theories over the views of others

Therefore in the following pages we shall now discuss the arguments and counter arguments adduced by the scholars against their rival schools of thought

THE VIEW OF THE GRAMMARIAN—

The Grammarian, having established as stated in the previous chapter, the meaning of the Verbal root to be activity and fruit, now, holds that the Verbal affix signifies the substratum—substratum of the activity (i e the agent), or substratum of the fruit there of (i e the object) 1 Since result and action are denote by the Verbal root the substratum is fit to be the expressive sense of a word must be such as cannot be arrived at by any other means 2

The meanings of the Verbal root and the suffix agree with each other by the relation of the qualified to the qualifier in general. It is like this When the verb word is in active voice, the agent meaning of the suffix is an atrribute to the action signified by the Verbal root, and the object meaning is an attribute to the result And this result is an attribute of the action When the verb is in active

1 Phala vyāpārayor dhātur āsraye tu Tiṅah smṛtāh (Vai. Bhū Kārika 2)

Asraye-Vyāpārasraye phalasraye ca, phalavyāpārayoh dhātulabhyatwāt, āsraya mātramarthah, Ananya lābhyasa sabdārthatvāt (Vai Bhū P 5)

2 Ananyalabhyah Sabdārthah

voice, the number meaning of the affix is an attribute of agent—meaning signified by the Tin affix, but of the object when the verb is in passive construction As regards the Time meaning of the verbal suffix, it is always an attribute of the action Thus according to the grammarian a verbal suffix signifies substratum (agent or object) number, person, time and also upagraha The person meaning is an attribute of the agent or object when the sentence is in active or passive construction respectively. And the verbal import of the sentence, "Caitra cooks rice" (Caitrah tandulam pacati), as explained by the Grammarian, would be "action of the present time congenial to softening which (softening) resides in the rice not different from the object' and which action has one agent non-different from Caitra "[2]

Thus in the above sentence, the root 'Pac, expresses the action of 'cooking' The statement ',Viklittyanukūla etc." shows that the fruit ' Viklitti" is an attribute of the action expressed by the verbal root "Pac". "Caitra Kartikah Pākah" and Tandulabhinna Karmavittih" shows that the subject "Caitra" is an attribute of the action 'Pāka' and that the object "Tandula" is and attribute of ' Viklitti" (result) of the action Ekakartrkaḥ" shows that the number meaning expressed by the Verbal affix is an attribute of the subject Caitra. "Caitrābhinna eKa kartika and tandulābhinna karmavitti" show the non-differential relation subsisting between Caitra and the substratum of action etc. Thus the grammarian holds that a verbal affix signifies the substratum (Āsraya) i e Kartā or karman as the case may be

It may be observed here in the verb word, the substratum i. e the meaning of the suffix (Pratyaya), is an attribute of the action meaning of the root (Prakrti) As such, it should not be mistaken that it will result in contradicting the maxim ',when the

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1 Tinabhihitena Bhāvena Kālapuruṣopagrahā Vyajyante. (Bhāṣya on P,3 1 67)

2 Caitrābhinnaikakartikaḥ tandulābinna karmavitti viklityanukūla vartamānakāliko vyāpāraḥ

base and affix are conjointly uttered, then, of the meanings signified by the two, the sense (or the meaning) of the suffix should be predominent" 1 The grammarian is of the view that this rule does not apply in the case of verb words in view of the notion, "The predominent element in a verb words is action" 2

According to the Logician, however, the meaning signified by the potentiality of the suffix is activity (Kṛti), which is different from the action signified by the verbal root Similarly the Mīmāmsaka holds that Bhāvanā is the signified potentiality of the suffix, but not the substratum The grammarian argues that, if we are to accept the above contention, then naturally we cannot maintain the system of Person agreeing with the agent, etc The aphorisms "Yuṣmadyupapad Asmdyutta, seṣeprathamaḥ" lay down clerly that the agent or the object signified by tiṅ affix should be in the same substratum as the subject or the object concerned in the sentence But if the agent or the the object is not the expressed sense of the Verbal affix then the question of subsistence in the same substratum along with the agent or the object does not arise in all the three persons (1st, 2nd or 3rd person) Hence according to the governing aphorism "when not expressed" (Anabhihite), in sentences like Devadatta cooks (Devadattaḥ pacti) according to the Logician (or the Mīmāmsaka) the agent Devadatta has to take the instrumental case affix, since the agent meaning is not expressed by the verbal affix 3 and in sentences in the passive construction as "Pacyate Taṇḍulaḥ" and the like, the object rice (Taṇḍulaḥ) has to be in the accusative case, because, the object is not exprassed by the Verbal affix

The Logician explains the aphorism 'Anabhihite' as when the verbal affix does not express the number-meaning of the agent or the object, but the grammarian rejects such an explanation, because the number meaning is not expressed by the primary and secondary affixes and by compounds and as such sentences like

---

1 Prakṛti pratyayau sahārtham brūtastayoḥ pratyayārthasya pradhānyam (Bhā C P 79, and few lines)

2, Bhāvapradhānamākhyātam

3 Anabhihite (P.2 3 1,) and KartṛKaraṇayostṛtiyā (P 2 3 18)

"Devadattah pāckah" will not be rendered possible, and on the other hand sentences like "Devadattena pācakh" will have to be formed Consequently the agent not being expressed by the Nvu affix in the word 'pācaka', the agent Devadatta is to be expressed in the instrumental case And further if it is contended by the opponent that the agent is not expressed by the Verbal suffix then he has to admit that the primary suffixes like "Nvul" etc also do not express the agent, because both the verbal affix and the primary affix are the substitutes in the same sense in the place of the Lakāra it self There fore it will be rational to accept that the agent or the object is the signified potentiality of the verbal affix

Further the grammarian continues his arguments as follows The verbs "Pacati" and the like are found to agree with words such as "Devadatta" and the like which are used to specify the particular agent or object And this is possible only if we accept the sameness of the substratum between the two Sameness of substratum is possible only between two entities which are identical 1 Consequently, in the present instance, the necessary sameness of substratum could be obtained only if the verb word "pacati" in general denotes the agent Devadatta The argument that the agent is indicated by the verb "pacati" in accordance with the 'Akrtyadhikrana Nyaya', is not correct, because, the agent in the sentence "Devadattah pacati" cannot be indicated by the cooking (Pāka) which subsists in the rice In fact the cooking can indicate only the number singleness inhering in the rice, but not a thing that inheres in another substratum 2 Thus it becomes evident that the word "Pacati" and the like are denotative of the agent or the object. 3

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1 Tattu samānādhikāranyāt bhavati, samānādhikāranyam ca dvayorapyekavisayatve kalpyeta (Tan. Var P. 930,)

2 Tena yadi hi Devadattādayah sāmānyatah pacatisabdenābhihitah Tatastaih Samānādhikaranyam labhyate, laksanayā ākrtyārunādhikaranokta nyāyena bhavisyatiti cet na Tandulāstena pākena laksayitumasakyatvāt, Tatsamavetameva Dvyekatvādi laKs ayitum sakyate, nānya samavāyi (Tan Var Pa 930)

3 Tasmāt pacati sabdādirvācakah karti karmanoh (Tan Var P 963)

Further the fact that the Verbal affix denotes either an agent or an object can be established in another way For instance let us observe the word "pākaḥ" which is formed by adding the primary suffix 'ghan to the root Pac, Here the affix 'ghan' speaks of Bhāva and not of the agent or the object Hence in these cases the sameness of substratum (sāmānādhikaraṇya) cannot be brought about between pāka (cooking) and Devadatta etc ,[1] but in cases like "Devadattaḥ pacati" we can explain the sameness of substratum between pākakarta and Devadatta on the lines of the statement "Devadattaḥ Pācakaḥ" where the Nvul affix signifies the agent Thus the verbal affix denotes the agent or the object

Further, let us observe sentences like "Devadattaḥ pacati, pacato Devadatta yajnadattau pacanti Devadatta yajñadatta Vishnuguptāḥ" Here it is observed that the number in the word expressing the particular agent is exactly the same as that denoted by the verbal affix And we also note that a change in the number of the word expressive of the particular agent Devadatta etc ' causes, a simultaneous and identical change in the number expressed by the verbal affix in the word "pacati" and the like And further wherever we find such to be the case, we find the word to be actually denotative of the agent or the object as in the case of the words "Paktā" and the like, in connection of which also we have such usages as "Paktā Devadattaḥ Paktārau Devadatta yajnadattau, Paktāraḥ Devadatta Yajnadatta Visnuguptāḥ" So also in the case of passive sentences (karmaṇi), we find such usages as "Pacyate odanaḥ, Pacyate odanasākau, pakvan odanaḥ, etc [2] Thu from all the above illustrations, it becomes evident that the agent or the object is the signified potentiality of the verbal affix

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1 Yata ca kartṛkarma Vacanatvam nāsti tatrasāmanādhikaraṇyam adṛṣṭam yathā pākādiśabde (Tan Var P 930)

2 Tacchabdopātta tadbhūtasamkhyābhedānuvartanāt Tathaiva vācakatvam syāt dṛṣṭāntau tāvihāpica (Tan Var Slok 1)

The grammarian further argues that unless we accept th denotational capacity to the verbal affix in expressing the agen or the object, there would be nothing to justify the prohibition o affixes of instrumental case and the objective case after the word Devadatta and Odana in the sentences 'Pacati Devadattah' an 'pacyate odanah' respectively It is found that the rules of gramma lay down the prohibition of the nominative and the objectiv case endings after the words denoting the agent or the object i particular, in case this agent or the object is not denoted b other words, such as the verbal affix Thus the aphorisms Karma Dvitiyā, Karti karaṇa yosti tiyā, under the governing sutra "Anabh hite" can regulate the case affixes after the agent, object etc Thus, in as much as we find that these affixes are actually proh bited it is possible to account for such prohibition only by accep ting the rule that the verbal suffixes denote the agent or th object like the primary affixes

Futher if it is not accepted that Verbal affix signifies th agent or the object, it can not be explained how it (the suffix could denote a particular property of the agent or the object in th shape of number. To assert that the affix does not denote the agen etc , but denotes their property involves contradiction If as th Mimamsaka contends, the subject is secured by presumptio from Bhāvanā, then there is the contingency of the number meanin having to agree with the agent which is not an object of Sābdabo dha Consequently the number meaning which is expressed by th suffix has to qualify the expressed meaning "Bhāvanā" only i which case the change in number would have not been possibl because Bhāvanā is always single by nature (Ekākriyā) as in th case of sentences in impersonal usages Hence in order to ove come this awkward situation, we must admit that verbal affi signifies the meaning agent or object etc, And for this reaso also the verbal affix must be admitted as signifying the agent c the object

Similarly in order to justify the qualifying nature of th adjectives, as in instances "Śobhanah pacati' Śobhanah pacyate etc also we have to accept the denotating capacity to the Verba affix in the agent or object This becomes evident when we examin

the sentences "Śobhanaḥ Paktā" and "Śobhanaḥ pakvaḥ" and 'Śobhanam Āsyate" etc 1 Besides the meaning of the base, the number and gender of the adjective which are the expressed senses, qualify the number and gender of the agent which are expressed by the suffix in Paktā, Pakvaḥ etc , Therefore in the sentence "Śobhanaḥ pacati' the adjective "Śobhanaḥ" cannot qualify something which is not the expressed sense of the verbal affix Where such an agent is not expressed by the suffix as "Āsyate", the verbal affix in the impersonal mood denotes activity (Bhāva) denoted by the root' but not the agent or the object And hence its qualify is denoted by he indeclinable word "Śobhadam as in the instances Śobhanam pacati '

Thus from all the above observations, the grammarian asserts that the verbal affix denotes the Āśraya i, e the agent or the object etc

THE VERBAL SUFFIX-THE MĪMĀMSAKA SCHOOL

Of the two existing schools of the Mīmāmsa doctrine, first we will examine the views of the Bhātta School, as far as it concerns the meaning of the Verbal affix Even in this school different scholars expressed different views regarding the denotative potentiality of the verbal affix, and also tried to defend their own stand, but there is one thing in common to all of them, i e none of them accepts that the verbal affix signifies the agent or the object as propounded by the grammarian

Among such Mīmāmsa scholars Kumārilabhatta is the first and foremost person in refuting the grammarian The various arguments advanced by him to refute the views of grammarians can be summarised as under

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1 Viśeṣaṇaiśca sambandhāducyete kartṛkarmaṇī Na hyanuktasya sambandhaḥ svaguṇaiḥ pravakalpyate (Ibid P 965)

VIEWS OF KUMARILA

Kumarila opines that Bhāvanā is the signified potentiality of the Verbal suffix After all, the meaning of any word is that which is not secured from any other source And no other denoter is found to signify Bhāvanā than the verbal affix itself Especially the time and other meanings secured from the Verbal affix are not found to be in invariable concomittance with Bhāvanā and are found to exist even without Bhāvanā [1]

Further Bhāvanā cannot be presumed either by time or by the agent etc , denoted by the Verbal affix, nor can it be presumed through the meaning of the Verbal root, because if it can be so presumed' Bhāvanā has to become subsidiary to the agent meaning as contended by the grammarian Just as in the case of words formed by adding primary affixes after a verbal root, e g pācaka, and the like But as a matter of fact in strict adherence to the maxim "Bhāva pradhānamākhyātam" of the various meanings signified by the Ākhyāta (verbal affix) Bhāvanā is always cognised as the predominant element and hence we have to accept that Bhāvana is directly signified by the Verbal affix itself [2]

More over, of the meanings of the base and the affix, the affix-meaning should be more prominant That is the maxim [2] So in the present case, the important sense we get from a 'Verb word as a whole' is Bhāvanā Therefore this Bhāvanā must be accepted as being signified by the suffix, failing which it goes against the said maxim And then, the root and the affix are always found to appear in a definite order of sequence And the knowledge of Bhāvanā comes only after hearing the verbal affix in the verb word So this experience of ours also proves that Bhāvanā is the signified

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1 Bhāvanāyāstāvanna Śabdavyatiriktam pratyāyakam paśyāmah Tatra Kālādīnām vyabhicāritvāt sambhavantihi vināpi Bhāvanaya kāla samkhyādayah, (Tan Vār P.940)

2 Yadyapyanyad viveka kāranam nāsti tathāpi prādhānyam partyayārthe dharmam dṛstvā nūnamiyampratyayārtha ityavagamyate (Tan. Var. P 348, 647)

potentiality of the verbal affix [1] That is to say that there is an invariable concomittance between the verbal affix and Bhāvanā is cognised only when the verbal suffix is used And hence the theory i e "Bhāvanā is the expressed sense of the affix" is established

Another powerful argument to substantiate the mimamsaka theory is the very explanatory sentence of the meaning of the verb word For instance, the word 'Pacati' is explained as 'Pākam karoti' (He does cooking) The verb word has two constituent parts viz , the base 'Pac' and the suffix 'Ti' In the explanatory sentence also the meaning of the verbal base (root) which is to be accomplished is explained by the word 'Pāka' ending in an accusative case affix, and the meaning of the suffix 'Ti' is explained by the word 'Karoti' The sense that is conveyed by the word 'Karoti' is called 'Bhavanā' And therefore it is logical to accept this Bhāvanā as the one signified by the verbal affix, because it is a universal fact that the sense or import we get on hearing a particular word, is the meaning of that particular word itself

Now as regards the meaning the agent or the object unlike the other meanings (factors) of the Verbal affix, it is presumed by Bhāvanā, because Bhāvanā can not be accomplished without the agent Here the agent is cognised in a subdued form and hence can be accepted that the agent is presumed from the Bhavana, the denoted sense of the verbal affix. Of course it can be questioned as to how the agent Kāraka alone can be presumed by Bhāvanā, when there are other Kārakas also claiming to come up in its place. To this it is replied that the Kārakas other than the agent Kāraka are not found to be so concomittant with it, as the agent is This fact also strengthens the capability of Bhavanā to presume primarily the agent Hence it is proved that the agent is obtained from Bhāvanā either by presumption (arthāpatti) or by inference (Anumāna) [2]

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1 Tathā karma vatornityam prakṛti pratyayāmsayoh, pretyayasi-tivelāyam bhāvanātmā avagamyate (Tan Var P 348),

2 Yadi sasca guṇabhūtah karta atravaghmyate na ādisena vihā Bhāvanopapadyata iti arthāpatyā anumānena vā saktāgamayitum (Tan Var P,914,),

The Mīmāṃsaka continues to criticise the views of the grammarian in the following way — The very fact that number is related to the agent only, also goes to prove that the agent is presumed by Bhāvanā That is to say in instances like 'gacchet', we find that the number (meaning) is not secured by any other means of knowledge and as such it is to be accepted as the expressed sense of the suffix Number being a quality can not exist independently and hence its 'āsraya' as the agent or object has to be presumed But not Vice-versa It is very unfortunate that the grammarian could not understand the spirit of the teachings of their sages Pāṇini, Patañjali etc If we closely examine Pāṇini's style of aphorisms dealing with this subject, it will be evident that these aphorisms dealing with the verbal affixes are to be construed as forming a single sentence so that any incompatibility can be avoided by reading all these aphorisms as a single sentence So when we examine the whole set of the aphorisms dealing with the verbal affixes, from this view point, one thing becomes clear to us that whether the relationship between the words constituting the aphorisms mentioned in the said section is either by having the same locus or otherwise, the final purport is that the verbal affixes denote only the numbers oneness etc as qualified by the agent or object as the case may be This type of interpretation alone can avoid all the discrepencies and will be in keeping with the spirit of the section dealing with the verbal affixes Thus it becomes established that the agent or the object is the result of presumption but not of direct denotation 1 And further Mimāṃsaka always proves the potentiality of words or even sakti (capacity) with the help of presumption (Arthāpatti) only. This being the position, in the present case, this presumption is capable of being explained with the help of

1, Tasmād karturekatva ityevamādinā darśite kartṛkarma vsista ekatvādayah pratyayavācyeh śāstrnugataḥ. (Tan Vār P.926, 1 1 5-6)

Bhāvanā i e Bhāvanā cannot exist without an agent Hence the notion that the verbal affix denotes the agent, cannot be accepted but should be discarded [1]

The Mimāmsaka contends that the stand of the gramma rian can be set aside on another count also The agent or ob ject is not expressed by the Verbal affix The verbal affix deno tes Bhāvanā with which it is invariably concomittant And it i also an accepted fact that which denotes something with which another thing is invariably concomitant, can never denot this latter as seen in the instance of Simsupa. The word Sin supa being denotative of the class (Jāti) Simsupa is incapable o denoting the individual treehood (vyakti), the invariable conco mittant of the former Further, the verbal affix can not abandon its own denotable meaning Bhāvanā, just to express either th agent or object because these can be obtained even by other mean like Arthāpatti or Anumāna The agent or the object is cognise even without accepting a separate potentiality to it in the verba affix Further the agent or the object is a Kāraka just like an other Kāraka as instrument (karaṇa) etc The Mīmāmsaka find no logic in the argument of the grammarian that the subjec kāraka alone is expressed to the exclusion of all oth Kārakas like the instrumental Kāraka Now let us take the word Āsyate Here according to the grammarian also, the verbal suffix do es not denote either an object or an agent. The verbal affix foun in Pacati or Yajate" is just like the one found in Āsyate An there is no logic in accepting the affix to denote Bhāvanā at on place and not to denote it at another place If we are to accep the grammarian's theory, it would contradict all the above ment oned arguments based on inference Hence the Verbal affix car not denote the agent or object [2]

Kumārila now probes into the very roots of the argumen of the grammarian i e the sameness of substratum of the ager or the object and Vyapāra, in Caitra. The Mīmāmsaka question

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1 Tatra yadivācaka saktyā astitvamanumīyeta tatah pūrvoktei ārthāpttibhangena sarvapramāna anupapatteḥ anupalabdhi virodhah (Tan Vār P 932,).

2 Anumānavirodhasca (Tan. Vār P.932,)

whether such co-existence is directly denoted by the verbal affix or got through secondary signification 1

Neither the Mīmāṃsaka nor the Grammarian can admit that such a co-existence is directly denoted by the verbal affix (śrautam) To the Mīmāṃsaka a verbal affix denots Bhāvanā and to the Grammarian it is śakti (Potency) as such there is no possibility of direct denotation of co-existence, because one is vyāpāra and the other is a dravya

For the grammarian a Kāraka is nothing more than a capacity and as such we do not find capacity (śakti) being expressed by the words Devadatta and the like, since they are found to denote substance (Dravya) Consequently, if the affix is accepted as denoting the Kāraka, it must be admitted that it would denote it only in the form of capacity and never in the form of a substance, because the substance is not the Kāraka Hence in accordance with the law pertaining to the Ākṛtyadhikaraṇa, it must be admitted even by the grammarian, that capacity alone is the meaning signified by the affix but not the substance 2 Thus, no co-existence with the word denotative of substance would ever be possible Nor, do we find any word mentioned along with verb word, that could denote potency with which (word) there could be a directly denoted coexistence Such a word denoting potency could only be one that ends in a Kāraka case affix, but in instances like "Caitraḥ pacati " there is no word found to be ending in a case affix Thus the Mīmāṃsaka establishes that the directly denoted coexistence is not possible either for him or for the grammarian 3

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1 Tathāsāmānādhikaraṇyam śrautaṃ lākṣaṇikaṃ ca heturucyate (ibid 933),

2 Note Even if the kāraka be accepted to be a dravya, śakti has to be accepted as the attributive to it Since without śakti, Vyāpāra is impossible, Hence according to Ākṛtyadhikaraṇa only śakti is signified and this śakti can not agree by the relation of identity with a word which signifies dravya Caitra etc

3 Tataścāvasthitam sti sāmānādhikaraṇyasyobhayorapoasiddhatvaṃ' (Op Cit)

Now if we come to the second possibility i e the coexistence of one that is got through the secondary signification (lakṣaṇā) even in instances like the "boy is a lion" (Simho māṇavakah) you have to accept the coexistence of boy-hood and lion-hood in the boy inspite of the fact there exists no such idea of the expresser and the expressed (vācya-vācakabhāva And such an acceptance leads to the fallacy of Anaikāntikatā 1 Thus it is established that co-existence can not be proved with the help of secondary signification

Now as regards the citations of Paktā, Pācakah etc, quoted by the grammarian to prove his stand that the verbal affixes have denotational potency in the agent etc tha Mīmamsaka says such an argument is not valid because words like Pacati etc do not purport to signify sakti but because they agree with some other sakti, they should be construed as signifying the saktimat Thus all the fallacies pointed out in the first few arguments of the grammarian can be extended even to the other arguments For instance contrary to the contention of the grammarian we say that the verbal affix can not express the number of the agent It is like this Numbers always belong to substances but not to capacities The grammarian admits it And as such numbers do not belong to Kārakas like the agent etc which are of the form of capacities 2 And if we are to hold that the verbal affix denotes the substance whose number it would express, then there would be a conflict of its not agreeing with a dravya as no grammarian accepts that the verbal affix is denotative of a substance 3

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1 Atha lakṣaṇayā sāmānādhikaraṇyamaviseṣitam vā hetuh tatah simho māṇavaa ityādiṣvantareṇāpi vācyavācakabhāvam sāmānādhikaraṇyam dṛṣṭamityanaikāntikatā (Op Cit P 934)

2 Saktih Sādhanam (M B)

3 Tadgata samkhyopadānamapi sakti-gatatvena tavadasidham Nahi kascidvaiyākrṇah ākhyātasya dravya vacanatvamicchati (Tan Vā P 969)

Now as regards the contention of the grammarian that the Anabhihitādhikārasūtra itself is a proof to establish that the verbal affix denotes agent or object, the Mīmāmsaka replies as follows - The contention that "other designations like karaṇa, karma are prevented since the verbal affix denotes the agent etc, is not a sound argument Here it is to be noted clearly that, if the prevention meant by the grammarian, be the prevention of all other kāraKa (case) affixes, then the argument is subject to the falacy of the unestablished (asiddha) in the given example "Devadattaḥ pacati" the nominative affix too is a denoted kāraka case affix [1]

Further if the grammarian opines that the Nominative and other case affixes drop on account of their being denoted by the verbal affix etc then such dropping of case affixes is found even if the subject etc is not denoted by others, as in instances governed by the Sutra "Ubhayaprāptau karmaṇi" Here in sentences like "Paśya Sītāyāḥ haraṇam Rāvaṇena" the genitive pertaining to the object does not denote the agent but it prevents the sixth case affix from the agent [2] Thus the mere prevention of kāraka affixes laid down by the grammatical rules cannot substantiate the contention that a verbal affix denotes agent or object

Now to the argument of the grammarian that in instances like 'Devadattaḥ, Pacati and Pacyate odanaḥ Devadattena', the instrumental and accusative case affixes would have been appended after the words Devadatta and Odana respectively according to the governing aphorism 'Anabhihite" were not ths agent and object denoted by the Verbal affix, Kumarila replies that such an argument is not valid It is clearly to be noted that enjoining a Kāraka affix is to bring the number meaning and the Kāraka meaning This being the position, in the present examples "Devadattaḥ

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1 Yadapi kāraka vibhakteḥ pratibandhanam, tadāpi yadi tāvat sarvam syat tatosiddham, prathamāyā api anabhihitakārakavibhaktitvat (Tan Var, P 935)

2 Ubhayapraptau karmaṇi (ibid)

pacati etc "the agent is found to be secured by Bhāvanā denoted by the verbal affix and the number meaning is secured by the verbal affix Then what is left unexpressed? and what is that Which compells the grammarian to create another denotative potentiality in the verbal affix? Since the agent and the number are expressed directly or indirectly by the Verbal affix, the words Devadatta and Odana cannot take other case affixes [1]

As for the argument of the grammarian that the verbal affix has to denote the agent or object since it (the verbal affix) signifies their particular qualification (number), the Mīmāṃsaka points out such an argument suffers from the fallacy of Anaikāntikatva as is clear from the instance of 'Śimsupā' [2] The word simsupā is not denotative of the class, tree, earthly substance etc though it is found to denote a particular phase of these, the class simsupā And just as in this case (1) we find that the denotation of the particular is not opposed to the non-denotation of the general. (2) In the case of the Eye also we find that its non-perceptionness of impermanence, is not opposed to its perception of colour (3) Even according to the grammarian, the Verbal affix does not denote the generic element of 'substance' but denotes agenthood a particular phase of it in the form of the agent So in the same way even without the denotation of the agent there would be nothing incongruous in expressing the number without expressing the Agent

Further the argument of the grammarian that the expressed qualities cannot agree with the presumed individuals and therefore it is obligatory that the agent or object also should be expressed, is not tenable [3] This can be answered following the

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1 Saṃkhyāyaṃ kārakevā dhirvibhaktyāḥ । pravartate Ubhayam cātra tatsiddham Bhāvanā tiṅvibhaktikaḥ (Tan Vār P 935) and also last but two lines

2 Yattu tadviśeṣābhidhānāditi tatsimsupā sabdaiḥ anaikāntikam (Tan Vār P 940.)

3 Yadapi gamyamānasya viśeṣaṇa sambandhaḥ nāsti, atastat sambandha darśanā dabhidhānamiti (ibid)

Ākṛtyadhikaraṇa Nyāya or Aruṇādhikaraṇa Nyāya In a statement like "Aruṇaya ekahaayanyā pingākṣyā somam krīṇāti", we find that the qualification Āruṇayā (Redness) etc agrees with the agent presumed by the Tiṅ suffix (of course through the medium of the cow).

Further the grammarian's argument suffers from the fallacy of Anaikāntikatva Let us examine the sentence "Madhurarasaḥ snigdho sito guruśca" Here the madhurarasa (Sweet taste), being a property, does not agree with other properties such as sneha and the rest But all these properties exist in that particular object presumed by the phrase Madhurarasa etc.. And certainly nobody would admit the word 'Rasa' is denotative of the substance directly Similarly we can show another example where expressed meanings agree with presumed objects For instance in the sentence "Aśvasahasreṇa muṣitam nagaram" (The city was robbed by a thousand horses), the action of robbing is connected with the raiders presumed by the word horses (Aśva) 1 Thus Kumarila says all the arguments of the Grammarian are fallacious

Now the opponent may question why in the case of verbs like Asti, Bhavati Jāyate etc no Bhāvana is cognised from the verbal affix and as such there can be concomittance between the suffix and the Bhāvanā, hence it cannot be admitted that Bhāvanā is cognised only after hearing the suffix and consequently the affix cannot denote Bhāvanā

To this objection Kumārila replies that the objection holds good even to the grammarian who argues that Bhāvanā is denoted by the root or the root meaning 2 So what the Mīmāmsaka argues is that, whenever Bhāvanā is cognised, it is always expres-

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1 Tathā aśvasahasreṇa nagaram muṣitamiti gamyamānānāmeva sādinām moṣakriyāsambandhaḥ (Tan. Vār. ibid P.940)

2 Yattvastyādiparaḥ pratyayopi bhāvanām jahātīti tulyam Dhātu samudāyapakṣayorapyetat, Sarvathā Yatra pratīyate tatra tāvat pratyayārthatvam niściyate (Tan Vār. P.381.)

sed by the affix and where it is not cognised there is no scope for the discussion as to by what it is expressed.[1]

Though Kumārila gives the above reply he does not seem to be satisfied with it probably because in the case of Asti, Bhavati etc he has to provide for an exception So now he offers an alternative argument to the opponent In the case of the words, Asti and the like, also, there exists Bhāvanā in the form of accomplishing the agent himself who is still in an unaccomplished state And this Bhāvanā cannot be distinctly cognised apart from the Agent.[2] Though there is no functioning of the agent that can be specially cognised, the element of Bhāvanā can be cognised due to the very innate potentiality of the affix itself.. This Bhāvanā has evidently generic nature present in both the birth of the individual (the former being Siddha) and the latter being sādhya

The Mimāmsaka admits frankly the fact that Bhāvanā is never cognised apart from the signification of the verbal root, but he humbly argues that the Bhāvanā proper that is cognised in a general form covering many particular actions, is something entirely different from the action denoted by the root [3] That is to say, in all the particular actions viz laying the vessel upon the fire, fanning etc, a common generic action in the form of Karoti (does) is always perceived And among all these actions the mere action of "cessation from inactivity", the mere 'moving' towards the performance of an action is what is meant by the word Bhāvana [4] And all the particular actions which inhere

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1 Sarvathā yatra pratīyate tatra tāvat pratyayārthatvam niscīyate Anyatratvayam vicāra eva nāsti (Tan Var P 281)

2 Astyādāvapi kartramse bhāvye asthyeva hi Bhāvanā, Anyatrāsesabhāvāttu na tathā sa prakāsate (ibid)

3. Dhātvarthātirekena yadyapyesa na labhyate, tathāpi sarvasāmānya rūpena anyāvagamyate. (Tan Vār P 382)

2. Tatra yādrusī pracyutimātrena parispanda rūpam nirūpyate sā bhāvanā (ibid P.382)

in the object as well as in the agent, become related to it (bh. vanā) either in the form of the instrument or in that of Process.

The Mīmāṃsaka here cautions us not to mistake in th above case that Bhāvanā is nothing more "than a generic deno tation of the verbal root' No doubt Bhāvanā appears in generic form but always in the form of "Something to be accomp lished and never in the particular forms of the sacrifice etc Yāga etc also are called particular Bhāvanās because of the attributiveness in the form of Karaṇatva etc

Further, strictly speaking the Bhāvanā, signified by th verbal affix cannot be expressed in the same form by an other word This Bhāvanā signified by the Verbal affix is entire free from any element of gender and number. Thus the Bhaṭṭa mīmāṃsaka in genral and Kumārila in particular asserts that th Verbal affix has potency in denoting Bhāvanā but not the agen or object which (in his view) can be had through presumption

MAṆḌANA MIŚRA —

Maṇḍana Miśra, a great Mīmāṃsaka, contrary to every othe one, pursues an altogether different line dealing with the meanin of the Verbal affix He says that "The activity, like blowing th pipe etc, in the form of activityhood, congenial to the fulfilmen of the result is the meaning of the Verbal affix", and the resu is the meaning of the root He is so unfortunate that the theor propounded by him has been severely criticised by the scholar belonging to every school or discipline His views in detail hav already been mentioned while discussing the meaning of th Verbal Root, as it is related to it (the meaning of the Verbal root

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1 Anyadevahi Bhāgadau sāmānyaṃ kāraṇātmakam
Anyacca Bhāvanā nāma sādhyatvena vyavasthitam
(ibd P 383).

PĀRTHASĀRATHI MISRA'S VIEW :—

Kumārila did not specify whether Bhāvanā exists in the form of activity in general as denoted by 'Karoti' or in the form of "effort" (Yatna) as denoted by the word 'Yatate' So now Pārthasārathi Misra, an ardent follower of the Bhātta Mimāmsa school and the author of the Sastradipikā takes the responsibility of determining the character of this Bhāvanā, whether it is of the form of activity in general as denoted by 'Karoti' or 'Yatna' (effort) as expressed by 'Yatate'

According to this scholar the verbal affix denotes "activity in the form of generality" congenial to the fulfilment of the result which is called Bhāvanā1 and is denoted by the verbal affix He is of the firm opinion that there is nothing as Bhāvanā over and above the meaning of the verbal root, but it is only a variation of the meaning of the verbal root. He analyses action, the meaning of the verbal root, as having two aspects in it, one is peculiar to the verbal root itself denoted by it as not having any activity in the accomplished form The other is that which is found commonly in all the verbal roots We can cognise it in its form from the sentence "He does" (Sah karoti) It is in the form of accomplishment of something Now let us observe the sentences, 'He shakes, He sacrifices, He speaks etc when we put the question Kim karoti, to each of these the answer is shakes, sacrifices etc Now "Karoti" expresses an action and so the question 'kim karoti' also expects an action in reply And all the specific actions have in them a type of generic action That is why when we put the question in terms of action in general, the reply "pacati" etc, speak of action in particular, not devoid of action in general And this action in general is to be called Bhāvanā and is denoted by the verbal affix Thus it is cognised from the cognition of the verb (he) 'does'

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1 Aparam tu sarvadhātvarthānuyāyi karotipratyaya vedyam Ākhyākriyātmakam sādhyasvabhāvam anyotpādānukūlātmakam Ākhyātābhidheyam .Tadeva bhavituh prayojakavyāpāro Bhāvanetyucyate" (Sas. Dip P 199).

Now the meaning of the verb 'karoti' is not effort (yatna) but activity (vyāpāra) only Otherwise even the verb 'karoti' would become intransitive like the verb 'Yatate' Such a meaning i e a generic action is accepted as the denoted sense of the verbal affix, because it is cognised in the presence of the verbal affix and it is not cognised in the absence of the verbal affix as in instances like 'Pāka' The activity, in particular actions like yāga etc, denoted by the verbal roots, gets syntactically connected with the meaning Bhāvanā denoted by the verbal affix, by the relation of karaṇa or karma according to the desire (Vivakṣa) of the speaker, taking the latter as objectness (Karmatva) as is seen in the instances 'Pākam karoti' and yagena svargam bhāvayati and the like The expressed sense of the affix is in the form of generality and when the question of particularity comes it is supplied through another means (i e root) but not by the verbal affix 1

Pārthasārathi opines that the determinant of Bhāvanā is Vyāpāratva in general but not Yatnatva If we accept that Bhāvanā is of the form of Yatna as denoted by the Verb Yatate and also as the activity in general as denoted by the verb'Karoti' then the roots Kṛ and Yat' become synonymous So much so the root Kṛ is also to be reckoned as intransitive like 'Yat', but in fact the root Kṛ is transitive as it always speaks of something to be brought into existence Further the root Kṛ always has the expectancy of an object And Bhavana has always an expectancy of the object, in the form of the activity, denoted by the Verbal root That is why even in intransitive verbs like 'Śete Patati etc' we have Bhavanā denoted by the verb karoti as 'Swapam karoti, etc

Thus Pārthasarathi Miśra concludes that the activity in general is the determinant of the Bhavanā by being its theme and this Bhāvana is always denoted by the verbal affix only

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1 Tasyāpi vyāpārasya viśeṣarūpam prāmānāntareṇa vedyam nā akhyātena (Śās. Dīp P 199,)

THE VIEW OF KHANDADEVA —

So far we have observed that the Mīmāṁsaka arguing against the Grammarian, takes it for granted that there exists something called Bhāvanā, denoted by the verbal affix Now let us examine what actually is meant by Bhāvanā and the validity in accepting it, its nature and character These aspects of Bhāvanā are lucidly explained by Khaṇḍadeva in his Mīmāṁsā Kaustubham

According to the Grammarian the meanings of the root are the result (Phala) and activity congenial to it (Tadanukūla vyāpāra) Khaṇḍadeva raises a question as to what is meant by congeniality? Does it mean mere producitvity (janakatvamātram) or engagement in general (Prayojakatvasādhāraṇam vā) 1 Evidently it is not the former because even after the direct activity ceases, usages like 'he cooks' are rendered possible Effort etc exist in ones self, which effort produces the particular activity in the body which (activity) in its turn produces the particular result The nature of productivity exists even after the activity ceases It may not be urged that the word cooks' does not include that part of the meaning also because it is not experienced For, we explain the word 'cooks' as Pāke Yatate and hence Yatna is also included in the meaning of the verb word

By not accepting the 'congeniality to produce the result' as the determinant of the denoted mean'ng in the case of the word "cooks" and accepting efforthood and the nature of heating from underneath etc, by themselves as the determinant of the denoted meaning, if it is to be maintained that only those activities alone which are responsible for cooking, constitute the denoted meaning, and as such there is no overlapping, then the objector has to explain how the word Pacati' is explained as 'Pake yatate' where 'Yatna' is separately spoken of from Paka,

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1 Mīmāṁskāaustubham P 16, 2nd para

and also he has to explain how yatna etc are not included in the meaning of the 'pac [1]

It may be argued by the opponent (Grammarian) that, in the explanatory sentence 'Pake Yatate' the root where conjointly uttered with Kṛt suffixes like Ghañ etc denotes merely the result part and so the activity part is explained by the word Yatate' etc But this argument lands us in many undesirable consequences The one that we have to accept that the activity denoted by the concerned causal aggregate (Sāmagri) and the conjoint utterance of Ghañ etc, is an impediment to denote activity, Secondly if Śakti is accepted in activity when the root is conjointly uttered with Tip, then, not only is there prolixity in the determinent of the denoter-hood, but also the acceptance of two separate cause-effect relations Thirdly there is the contingency of the root appended with Ghañ etc not denoting Vyapara, which is in common experience

If, on the other hand, the grammarian argues that then the activity of the karaka is intended to be expressed by the root 'Pac' and hence there is no intention to speak of the other meaning, effort etc and hence it is separately expressed in the statement 'Pake Yatate', the Mimamsaka rejoinds that in the explanatory sentence there is absolute necessity to accept the presence of 'effort' in the part of the Agent Otherwise the word denoting the agent, cannot claim the nominative case affix because he is not the substratum of the activity denoted by the root Nor can it be stated that some other activity in the agent is desired to be expresssed by the word 'Yatate', since in that case the explanatory sentence 'Pake yatate' itself will not be rendered possible So from all these points the opponent has to accept that there exists in the verb word something in the form of effort etc different from and independent of the activity expressed by the root And that is called Bhavanā Since the Verbal root denotes activity

1 Evam Tarhi pacati = Pāke yatate, Pākam bhāvayati ityādivivaraṇāt yatnādīnām pākāt pṛthakkaraṇena yatnādīnām pacau samgrahānupapatteh (ibid P 17)

congenial to produce the result, one has to accept this Bhāvanā from which the said activity is produced This Bhāvanā which the root fails to denote is denoted by the verbal affix

According to Khaṇḍa Deva effort-hood (Yatnatvam) alone is fit to be the determinent of the potentiality of the Tin affix Hs does not accept the theory of Parthasarathi Misra According to Khaṇḍa Deva there is no single factor simple in nature worth to be the determinant of the meaning of the verbal affix because different verbs denote different activities and results The explanatory sentence of Pacati is also formed to be Pāke yatate or Pākam karoti Taking all these factors into account it is prudent to accept (Yatnatva) effort-hood alone as the determinant of the potentiality of the affix [1] Further the argument that karoti i e the root Kṛ does not denote 'yatna' (effort) is also not correct. For instance when a man is suffering from gout (vātaroga) there may be usages like 'Naham spandām karomi kintu vātarogeṇa mama dehasspandate' (I am not moving but my body moves (shivers) due to gout), from which it is evident that root karoti has the meaning of effort Further it is parsimonious to admit that effort-hood is the determinant of denotative meaning-hood Therefore, consequently, usages like Ratho gamanam karoti etc are explained by taking recourse to the secondary signification for the root Kṛ in the meaning 'congenial to movement'

We have observed Pārthasārathi arguing that if the root 'Kṛ' denotes 'effort' then it becomes intransitive becaus the root 'Yat' denoting effort is an intransitive root So with the same 'effort', being denoted by both the roots, they become synonymous and hence the root Kṛ becomes intransitive To this Khaṇḍa Deva replies 'it is not so' It is an accepted fact that if the activity and the result denoted by the root subsist in the same substratum then the root becomes intransitive, otherwise transitive only As

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1 Vastutastu tattatphalabhedena, tad vyāpārabhedena ca anugatika laghubhūtasakyatāvachedakābhāvāt, Pacati pāke yatate, Pākam karoti ityādivivaraṇācca ākhyātasya yatnatvameva sakyatāvachedakam (Bhā Raḥ p 61)

regards the meaning of the root 'Yat', the result is the activity subsisting in Caitra and yatna concerned subsists in (him) the same substratum Hence it is intransitive But in the case of the root 'Kr' the result is in the form of production (utpatti) which cannot subsist in the same substratum along with activity meaning It is due to this peculiar nature of the particular roots, they become transitive or intransitive So it does not matter even if we admit that the root 'Kr' denotes effort [1]

Strictly speaking, a root is said to be transitive when it has the definite expectancy of an object Where such an expectancy is absent, the root is said to be intransitive [2] (Of course the grammarian does not accept it [3]) Here the expectancy is the inherent quality of the root word (Root) itself, That is why in certain instances there may be an expectancy of the object and in certain cases it is not When we say karoti' the expectancy is kim karoti? This expectancy can be satisfied by the supply of the proper object word ghatam, hence the root 'Kr' is a transitive root The form of the word denoting the object also should be 'ghatam' (Ghata-Am) with Am in its own form 'Am' (objective case affix concerned) but not its meaning e g Ghta karmatvam karoti does not mean ghatam karoti' though the affix 'am' may signify the meaning karmatva[4] Thus the root Kr does have the expectancy because we donot put the question 'kim yatate' but 'Kasmin yatate'. In the case of the roots 'Pac' and the like, though originally transitive by nature, if the speaker does not want to treat it as transitive by mentioning the object, it is treated as intransitive Similarly it is found that certain roots originally intransitive, are

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1 Phala vyaparayoh samanadhikaranye akarmakatvam, Utpatyanukūla vyaparah kṛñarthah Phalavyaparayoh vyadhikaranatve dhatoh sakarmakatvam.

2 Vastutastu , avivakṣā viraha viśiṣṭa karmakānkṣā dhātutvaṁ sakarmakatvam, tadabhāvaśca akarmakatvamityevam kaustubhoktalakṣanam yuktam (Bhā Rah. P 62,).

3. For details see First Part Chapter 3-7

4 This is what is designated swarūpa yogyatā for the affix.

treated as transitive, for example, the root 'Ās' when spoken with the words denoting time etc are treated as transitive as in 'Māsamāste, Caitreṇa āsyate māsaḥ' and the like

Therefore inspite of the fact the root Kṛ denotes yatna it does not become intransitive it is not dependent on the mere meaning of the root Hence the affix which is explained in terms of 'Karoti' also denotes Yatna' only but not activity in general[1] Of course in instances, like 'the car goes, he knows, desires, etc where 'Yatna' cannot be explained as the meaning of the suffix, we take recourse to secondary signification in activity in general,[2] or in substratumness as the case may be

THE VIEW OF PRABHĀKHRA —

The Prabhākara takes an altogether different stand As regards the denotation of the Verbal root he admits that a root denotes both the result and the activity congenial to it. He is also of the view that there exists nothing specially as Bhavanā either in the form of activity in general or 'yatna' to be denoted by the affix All this is included in the activity part of the meaning denoted by the root Thus he agrees with the grammarian But as regards the denotation of the verbal affix is concerned, he is of the opinion that where the sentence is an injunctive one there only the Tiṅ suffix denotes Bhavanā and in all other cases, he states, that the verbal affix denotes only the number meaning and the Tense meaning[3] Thus from the Tin suffix in pacati' we understand that the activity is of the present tense, and its agent is a single person (Vartamāna Kālikah Ekakartṛkah vyāparah)

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1 Ato yatnārthakatvepi karoteh sakarmakatva akṣateḥ tena vivriyamāṇa ākhyātasyāpi yatnārthakatvam (ibid Bhā Rah P 63 Para 3)

2 Yatra yatnasya bādah tatra anukūla vyāpārasya āsrayatasya vā Lakṣaneti draṣṭavyam (ibid P 63)

1 Nanu kṛtyadikam ākyatasyārthaḥ kintu kalah saṃkhyā ca; Prakārāntaralabhyatvat (Sab Śak Pra P 399).

In as much as it is concerned with the Agent or Object, the Prabhakāra joins hands with the Bhatta Mīmāṃsaka, to the extent that the agent or object is obtained by presumption (Ākṣepa) Therefore what is left to be accounted for is the number and tense only So the Prabhakara advocates that the Verbal affix denotes this number meaning and the tense (Past present etc) because this much only is not secured from any other source [1]

Further, non-acceptance of the Bhāvana as the denoted sense of the verbal affixes' in any way does not obstruct usage And the acceptance of the number meaning and tense alone as the denoted senses of the verbal affix, does not result in any wrong usage And if it so urged that without yatna, no activity is possible it can be explained as secured with the help of presumption from the meaning denoted by the verbal root [2]

Now as regards the practice of putting a question with 'karoti a word which denotes activity in general, and getting a reply with a word like 'Pakam' (karoti) does not have way to establish the denotation of activity or Bhavanā by the verbal affix As a matter of fact the question 'Kim karoti' is intended to know the particular type of the action one does Because no one can be without any action at any moment Hence the intention of the person who puts the question 'Kim karoti" is just to enquire into that particular action of the person Therefore there is no possibility of denoting action of the form Does (karoti) by the verbal affixes which action is different from that denoted by the root [3] Now the question raised by the opponent is like this-'the question and answer' is possible where the action or effort lies in human beings or animals, because they can perform many activities But we find in sentences like 'Ratho gacchati' also this type of questioning and getting the answer Therefore the affix

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1 Vide Pra Pancika P 425 and also Tar Tan P 74

2 Pacati ityatra yatnadhistu dhatvarthena akṣepadityahuh, (Tar Tan Part 3 p 75)

3 Tathā ca na sidhyati dhatvarthatirikta karotyarthavacanata akhyātānam (Pra Pan P 425) Edn 1962

denotes action But the Prabhākara asserts such type of ques-
tion itself is irregular [1]

Now summarising the entire discussion on the denotation of the verbal affix in accordance with the Mimāmsakas we arrive at the following observations

1 Ma ana opines that the activity congenial to the production of the specific result as signified by the verbal root, is the denoted sense of the verbal affix

2 Prabhakara Mimāmsakas accept only the number meaning and the tense meaning but not Bhāvanā as the denoted potentialities of the verbal affix For the Bhavanā is expressed by the Ti affix in the case of injunctive sentences only

3 The Bhattam māmsakas in general argue that there exists some activity called Bhāvana, different from that which is denoted by the verbal root, and this Bhāvanā besides number meaning and tense, is the denoted sense of the verbal affix

4 P rthasāratni Misra a Bhatta Mīmamsaka, argues that the act vity in the form of generality alone is fit to be accepted as the denotation of the Verbal affix

5 Pra adeva says that this Bhāvanā is of the form of Yatna and its determinant is effort-hood (Yatnatva), but not activity in the form of generality

Thus all these scholars except Mandana Misra unanimously agree on the point that there exists something called Bhāvanā in the form of either activity or effort and it is the denoted potentiality of the verbal affix, with the exception of the Prabhakara as detailed above

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1 Gacchat ti cottare gamanātirikta vyāpārābhāvāt anupapattireva syāt (ibid).

Refutation of the Mīmāmsaka Theory —

The Grammarian does not accept this theory of the Mīmāmsaka They criticise this theory severally Now let us examine their arguments in this regard

If it is argued by the Mīmāmsaka that the agent is somehow presumed by Bhāvanā denoted by the Verbal affix, we have to say such an argument does not pave way in establishing the arrangement for forms expressive of different persons (Abhidhāna vyavasthā)

In the case of the passive construction the suffix denotes only the result, but not Bhāvanā And if it is argued that Bhāvanā is expressed here also, then according to the Mīmāmsaka since the agent is obtained by presumption, the word denoting agent cannot take the instrumental case Hence wrong usages like "Caitraḥ Taṇḍulaḥ Pacyate ' insted of Caitreṇa Taṇḍulaḥ pacyate will result Otherwise it is to be admitted that the verbal affix in the active construction denotes Bhāvanā and in the passive construction denotes the fruit [1]

And if the Mīmaaṁsaka fears that if Bhāvanā is presumed by the agent or by the root meaning, it could be cognised only in a subdued form and may lose its predominace in the verbal import The grammarian assures that there would not be such contingency There is no impedement for the meaning got through the means of presumption to be the predominant factor - Otherwise if the Mīmāṁsaka argues that only the expressed sense will have the predominance over that of which is obtained through presumption, then all his efforts made in the Ākṛtyadhikaraṇa to establish the universal as the meaning of the nominal

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1 Vai. Bhū P 11.

2 Ākṣepa lahyasyapi pradhānyena bhāne bādhakābhāvāt. (Vai Bhū P 11)

base will go in vain[1] Here the idea is like this In the parlance of Mimamsaka the nominal base expresses the universal (Ākṛti or Jati) i e words like Cow, Horse, etc denotes cowness, corseness etc universals but not the individual But when we use the sentences like 'Bring the cow, "Take the horse" we cannot bring cowness or horseness So the Mīmāmsaka accepts that the individual is obtained through presumption Thus the expressed sense is the universal, but the predominace is only to the individual which is obtained through presumption[2]

As for the argument of the Mimamsaka in the csse of the primary affixes, the denotation of the agent by these affixes is enjoined by a special aphorism "kartari kṛt , so only in those cases Bhavanā is got through presumption, but in the case of the Tin suffixes there is no such an aphorism specifically enjoinng the denotation of the substratum by these affixes hence there is nothing to prevent us from accepting Bhāvana as the expressed sense of the suffix and the agent through presmption, the grammarian replies as follows Even in the case of the affixes Tin and the like, there is a specific aphorism 'Laḥ karmaṇi ca bhāve cākarmakebhyaḥ' which enjoins the lakāras(Tin affixes, Śatṛ Śānac etc) only in the sence of the agent etc Of course the word 'in the sense of agent (Kartari) is supplied into the aphorism from the previous aphorism 'Kartari Kṛt' Such being the case, we find no logic in discriminating between the kṛt and Tin affixes on this point, because in both the cases the maxim that ' the expressive sense of the word must be such as cannot be arrived at by any other means" applies equally Otherwise the Mimamsaka suffers from the fault of partial acceptance (Arthajaratiyatā)

Further Nāgesa question the validity of accepting Bhāvana as the denoted meaning of the verbal affixes and accepting the

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1 Vācyena kartrā lakshita bhāvānāyā api prādhānyopapattehi anyatha vyakterapi vacyatvapattau akṛtyadhikaraṇocchedaḥ L M (NBP) (p 38)

2 Detailed discussion can be had in Ākṛtyadhikaraṇa of Purvamimāmsa (Sutras 3-1-6)

voice, the number meaning of the affix is an attribute of agent—meaning signified by the Tin affix, but of the object when the verb is in passive construction As regards the Time meaning of the verbal suffix, it is always an attribute of the action Thus according to the grammarian a verbal suffix signifies substratum (agent or object) number, person, time and also upagraha The person meaning is an attribute of the agent or object when the sentence is in active or passive construction respectively. And the verbal import of the sentence, "Caitra cooks rice" (Caitrah tandulam pacati), as explained by the Grammarian, would be "action of the present time congenial to softening which (softening) resides in the rice not different from the object' and which action has one agent non-different from Caitra "[2]

Thus in the above sentence, the root 'Pac, expresses the action of 'cooking' The statement ',Viklittyanukūla etc." shows that the fruit ' Viklitti" is an attribute of the action expressed by the verbal root "Pac". "Caitra Kartikah Pākah" and Tandulabhinna Karmavittih" shows that the subject "Caitra" is an attribute of the action 'Pāka' and that the object "Tandula" is and attribute of ' Viklitti" (result) of the action Ekakartrkaḥ" shows that the number meaning expressed by the Verbal affix is an attribute of the subject Caitra. "Caitrābhinna eKa kartika and tandulābhinna karmavitti" show the non-differential relation subsisting between Caitra and the substratum of action etc. Thus the grammarian holds that a verbal affix signifies the substratum (Āsraya) i e Kartā or karman as the case may be

It may be observed here in the verb word, the substratum i. e the meaning of the suffix (Pratyaya), is an attribute of the action meaning of the root (Prakrti) As such, it should not be mistaken that it will result in contradicting the maxim ',when the

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1 Tinabhihitena Bhāvena Kālapurusopagrahā Vyajyante. (Bhāsya on P,3 1 67)

2 Caitrābhinnaikakartikaḥ tandulābinna karmavitti viklityanukūl vartamānakāliko vyāpāraḥ

because the sūtra 'Laḥ Karmaṇi' where the word 'Kartari' is to be supplied has no word showing Number. Hence the interpretation given by the Mīmāṃsaka to the above mentioned sūtras is wholly improper

Further the Grammarian questions the Mimāṃsaka whether, if the affixes denote Bhāvanā and presume the agent etc, is it the qualified agent (qualified by Bhāvanā) or a pure agent that is presumed According to Nāgeśa neither of it is possiqle If we accept a qualified agent (Bhāvanā visista karta or Kṛti visista kartā) then it becomes predominent and Bhāvanā becomes secondary. The Mīmāṃsaka cannot accept this position If the pure agent only is presumed then in the verbal import it cannot qualify the Bhavanā since it is never found that a secondary meaning qualifies a primary meaning [1] We see that in sentences like 'Ganghyām ghosaḥ' the denotative meaning of the word 'Gangā' qualifying the secondary meaning "bank" (Tīra), but nont vice versa Nor the Mīmāṃsaka is at liberty to argue that in the above case i e Gangāyām ghoṣaḥ, there is a difficulty to accept the primary meaning and hence it qualifies the seconday meaning, but here in the case of the verbal affix it is not of that position But this argument is not logical, because there lies the prolixity in accepting different denotations [2]

Furthei let us take the two aphorisms 'Laḥ Karmaṇi ca.. "and Lataḥ Śatṛśānacāvaprathamā sāmānādhikaraṇe". When we read these two as a single sentence we get the meaning that the lakaras are enjoined in the sense of agent etc And the Śatṛ etc. suffixes are enjoined in its (lakāra) place as substitutes So these suffixes also denote the agent like the lakāras. This is accepted even by the Mīmāṃsaka also Now the Grammarian says that in a similar way the verbal affixes which are enjoined in the place of lakāra, express the same meaning agent etc . And we have no valid reason to reject this analogy

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1 Kṛtau saktiḥ, nāsraye lakṣaṇā, tatra laksyārthasya sakyarthe viśeṣaṇateti na kwāpi dṛṣṭacaram (L.M. nbp P.40).

2. Vyutpatti Kalpane gauravam (ibid)

Of course the Mīmamsaka may say that the suffixes Śatṛ and Śānac denote the agent by being governed by the aphorism Kartari kṛt. But it is not logical. In that case in words like 'Pacyamānaḥ (Passive) and Śayyamāna (Bhave) we can not have Śānac. And if the Mīmāmsaka tries to argue taking recourse to the aphorisms 'Bhāva Karmaṇoḥ', 'Tanānāvātmanepadam', that also becomes improbable. In that case, i e Śanac, subject to the governing aphorism Bhava Karmaṇoḥ has to occur in the case of transitive roots also, but it is not accepted by any one including the Mīmāmsaka. Therefore the Mīmāmsaka has to admit that the verbal affixes denote the agent etc.,

Further the Mīmāmsaka fails to explain these two suffixes Śatṛ, and Śānac though they are enjoined in the place of lakāra and these suffixes do not have the number meaning as two etc Similarly the Mīmāmsaka cannot explain the meaning of the lakāra which is an object of the affix Am in words like Edhāñcakre etc According to the Mīmamsaka this lakara has to denote the agent as governed by the aphorism 'Kartari kṛt, But it is not so Further this lakara denotes Bhāva or object (Karma) also, depending upon the following root (Anuprayukta Dhātu) as in the words Edhāmāsa, Bibharām babhuvire etc .

Further Bhattoji Dikṣita makes it clear in his Śabda Kaustubha[1] that effort (Bhavanā) cannot be the denoted sense of the verbal affix as argued by the Mīmamsakas, for in words like Bhoktavyam' the meaning, Bhāvanā, is cognised even without the verbal affix That is to say, in the above instance, we have the expectancy of a Kāraka and its coexistence with the verb 'karoti' as instanced in 'Kim kartavyam? Bhoktavyam, Kim kṛtavan-Bhuktavān etc And on the other hand if we accept the stand of the Mīmamsaka then we must have usages like 'Bhavati ghaṭam' on par with sentences like 'Ghaṭam Bhāvayati', Because both the sentences give a similar meaning But nobody accepts the former sentence. In the instances "Ghaṭam Bhāvayati" the causal affix

1. Kinca Bhāvayati ghaṭamitivat tvanmate Bhavati Ghaṭmityapi syāt tulyārthatvāt (Śab. Kau. P.1 3.1.,).

'Nic' expresses the meaning of the action of the potter, while in the sentence "Ghaṭam Bhavati" the verbal affix expresses the same meaning. And the pot is the object in either case It can not be argued that the causal affix 'Nic' expresses the meaning of the causal agent (Prayojaka) while the verbal affix denotes the meaning of the agent and thus there is no similarity between the two sentences cited above. If the word agent (Kartā) means one who sets to action the whole circle of objects that are connected with the action, then 'Ghaṭa' is not such an agent If, on the other hand, it is considered that the agent is the principal entity which has the action expressed by the verbal root as advocated by (Bhartṛhari) the Grammarian, then what could be the sense of the verbal affix since tha action has already been denoted by the verbal root?[1] That is to say, in the former alternative the definition given to the agent does not cover the pot (ghaṭa) and in the latter case Bhāvanā becomes the meaning of the verbal root itself.

Further in the Mīmāṃsaka theory the formation of the word "Jyotiṣṭomayājin" bacomes impossible. The affix 'Ninin enjoined by the aphorism 'Karaṇe yajaḥ becomes applicable only in accordance with the theory of the Grammarian because the root 'Yaj' as a root (Dhātu) express B hāvanā and the root as 'Yaj' denotes 'Sacrifice' (Yāga) which latter serves as the efficient cause Karaṇa concerned But in the Mīmāṃsaka theory this formation is not possible because the element expressive or Bhāvanā is not present in the root and as such 'Karmatva' cannot have agreement with it.[2]

Another objection is that there cannot be the agreement of the number meaning denoted by the verbal affix with the agent

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1. Yadi tu-Dhātunoktakriyā nityaṃ kārake kartṛteṣyate iti Bhartṛhari Prātipādita rītyā, prādhānyena dhātūpātta vyāpāratva rūpaṃ kartṛtvaṃ tavāpi sammataṃ. Kastarhi idānīmākhyātārthaḥ (Śabda Kaustubha-under Sūtra 1-3-1, P 51)
2. Dhātutvena dhātūpattāṃ Bhāvanāṃ prati yajitvena tadupāttasya aṃśāntarasya karaṇatvāt (Śab Kau. ibid P.52).

presumed by the Bhāvanā because these two are secured through different means of knowledge 1

Further take the sentence "Caitraḥ pacati" Here everyone including the Mīmāmsaka, accepts that there exists identity between Caitra denoted by the word Caitra and the agent denoted by the verbal affix Now the Mīmāmsaka's theory compells us to accept that this indentity (Samānādhikaraṇya) exists between the denoted sense of the word Caitra and the agent obtained through a secondary signification (Lakṣitakartra) of the affix i e agent obtained by lakṣaṇā If the Mīmāmsaka means this, then he has to forego several other tenets of his Śastra like the (pūrvapakṣa of) Aruṇādhikaraṇa' and Guṇādhikaraṇa etc

ARUṆĀDHIKARAṆA AND THE GRAMMARIAN —

Aruṇādhikaraṇa is explained in this way There is an injunction "Aruṇayā Ekahāyanyā Pingākṣyā Somam Krīṇāti" (one should purchase some with a cow red, one year old and tawny eyed) As the Mīmāmsaka says the words Ekahāyanī and Pingākṣī agree with the verb since they are Dravyas and they have the indentity of case relationship with the cow But the word Āruṇya is not a substance but quality so it cannot independently agree with the verb On this point the Mīmāmsaka formulates his purvapakṣa that the āruṇya agrees with every thing used for the purchase of Soma There he clearly rejects the argument that the word Aruṇayā denotes substance through implication and that substance obtained through implication agrees with Bhāvanā (verb) Thus taking it granted that a substance obtained through implication cannot agree with that obtained by direct expression, the Mīmāmsaka formulates the purvapakṣa At this point the Grammarian questions how the Mīmāmsaka can take a different stand regarding the denotation of agent etc by the affix and argue there that the agent obtained by implication can have agreement with that expressed by Devadatta etc in sen-

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1 Nahi Śābdamaśābdenānveti

tence like "Devadattaḥ pacati" The Grammarian insists that he should take the same stand in both cases So as regards the denotation of Agent etc by the affix the Mīmāṃsaka has to accept the Grammarian's theory at least in his own interest Otherwise the formation of the Pūrvapakṣa itself becomes less meaningful and il-logical [1]

Now if the Mīmāṃsaka comes forward to accept the "identity of the subject or object with an entity obtained through (lakṣaṇa) secondary signification, then his explanation of the Guṇādhikaraṇa becomes improper, because in his final view the Vsivedevāḥ secured by implication from the word Vājibhyaḥ should agree with visvedevaḥ secured by direct assertion from the word Vaiṣvadevi, in which case the entire karma will have to be considered as one, much against his own theory

Further Nāgeṣa urges upon the Mīmāṃsaka to explain both the Kartradhikaraṇa and Jañjabhyamānadhikaraṇa on the same lines, and there is no justification in following double standards Nāgeṣa argues with the Mīmāṃsaka that there is no difficulty for him even if he (Mīmāṃsaka) accepts the agent/or object as the denoted meaning of the Tiṅ affix, in properly explaining the Kartradhikaraṇa and the jañjabhyamānādhikaraṇa 2 Hence the Grammarian's theory is more logical in explaining the Mīmāṃsaadhikaraṇas

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1. Kincaivam daṇḍi piṅgākṣyādi padānāmapi sambhandhe eva śaktiḥ, lakṣitena ca sambandhinā samānādikāraṇyaṃ syāditi Aruṇadhi karaṇocchedaṃ iti samāse nirūpayiṣyāmaḥ
2 For details vide L M (nbp) P 44 to 52 (Tiṅartha)



VYĀSATĪRTHA'S SUPPORT TO THE GRAMMARIAN -

Vyāsatīrtha, a neologician belonging to the Mādhva scho and author of the Tarka-Tāṇḍava extends a staunch support the grammarian's theory regarding the denotation of the verb affix He too advocates the theory that the verbal afffix denot the substratum i e the agent or the object,[1] because in instanc like 'Caitra cooks rice (Caitrastaṇḍulam pacati) we find agreeme between the number meaning denoted by the verbal affix and th agent Caitra, and in instances like 'rice is cooked by Caitra (Cai reṇa pacyante taṇḍulāh) the number meaning of the verbal aff agrees with the object 'Taṇḍula' Such an agreement as witnes ed between the number meaning and the agent or object is nc possible unless the substratum is also accepted as the denotatio of the verbal affix Further if the number meaning agrees eve with those, not denoted by the verbal affix, it should agree wit even the object in the active voice and with the subject in the pas sive voice, thus giving rise to a wrong construction of sentence as "Taṇḍulān pacanti" in the sense of 'Taṇḍulān pacati' and Caitre na pacyate' and Caitrena pacyate taṇḍulāh' in the sense "Caitren pacyante taṇḍulāh

Of course the opponent (Logician) may argue that thoug the agent or object is not accepted as the denotation of the verba affix there is no incongruity found in respect of the agreemen of the number meaning with the agent, for, the number meanin agrees with what is syntactically connected with Bhāvanā

Bhāvanā by itself is of the form of activity (Vyā pāra), and hence does not have expectancy with that which possesses the activity That being the case, in the instanc Caitra cooks rice', rice, which is an object, poesesses certain activity in itself So Bhavanā of the form of activity agrees with mere Caitra (devoid of any activity) cognised from the word Cai- ra ending in the nominative case affix which does not possess any action Similarly in the passive construction the Bhavana leave off Caitra, the agent, secured from the word Caitra (ending in

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1 Evam karti karmaṇi api lakara vacye (Tar Tan Vol 3, p 78)

the instrumental case affix) as he possesses activity and agrees with rice (Taṇḍulaḥ) which is got from the word ending in the nominative case affix Consequently on observation we find that, in each case the number meaning agress with that with which the Bhavana agrees

Vyasatīrtha says such an argument (as above) of the Logician is not logical The number though follows kṛti it cannot agree with the meaning denoted by the nominal base with which kṛti agress Of the two number meanings, one of the Sup suffix and the other of the Tiṅ Suffix, the nominal base has the expectancy of the number meaning denoted by the Sup suffix, only This being internal and close to it, readily agrees with the nominal base Then the nominal base does not have any expectancy of the number meaning of the Tiṅ suffix to agree with'[1]

So far Vyāsatīrtha supports the Grammarian Now he goes a step further and accepts the movent (Spanda) favourable to the meaning of the root as the denoted sense of the verbal affix, besides the agent or object and the number meaning. And this meaning agrees with the agent as subsisting in it [2]

NĀGEŚA'S CRITICISM OF THE MĪMĀṀSAKA-VIEW .—

Nāgeśa bitterly attacks the Mīmaṁsakas and goes deep into the very roots of the Mīmāṁsaka s arguments He opines that the Bhāṣyakara Śabara and Kumarila have drawn such conclusions from the Sutras of the sage, Jaimini, which the sage has never intended Nāgeśa says that there is no specific sūtra of Jiamini stating that Bhāvanā is different from action and it is denotad by the verbal affix And further the Pūrvamīmāṁsā

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1 Bhāvanānityā api saṁkhyayā nirākāṁkṣena Prātipadikārthenā anvayasyoktatvāt (ibid P 86 2nd para)

2 Tasmāt phalanukūlo adhaḥ santāpanādiḥ dhatvarthaḥ Tadanukūla spandadisca ākhyatārthah , Sa ca kartrādheya tayā, anveti ityeve yuktam (Op Cip P 95 last para)

sūtra (2 1 1),[1] never gives such an import, which by Bhāṣyakāra and others that Bhāvanā is different (denoted by the root) and is denoted by the \ When we examine the said sutra the word Karmaśa words denoting action i e verbs like yajeta, Dadya Bhāvārthāḥ means Kriyārthāḥ because Bhāva, Karm all used as synonyms It is evident from the word vapradhānamākyātam' kriyapradhanamākhyaātam [2] this sūtra never speaks of any thing about Bhāvanā a by the Mimāmsaka Hence from the words Dadyā alone is predominantly understood That is the reas words are only used but not the nouns like yaga D course since action gets destroyed quickly and do the result swarga etc is attained, the Mimamsakas c new entity 'Apūrva, and deem it to last till swarga et red object) is achieved, So it is evident that ther in the sutra which gives even an indication that Bh meaning of the affix but not that of the root Na reason why these latter Mimamsakas try to establi which has not been said by their sage Of cou Mimamsaka may take his stand on the maxim 'I pradhānam'

Refutation of "Pratyayārthah Pradhānam" —

The Mīmamsaka argues that of the base and jointly uttered the meaning of the affix is predom in a verb word also the meaning of the affix should nant and the meaning of the root should qualify it

Nagesa says that the very notion "Pratyaya nam" as a universal fact, itself is a worng conce this maxim is only a casual statement which fails in r

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1 Bhāvarthāḥ karmaśabdāḥ tebhyaḥ karmapratīy vidhiyete

2 L.M (k k) P 774

Bhatta Kumārila develops all his arguments based on this maxim Nāgesa says that is a high handed argument (Praudha Vāda) For instance let us take the word Ajā, Chāgī etc, Here the suffix denotes feminity and the base denotes the substance. Here everyone admits that the Predominance is only to the meaning of the base but not to that of the suffix.

Nāgesa puts a shrewed question as to what the Mīmāmsaka means by the maxim 'Pratyayārthaḥ Pradhānam If it means that the meaning of the suffix is predominant then the maxim has failed in its purpose in the above cited examples Or, on the other hand, if it means that whatever is predominant that should be the meaning of the suffix, even then the maxim does not apply, because in the above example the sense 'goat' is predominant but it is not the meaning of the suffix Thus either of the interpretations of the maxim does not hold good

He further argues that the question of Pradhāna and Apradhana arises only when there is an agreement of the meaning of the base and the suffix In words like Pakvavān the meaning of the root is the object Paka (Karma kāraka) and that of the affix is the agent (Karti karaka) Thus they cannot have mutual agreement because both of them are Kārakas, These are expected to agree only with the meaning of the root. As such there is no agreement at all, much less a case of predominance of the one meaning over the other It should not be urged that "Sambandha Sāmanya ' may exist between the two as 'Pakasya kartā', for there is no yogyatā in-as-much as they are only kārakas which cannot mutually agree [1] So this theory has no scope at all

And in a word or sentence the question "which is predominant and which is not" does not depend on the maxim' That is what Panini states in unequivocal terms in his aphorism P 1 2.56[2]

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1 Vai Bhu - Karika 8, P 43;

2 Pradhānapratyayarthavacanarthasya anyapramānatvāt (P 1 2.56).

which means "it should not be construed that the meaning of the suffix is predominant because the knowledge of Predominance or otherwise depends on actual experience [1] And if we accept the maxim then the Bhasya on the Sutra P 1 3 1,[2] cannot properly be explained

Thus Nagesa opines that this maxim is applicable only in the case of suffixes which have an expressed sense as in the case of Kṛt etc And if we accept it, tnen in the case of Pācaka, Lāvaka etc there will not be any incongruity As far as verbal affixes Tin etc are concerned they are not expressive but indicative (suggestive) of their meaning Hence their meaning is subserviant to that of the base And suggestivenss to these suffixes is amply explained in the Mahabhasya at several places like "Kartari Karmavyatihāre" 'Śeṣātkartari Parasmaipadam' Hetumati ca' 'Lah Karmaṇi ca Bhave cā Karmakebhyah' etc sūtras Of course strictly speaking it is only the root that has a denotative potentiality in action, result, number, tense, and substratum. Such a potentiality in number, tense and substratum is suggested by the Tin suffix It has been established in the Bhāṣya on Pāṇini's aphorism "Hetumati ca" that a suggested sense cannot have predominance over the expressed sense As for the meaning of the word Bhāva it is maintained by the Vaiyakaraṇa that it is only Kriya but not Bhāvanā This has been amply explained by Kaiyata also So from the Bāṣya and all other commentaries it becomes evident that

(1) Bhavanā is not denoted by the suffixbut by the root alone
(2) The suffix denotes the agent or object but not Bhāvanā
(3) The maxim 'Pratyayarthah pradhānam' applies only in the case of Expressive suffixes

Thus to conclude, it may be stated that the Mimāmsakas invented somethihg which is not expressed by the sage Jaimini To substantiate their incorrect-interpretation of their texts, they did not

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1 Pradhānam pratyayārthah iti Na kāryam, Arthasya = Arthavabodhasya, Anyapramāṇatvat = Vyutpatyanusāritvāt iti tasyarthah (L M nbp P 75)

2 Bhuvadayo Dhātavah (P 1 3.1)

hesitate even to mis-interpret the grammatical aphorisms with out studying the entire Mahābhāsya. And further their interpretations land them in troubles as explained in Arunādhikarana, gunādhikarana etc But if they accept the grammarians explanation there will be no infringement of their fundamental theories

THE VIEW OF THE LOGICIAN —

According to the Logician there is something called 'Krti' a particular type of activity different from the action denoted by the root, but congenial to it, and this krti is denoted by the verbal affix, besides number and tense Now we shall examine their arguments and counter-arguments.

UDAYANA'S THEORY :—

Udayana, the first among the neologicians propounds that there exists two types of action in a human being One is the external i e Physical activity (Cestārupa bāhyavyāpāra) and the other is internal activity (Ātmanistavyāpāra) such as thinking, desiring, making effort etc This second type of activity is called yatna, krti, bhavanā and all these words are synoymous Udayana discusses all this in the 5th Chapter of his Kusumāñjali, while discussing the sense of potential mood affix 1 According to him the meaning of Vidhi is not effort (Prayatna) because effort is the potentiality denoted by all verbal affixes in general 2 The arguments, offered by him in establishing yatna or krti as the denotation of the verbal affix are the same as those already enumerated while discussing the Mimāmsaka theory Udayana says that this 'Yatna' itself is otherwise called Bhavanā by Mīmāmsaka s and krti by the Logicians

Of course, some like Parthasārathy, argue that the suffix denotes activity congenial to that denoted by the verbal root

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1 Under the kārika 8 i e istahāneranistāpetarapravrtteh etc
2 Napi tatkāranam prayatnah, tasya sarvākhyāta sadhāranatvāt

favourable to produce the result Otherwise there is prolixity To this Udayana reacts that neither congeniality alone nor activity congenial to, can be accepted as the denotation of the verbal affix And there is also no prolixity in accepting effort-hood (Yatnatva) as the determinant of the potentiality of the verbal affix Further it is evident that 'Yatna' is the denotation of the suffix on the bassis of explanatory sentence "He does cooking" (Pākam karoti) Otherwise we have to accept irregular sentences of the form "Pakena Odanam Karoti" on par with sentences like 'Kāṣtena Pākam karoti', but it is not tenable So from the explanatory sentence we are to accept something congenial to Pāka' as denoted by the root And that something is 'Yatna' itself and nothing else, otherwise sentences like 'Pākena odanam karoti' are inevitable

Now the question is whether the word 'Karoti' means mere 'effort' whose adjunct is effortness or effort having both effortness and congeniality (of action towards the result) as its adjuncts In the former case the word "Karoti" becomes synonymous with word 'Yatna' and in the later case there is prolixity Therefore the opponent demands basing on the principle of brievity, to accept "activity congenial ' as the denotation of the verbal affix, so that we need not take recourse to the meaning by implication in sentences like 'Ratho gacchati' etc., where effort in its form of effortness cannot be cognised

Udayana refuses such an argument of the opponent on two counts One is the established exprerince of ours in the usage that "such and such a thing is produced and such and such is not produced "Kṛtākṛtavibhagena" and the other is the way in which agent-hood is determined by Pāṇini [1] For example from the sentence 'Ghaṭah kṛtah' (The pot is made) we cognise 'Yatna' existing in the potter in bringing out the pot into existence, but

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1 Kṛtakṛta vibhagena kartṛrūpa vyavasthaya, yatna eva kṛtih purva parasmin saiva bhāvana (Kusumanjali V 9) Here the words Purva refers to Logicians and Parasmin to Mīmāmsakas

there is no such experience when we hear sentences like Ratho gamanam karoti So it is evident only in such cases whare 'Yatna' is specifically experienced we make use of the word Kṛtā (produced or made) We do not find such usage in the case of a sprout from a seed i e there is no usage as 'Aṃkuraḥ kṛtaḥ Bījena' (Sprout is made by the seed) The reason is that no effort congenial for the production of the sprout is witnessed in the seed Of course there may be congenial cirumstances or conditions (Anukūla hetavaḥ) Therefore, from such well-established usages it is evident that the meaning of the word karoti is kṛti Otherwise if it denotes some congenial action in geneneral, then in case of sprouting also, there exists some congenial action whatsoever it be, consequently we have to admit sentences like 'Bījenāmkuraḥ kṛtaḥ' which are far from experience Furtner, the fact, that the word 'Kartṛ' ending in the affix 'Tṛ' and derived from the root kṛ, is found to denote the substratum of effort, also goes to prove the contention that the verb word karoti denotes the sense of effort (Yatna) If, on the other hand, it is accepted that the root kṛ is merely denotative of 'Kriyā', then 'Kartṛ' being the substratum of Kriyā, all the kārakas would end only in kartṛkaraka, because every karaka possesses some activity of its own which helps to produce the result Thus it becomes clear that the verb Kṛ is denotative of the sense 'effort' And all the verbal affixes are explained away with the help of the verb word 'Karoti' so that we can safely conclude that all tha verbal affixes denote the sense of 'Effort' only

As a matter of fact, Udayana says an affix in general has a denotation in all the three factors combined together i e in 'a state of beginning and ending, effort and congeniality (Purvāparibhūtatva, yatnā anukūlatava samudāye śaktiḥ) [1] And it need not be doubted how the suffix can denote all these three meanings in sentences like 'Ratho gacchati' There the suffix does not denote all the meanings (Samudaya) but has denotation in

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1 Tena ca sarvamākhyata padam vivṛyate iti sarvatra sa eyārtha iti nirṇayaḥ (Nyā Ku V 9)

a part i e 'congeniality' (Anukūlatva) just as the[1] word 'Srotriya' used to denote Brahmin [2]

And in the case of insentient beings and usages as 'He knows, desires, stays, etc are all to be explained taking recourse to the secondary signification i e through implication Therefore in the case of 'Ratho gacchati' also we explain by taking recourse to the secondary signification Hence it is established that the affix has denotation only in Yatna and all other meanings which are, required depending on the nature of the agent, can be had through implication [3] Otherwise if you accept activity in general, congenial to action, as the denoted meaning, then when a man is sleeping or taking rest, which is required for a later work such as cooking etc we are to make sentences as 'he cooks', because he has activity in general congenial to cooking [4] Thus when one possesses the effort congenial to cooking, we use the verb in the present tense as 'Pacati' When the effort is over we use the verb in past tense as Apākṣīt etc

Further the root Kṛ denotes activity (Kṛti) subsisting in the agent And the agent is always a sentient being And the meaning of the root 'Kṛ' in the word Kartā is of the form of Knowledge, desire and effort If meaning of the kṛ is something different from any of these, we have to accept insentient objects also as being denotod by the word agent (Kartā) And it cannot be argued that an agent is one whose action is primarily denoted by the

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1 Tathā cā samudite pravṛttam padam tadekadeśe api prayujyate Viśuddhimātram Puraskṛtya Brahmaṇe śrotriyapadavat (Kusumañjali ibid V 9-Explanation)

2 Here the idea is this The word Śrotriya strictly denotes a Brahimin who is well versed in Vedic texts But it is also generally being used to denote a Brahmin even if he is not well versed in Vedic texts

3 Na ca vṛtyantareṇapi prayogasambhave śakti kalpanā ayuktā, Anyayāścanekarathatvamitistiteh (Kusumāñjali V-9)

4 Anyathā atītāvapi pariśramaśayane pacatīti pratyayaprasangāt (ibid)

root or the affix it does not matter whether the agent is sentient or not. Then, when such a root or suffix is not used, the person who is actually at work will not get the designation 'agent' Nor it can be argued that agentness means 'possess an activity (suitable to) worthy of being expressed by the suffix', because the nature of such worthiness itself cannot be established

Further Pānini s aphorism 'Svatantrah Kartā' (P 1 4 54) clearly lays down that the agent is one who is independent The nature of the independence is nothing but the inherence of knowledge desire and effort i e kṛti Therefore it goes without any doubt that one of these must be the denotational potency of the suffix Thus on who is the substratum of all these three, can act independently and can be called an agent Thus, the way in which we can arrive at the nature of the agent also testifies, to the fact that yatna or kṛti is the denoted meaning of the suffix

Now as regards the argument that this yatna or kṛti is obtained through presumption, Udayana states that this cannot be presumed by the action congenial to the fruit nor through congeniality, because this action in general congenial to the fruit or congeniality exists even in the action subsiating in insentient beings Further there is no coextensiveness between congeniality and effort-hood So it canoot be through congeniality

Nor it can be presumed through number, because number subsists in substances that can be counted, but not in effort which is always single

Nor it can be presumed through the agent Every agent may not possess effort' So through such an agent effort cannot be presumed And if the agent is one who has action, is it action in the form of activity (Yatna) or something different from it, because action may subsist even in insentient objects, but through such an agent effort cannot be presumed And if it is accepted that action is of the form of Yatna, then it can be stated to be the denoted meaning

Nor it can be presumed through the action denoted by the

veibal root In sentences like 'Vidyate Ghaṭah' etc, the meaning of the root 'Vid' is Being and it is permanent Being permanent by nature it does not comprehend any yatna Hence through this also, Yatna cannot be presumed

Now the question is if kṛti or yatna is the meaning of the affix, then in words like Karoti, Yatate etc, we must get the knowledge of kṛti twice in the explanatory sentence i e one denoted by the root and the other being denoted by the affix, To this, the Logician replies that in the above cases the suffix does not denote kṛti or yatna (except number and tense) but it is added after the root in accordance with the maxim ' Mere roots are not to be used'' 'a non-word should not be used [1] So here the surfix is only just to get wordness i e grammatical correctness, just as the grammarian explains the validity of number meaning to Sup suffixes in words like Ekah Dvau etc

THE VIEWS OF GANGEŚA AND GADĀDHARA .—

Further some scholars are of the opinion that this kṛti is denoted by the 'L' (lakāra) but no by Tiṅ suffixes, which are enjoined in the place of 'L'. Though the lakara is not found in the word the knowledge of it is obtained through recalling Thus kṛti is the denotational potency, of lakāra But Gadādharā does not accept this view, because the original and substitute are not definitely determined He argues that the suffixes are not uniformly enjoined by different grammarians in the place of lakāra so they cannot make us recall the original 'L' Further we have to create so many cause and effect relations to explain the system Hence taking brievity into consideration, Yatna is the denotation of the substitute only but not of the lakāra [3]

So far we have seen the Logician arguing to accept the secondary signification of the affix in sentence like 'Ratho gaccha-

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1 Na Kevalaḥ prakṛtayah prayoktavyah, Apadaṃ na prayuñjeeta

2 Vyu Vā. P 574

3 ibid P.575

(l) Now the question is whether to accept 'activity congenial' as the secondary meaning of substratum-hood (Anukūla vyāpāre ... rayeva la ... a ...)

A section of the logicians (old) argue that it is logical to accept 'activity conginial' as the secondary meaning so that the sentence 'Ratno gacchati' can be explained as 'Gamanānukūla vyāpāravān ratnaḥ' Gangeśa Raghunāthaśiromaṇi upholds this view But the later logicians like Gadādhara[1] and Jagadīśa[2] favour the other view i e Lakṣaṇā in substratumness (Āśrayatva) as the secondary signification or by established implication (Nirudha Lakṣaṇā)

If Āśrayatva is not the secondary signification, then the following inconsistency arises Suppose a person pushes the cart, the cart moves but the person stands So when the cart is in motion, because the activity congenial to the running of the cart exists in the person also, we will be constrained to accept a statement like 'the man goes' when the cart is actually moving, but the man stands But if we accept substratumness as the secondary signification, then, because the person is not the substratum of motion, such a contingency will not arise

And now take the sentences "Caitro janāti", yatate etc. where we cannot notice any activity that can be assigned to the affix to be expressed by implication And even if it can be explained in these places, in sentence like 'ghate ghatatvam vidyate' (Pot-ness exists in the pot) Here every one should accept implication in Āśrayatva alone Therefore insted of accepting different secondary significations at different places, it is better to accept substratumness as the secondary signification of the affix, in a uniform way But however in sentances like "ghato Naśyati" (the pot perishes) the suffix expresses the counter-positive of destruction by implication

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1 Vyu Va P 563

2. Śab Śa Pra P 398

Rājacudāmaṇimakhin, the author of the Maṇidarpaṇa accepts both the views 1 However he finally favours the view "Āśraye Lakṣaṇā"

The View Held by the Author of the Ratnakoṣa .—

Almost all the later logicians are unanimous on the point that the verbal suffix denotes kṛti And where there is a stultification in such a denotation, they accept secondary signification either in substratumness or activity congenial to the action denoted by the root

Now, here is an instance where theLogician falls out of the general tradition The author of Ratnakoṣa, a Logician himself is of the view that the verbal affix has its denotation in the sense 'Utpādanā, and that agrees with the meaning of the verbal root by being its (of the meaning of the verbal root) thems (Viṣayin) and with the meaning of the nominal base as its (Utpādanā) substratum 2 By accepting such a denotation and argument, he is of the opinion, that the contingency of the use of the verbal affix being rendered secondary in the case of insentient entities like the car goes etc , can be avoided, because productivity (Utpādakatā) of the meaning of the verbal root is commonly found alike in the sentient as well as the insentient entities And on the other hand, if activity (vyāpāra) or effort (Yatna) be accepted as the denoted sense of the verbal affix, in instances like 'Yatate' Jānāti etc , there would be prolixity in accepting Lakṣaṇa in all such large number of cases But by accepting 'Utpatti' as the denoted sense of the verbal affix, since there is a possibility for effort (Yatna) and knowledge (Jñāna) to be the objects of 'Utpatti' the affix is enjoined in the sense of productivity, which is

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1 Jānāti icchati yatate ityādau jñānādyanukūla manassaṃyoge lakṣaṇā, Na caivam gamanasyāpi jānātīti prayogāpattiriti vācyam Tarhi Karotītyatreva Jñānādhyāśraye lakṣaṇā astu' (Maṇidarpaṇa P 199)

2 Utpādanaiva ākhyātārthaḥ (Tar Tan Vol 3, P 72)

valid from the point of view of meaning because both yatna and knowledge deserve to be produced, but in a very few cases like Utpādayate we have to accept simple grammatical correctness to the affix The advantage of this view over the other is that we can avoid secondary signification in the words like Jānāti, icchati, yatate, nidrati etc Hence on grounds of Parsimony 'Utpādanā' is to be accepted as the denoted sense of the verbal affix However this view is severely criticised by Vyāsatīrtha 1

The Logician's Criticism of the Grammarian's View —

The Logician is very critical of the Grammarian's theory He argues that the Grammarian's arguent that if substratum is to be accepted as the denoted sense of the verbal affix, in order to secure the agent and the object in instances "Pacati Devadattaḥ (Devadatta cooks), Pacyate taṇḍulascaitreṇa" (the rice is cooked by Caitra)" etc, is not correct, because the agent and the object can be secured from the verb through syntactical relation Therefore acceptance of such a potentiality for the verbal affix is to be rejected on the grounds of prolixity As for the argument of the Grammarian pertaining to the governing aphorism "Anabhihite" the Logician argues that the rule is to be interpreted to mean, when the number meaning of th affix is not denoted 2 The words 'Kartari and 'Karmaṇi' in the sutras 'Ksrtari Kṛt' 'Laḥ Karmaṇica' do not express the agent and the object but their properties (Dharma) agent-hood (Kartṛtva) and object-hood (Karmatva) The seventh case affix, in the words Kartari and Karmaṇi, is used in the sense of "being understood" but not in the sense of "being expressed" Again if agent etc be the meaning, then the agents being different in each case their determinants also will be manifold, but if agent-hood, is taken as the expressed sense of the suffix there is no prolixity Such an interpretation avoids all the contingencies urged by the Grammarian

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1 For details see P 60-63 of this book.

2 Anabhihite kartari ityāderanabhihitāyām kartrādi samkhyāyām ityatraiva tatprayaditi dik (Maṇidarpaṇa P 120)

Now we can summarise the whole argument of the Logician as follow.

The meaning or the denotated potentiality of the verbal affix is yatna called Kṛti The agent and object are secured through syntactical relation The word 'Kartari' in 'Kartari Kṛt' means agent qualified with activity', but mere agent-hood (Kṛti) only Acceptance of the agent or object as the denoted sense leads to prolixity The determinant of denotative potentiality is of the form of the Universal Kṛtitva This is proved from the explanatory sentence Pacati-Pākaṁ karoti, wherein Kṛti is exhibited as distinct from the action denoted by the verbal root However in the case where there is stultification of Kṛti as in sentence like the 'Car goes' (Ratho gacchati) we accept secondary signification in the verbal affix in substratumness The tense meaning agress with Kṛti denoted by the suffx The number meaning agress with the agent or object as the case may be

The Logician's Explanation-Passive Construction :—

In the case of the passive construction i e in sentence Taṇḍulaḥ pacyate Caitreṇa' etc the result and the action (Vyāpāra) are denoted by the verbal root And the action agrees with the result, being an attribute to the latter The affix, denotes substratumness (Āsrayatva) The result meaning of the root becomes an attribute to the meaning of the verbal affix i e Kṛti And this meaning of the affix, being an attributive of the word in the nominative case affix (but not qualifying another word), agrees with its meaning The meaning 'Time' agrees with the action denoted by the verbal root Thus the verbal import is of the form Rice is the substratum for the softening produced by action, of the present time, which (action) inhers in Caitra" 1

Some Logicians of the earlier period opined that in the passive construction the root denotes activity qualified by (the

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1 Caitravṛtti vartamānakālika kṛtijanya vyāpārajanya viklittyāśrayastaṇḍulaḥ

determinant of which is) result The megning of the affix is result. But their view is not correct, because in the verbal import we hear the result twice 1 In the practical experience it is not so Hence the affix denotes substratumness

The Logician's view in the Impersonal Construction —

The lakāras are enjoined, after an intransitive root, in the impersonal sense2 (Bhave) What we mean by the word Bhāava here, is, the meaning of the root itself For example take the sentence "Caitreṇa sayyate" Here the verbal suffix does not have any meaning but simply repeats (by Anuvāda) the meaning of the root The affix is only for the sake of grammatical correctness of the word Since Bhava is always unitary by nature, the affix always is in singular number but never in the dual or plural Again the affix denoting Bhava in such sentences is always in the third person Thus the verb word is always in the third person singular number 3 Hence the suffix does not denote either the agent or the number in the agent Therefore the agent always takes the instrumental case 4 The meaning of this instrumental case is attributive to the meaning of the root Thus the verbal import of the sentence 'Caitreṇa supyate' is of the form 'Caitravṛtti swāpah '

Here we can easily note that there is a departure from the general stand taken by the Logician, that the prathamānthārtha is the main substantive in the verbal import of a sentence

Refutation of the Logician's Theory —

The much argued Logician's theory was subjected to seve-

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1 The verbal import is of the form 'Viklittyanukūla vyāpārajanya viklittyāśrayastaṇḍulah

2. Laḥ karmaṇica bhave cākarmakebhyaḥ

3 However the Bhāṣyakāra gives examples in plural number also "uṣṭrāsikah sayyante" etc

4 Anabhihite-Kartṛ Karaṇayostṛtīyā

ral criticisms not only by the Mīmāmsakas and the Grammarians but also by a section of Logicians themselves Now in the following pages we will discuss them in brief

Vyāsatīrtha s Criticism —

The Logician s theory received a severe criticism at the hands of Vyāsatīrtha, who was a good Logician among the Dvaita Vedāntins He does not accept the general theory of the Logicians in so far it concerns the meaning of the verbal affix Some of the arguments advanced by him against the Logician's theory deserve mention in this context

According to Vyāsatīrtha, as already stated, the verbal affix denotes activity in general congenial to that denoted by the root, Besides this, it denotes the substratum also i e agent or object as the case may be We have seen that Gangeśa, the author of the Tattvacintāmaṇi declares that the verbal affix denotes kṛti or Yatna [1] But Vyasatīrtha opines that this Yatna, obtained by presumption through activity in general, is the meaning of the verbal affix, because Yatna is the cause and Activity in general is the effect So from the effect, we can presume the cause,[2] but not viceversa And the example 'Ghataḥ kṛtaḥ Amkuro na kṛtaḥ' cannot be helpful to the Logician Because usages like 'he makes a pot,' the seed makes the sprout' makes it clear such a division of Kṛta and Akṛtā is made only with reference to the productivity involving physical activity, and in its absence, i e where physical activity is not found, we use Akṛta Therefore the root kṛ denotes activity in general only but not yatna or kṛti And

1 Tasmāt ladākhyatam yatnavācakam, ākhyatatvat, linākhyātavat ityuktam (Tar Tan Vol 2 P 66,)

2 Vyāparasya kāryatvena svakarane yatnākṣepakatvāt (ibid P. 68)

further even the word Kartā is not a derivative word but only a conventional (Rūḍha) 1

If it is argued that the word 'Kartā' is derived by adding the suffix Tṛc to the root Kṛ then in that case the root Kṛ should not be accepted as denoting the sense 'effort' and the affix 'Tṛc' as denoting the sense 'substratum' If it be so the word 'Kartā' means 'the substratum of effort (Kṛtyāsrayaḥ) Then consequently from the word 'Paktā' we get the meaning in the form of 'substratum of cooking (Pakāśrayaḥ) but not the substratum of the effort of cooking (Pakakṛtyāsrya) Further the affix Tṛc is also not denotative of sense 'effort', because, in such a case the meaning of the 'Tṛc' cannot agree with the effort secured from the verbal root meaning through the relation of Viṣayatva or Janakatva'. In tne word Paktā, if it be accepted that the meaning of the affix Tṛc i e Kṛti agrees with the meaning Kṛti of the verbal root through the relation of identity, then we get the cognition of the effort, but not of substratum of effort If the meaning of the Tṛc Pratyaya is considered Kṛti, it cannot agree with 'Kṛti' the meaning of the root by any relation Viṣayatva or Janakatva If identity (Abhedānvaya) is accepted, then finally Pāka Kṛti alone is denoted by word 'Paktā' but not the agent of Kṛti, which is necessary to be accepted Therefore there is no other way but to accept Kṛtimān as the meaning of the affix Tṛc Thus from the word Paktā we get the import in the form 'Pakakṛti' but not the sense as one possessing the effort related to cooking ('Pākakṛtimān) Therefore to avoid such an inconsistency the Logician is forced to accept that the affix 'Tṛc' is denotative of the substratum of the effort Then the word Paktā gives us the sense "substratum of the effort of cooking" Then take the word" Pāka

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1 Pratyuta naiyāyikānām ghaṭāṁkurayoḥ kṛti janakatva sāmye api Sarira vyāpāra janyatvājanyatvābhyāmeva kṛtākṛta vyavahāra darsanāt kiñ dhātoh vyāpārarūpa kriyārthatvameva yuktam Kartṛpadamapi na yaugikam (ibid P 64)

2 Tathā ca pākakartetyatra dhātoḥ kṛtirarthascet, tṛjarthena kṛtyāsrayeṇa saha kṛ dhātvarthasya anvayah syāt Na hi kṛtyāsrayasya punaḥ svakṛtyanvayaḥ (ibid P 65)

Kartā" Here if the meaning of the affix is "Kṛtimān, (as the Logician is forced to acccept as shown above) and the root Kṛ also denotes Kṛti then the meaning of Tic (Kṛtyāsrayaḥ) has to agree with the meaning of the root Kṛ (kṛti) But it is not possible, because the substratum of Kṛti (of others) cannot agree with its own kṛti for a second time Thus it becomes clear that the word Kartṛ is conventional in the sense of kṛtyāsraya or kriyāśraya, but not derivative (Yaugikal) as urged by the Logician

Now, as regards the argument of the Logician that in instances like 'the car goes' (Acetanasthale) the use of the verbal affix is to be explained by taking recourse to the secondary signification Vyasatīrtha replies that there is no such need, because in the same manner as the word 'Ganga' is found to have the potentiality in signifying the meaning in Tīra (Bank) due to its frequent usage in that sense, in the same manner the verbal affix is not found to have the power of expressing the sense effort, and as such there should be necessity to accept lakṣaṇa in vyāpāra etc . But in this view he says there is only one mode of explanation, because he accepts Dhātvarthānukūla vyāpara which commonly exists in both the sensient and insentient objects Hence the contention of the Logician that that the verbal affix has denotative potentiality in tne sense 'effort' does not stand to logic

RATNAKOṢAKĀRA CRITICISED .—

As already mentioned the meaning of the verbal affix according to Ratnakosakāra is utpādanā and that agrees with the meaning of the verbal root by being its theme (Viṣayin) and with the nominal base meaning by being the substratum But Vyāsatīrtha criticises it[1] severally stating that if we are to accept the above contention, then in sentences 'Caitraḥ pacati' etc , we get

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1 Tar Tan Vol 2, P 63-74

an import of the form "Caitra is the producer of the production of pāka"[1] but not the "producer of pāka".[2]

Further in the case of non-sentient things also we get usages like "the sense organ knows" (indriyam jānāti, Cakṣurjānāti) i e the instruments are said to be producing the knowledge And also in cases "Caitro ghaṭam jānāti", we have the doubt "whether Caitra possess the knowledge of pot or not", because even those which cannot possess knowledge i e Cakṣus etc. are said to be the substratum of knowledge Therefore it is not possible to accept that the verbal affix denotes "Utapādanā" and it agrees with the nominal base-meaning as the substratum

THE MĪMĀMSAKA CRITICISES THE LOGICIAN :—

The Mīmāmsaka differs with the Logician to the extent that the root Kṛ does not denote the sense of effort (Yatna), because even without intending to convey the effort (Yatna), there are usages found in instaces like 'the sprout is made of the seed (Bijenānkurah kṛtah[3])and Happiness is made by heaven' (Svargādinā Sukham) etc Further in the instances 'Karoti' and Yatate, there can be no agreement between the meanings secured from the base and the affix, because, both,the base and the affix denote the same meaning viz effort (Yatna) Further it is an unnecessary redundancy In order to avoid such a redundancy, the Logician has to admit that here either the affix merely restates (Anuvāda) the meaning of the root or that, only those affixes which follow the verbal roots not denoting the sense of effort (Yatna) will be denotative of the sense effort (Yatna) 4

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1 Caitrah Pākotpattyutpādaka itidhīh, na tu pākotpādaka iti (ibid)

2 Utpatterākhyātārthatve tayā saha Caitrasya janakatva rūponvaya iti

3 We cannot speak of any effort on the part of the seed, in producing the sprout

4 Bhā. Cin P 81

Further the use of the verbal affix in the case of non-sentient objects like the car etc in sentences like "the car goes" (Ratho gacchati) is rendered secondary in its signification, because the car, an insentient entity, is incapable of undertaking any effort Similarly in instances like "He knows (jānāti)", "He wills (icchati) etc , where no effort can be cognised, the use of the verbal affix will be rendered secondary in its signification In order to avoid all these defects, the Mimāṃsaka urges upon the Logician to accept activity (Vyāpāra) as the denoted sense of the verb Kṛ Thus all the verbal affixes, denote the sense activity only but not Yatna or Kṛti as held by the Logician

The Logician Criticised by the Grammarian —

Grammarians like Jñānendrasarasvati, Bhaṭṭoji, Kauṇḍabhatta, etc in their respective works the Tattvabodhini, the Manoramā and tha Bhuṣaṇa etc have amply and aptly refuted the theory of the Logician Nāgeśa, also did not spare pains in reasserting the Grammarian s theory and refuting the Logicians' theory In the following pages we critically examine their views in brief

The Grammarian says that in instances like 'Pacati , etc , our normal expectancy is about the agent who does the act of cooking In compliance with that expectancy, it is proper to take the expressive power of Lakaras to be the agent (Kartā), but not effort (Kṛti) as urged by the Logician [1] If the verbal import of the word 'Pacati' is taken as effort congenial to cooking (Pākanukūlākṛtiḥ) as urged by the Logician, then one's expectancy would naturally be either in whom (Kasmin) or of whom (Kasya) The Grammarian replies that it is against popular experience, because when the word Pacati' is used, one is normally enthusiastic to know 'who cooks' but not in which or for whom unless otherwise warranted by the context

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1 Tattvabodhini p 318

Of course it may be argued by the Logician that even by accepting the Grammarian's theory there is no possibility for such an expectancy regarding the agent to arise because the knowledge of the agent is already clear in the import of the word Pacati' [1] But it is not acceptable Though we know from the verbal import that the action has an agent and it is one, yet we do not know who that particular agent is Thus though the expectancy regarding the agent in general is satisfied, the expectancy with regard to the particular agent remains unsatisfied Hence there is a possibility for the question "who cooks' Further the Logician cannot object that even after knowing that the action of cooking has Devadatta as its particular agent, the expectancy in which or 'for whom' still remains unsolved, for, the action of cooking (Pakakriya) means ' an action favourable to softening (Viklittyanukūlavyapara) The substratum of this action viz Devadatta is its agent And when the substratum of the action is decided upon, the expectancy "in whom" or "of whom" does not arise at all

Further in instances like 'Pacantam Devadattam paśya" Pacamānasya Devadattasya dravyam, the primary affixes ' Śatṛ and Śānac" in Pacantam and Pacamānasya respectively, just like Tip etc , should denote the sense of effort (Kṛti) only But it is not so, becouse it is undisputedly accepted even by the Logician that Śatṛ and Śānac affixes are enjoined in the sense of agent only And if we are to accept that from the suffixes 'Śatṛ' Śanac etc too, we get the import of Kṛti only then, in the above given instances i e Pacantam Devadattam etc the Logician cannot accept the agreement of the meanings of the two words with the relation of indetity [2] So in order to admit that the meanings of the two words agree by the relation of "non-differential identity ', (relationship) the Logician has to accept the primary suffixes Śatṛ etc denote the agent only Further the Logician cannot accept that inspite of the prolixity involved, he is prepared to accept that the primary suffix which comes in the place of the

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1 Ekakartṛka pakakriya

2 Prauḍhamanoramā , unber p 3 69,

Lakāra denote the agent and the Tiṅ suffixes denote Kṛti, because such a prolixity is not a prolixity when it it is justified But this acceptance does not save him Because it is an accepted principle of both the Grammarian and the Logician that the "Sthāni" alone is denotative but not the substitute (Ādesa) which comes in its place So the Grammarian questions what is the validity for the Logician,to say that Śatṛ etc. suffixes alone, which come in the place of Lakara, denote agent but not the Tiṅ suffixes and that these Tiṅ suffixes denote kṛti Therefore the Tiṅ suffixes too denote agent etc but not kṛti Acceptance of many potentialities for a word is not proper [1]

Further the interpretation offered by the Logician to the aphorism "Anabhihite" is also not correct It suffers from the fault of partial application inasmuch as it concerns the words ending in primary and secondary suffixes (Kṛt and Taddhita) and also in the case of compounds, because the number meaning is not found to be expressed by them The Logician explains the above sūtra ,Anabhihite as Saṃkhyānabhidhane' Consequently in instances like 'Paktavyastaṇḍulaḥ' 'Prāptodako grāmaḥ' etc since the number meaning is not expressed (Anabhihite) naturally the aphorism "Karmaṇi Dvitīyā" etc , operate and no scope is left for the nominative usage It cannot be argued that by supplying a word like 'Tiṣṭhati' we find even in the instances cited above number is expressed, because, if the word supplied is not 'Tiṣṭhati' but' Sthitaḥ', then the number meaning is not found to be expressed Thus the interpretation of the aphorism 'Anabhihite' as given by the Logician is untenable[2] and the Logician has to admit "Anabhihite as Anabhihite Kartari" etc

Similarly even in the case of the Tiṅ affixes, kṛti cannot be the denoted sense and we need not accept Lakṣaṇa (implication) in instances like "The Car goes" (Ratho gacchati) by accepting the 'substratum as the denoted sense of the verbal affixes

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1 Prauḍhamanorama under P 3 4 69

2 Tattvabodhini P 319, P 3 4 69 Tasmād anabhihite kartari ityadi vyākhyānamevābhyupetavyaṃ .

The incongruity anticipated by the Logician which forced him to accept a secondary meaning (Lakṣaṇā), can be warded off, because though the car is an insentient object, there is nothing wrong in its having activity (Vyāpāra) like movement of wheels etc congenial to going. Hence just as the primary affixes express the substratum, so also the Tiṅ suffixes too denote the substratum And there is no valid and substantiating reason to discriminate between the primary affixes and Tiṅ suffixes 1

Nāgesabhatta, in his Laghumañjūsā gives a systematic criticism against the Logician's theory Though Bhattoji, Kauṇḍabhatta Jñānendra etc' had amply refuted the Logiciana's theory, it is Nāgesa who, finally completed the task

The objection of the Logician to accept Āsraya i e the agent etc as the denoted sense of the verbal affix, is based on the principle of prolixity If the agent is the denoted potentiality of the verbal affix, then the determinant of this potentiality is agent-hood (Kartṛtvam) i e in other words it is kṛti only Since kṛtis are many in number, there can be no single common determinant of the denoted-sense of the affix So the Logician argues that if 'Kṛti' is accepted as the denoted meaning of the affix, then the determinant of the potentiality, by being its them is 'Kṛtitva' (activity-hood) which is singular in nature and common in all activities (Kṛtayaḥ) Hence it is logical to accept kṛti (Yatna) as the denoted meaning of the affix

For the objection raised by the Logician, the Grammarian Nāgeśa criticises him severely He questions him when the Logician has no objection to accept Cumber-someness (Prolixity), in the case of the determinant of the secondary meaning, as in instances like 'Gangāyam Ghoṣaḥ' then what prevents him from accepting the same even in the case of the meaning directly expressed And when the Logician has accepted 'Kṛti' as the expressed sense of the verbal affix the Grammarian has gone one step

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1 Tasmāt kartā tiṅā ca vailakṣaṇyam durlabhamiti kartrarthakatvamabhyupeyam (Tat Bo P 3-4-69)

forward and accepted kṛtyāśraya as the expressed meaning of the verbal affix in order to obtain Samānadhikaraṇya with the subject of the sentence And further there is no hard and fast rule laid down in any philosophy that, when a more concise property (Laghudharma) is available, more prolix property should not be taken as the determinant of the meaning And there is no logic in saying that a more prolix property is to be taken as the determinant of the potentiality, only in the case of secondary meanings In fact the determinant must be such that it is free from all the faults such as over-applicability, partial applicability etc Hence when the determinant does not suffer from any of the said faults, when it does not matter whether it is concise or not Nāgeśa does not accept that determinant-ness is a different category He views it as "Svarūpa sambandha, not different from svarūpa anb that svarūpa is present even in a gurudharma 1

And further, the question of taking the concise property or the prolix one as the determinant, arises only when both are possible 2 And these two would be possible where the meaning of a word is settled either as the expressed or otherwise But in the present case of the verbal affix, the very expressed meaning is under dispute i e whether the agent is directly expressed by the verbal affix or kṛti alone Unless it is settled, there is no meaning in arguing about the nature (i e cumbersom or simple) of the "determinant". And the Grammarian has not accepted kṛti as the denoted sense of the verbal affix, because to him it is denoted by the root itself 3

Nāgeśa further argues that no actual heaviness is experienced by, such as when carrying a load on the head The only difference is that the Logician accepts plurality in the case of kṛti which is the expressed meaning, the Viśeṣya, and in the Gramma-

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1 K M (nbp) P 12, 11 13-14

2 ibid

3 Prakṛte ca pratyayāt kṛtitvena bobhah savivādah, Dhātutaḥ eva tadbodhāt (L M (k k)

rian's view it is the viśeṣa (kṛtyāśraya) which has plurality It does not matter whether Viśeṣya is manifold or Viśeṣaṇa is manifold There is no deciding criterion as to which should be manifold i e the viśeṣya or Viśeṣaṇa Hence is the Grammarian's stand

And as regards the argument put forward by the Logician, that from the explanatory sentence, (Pacati = Pākam karoti) it is evident that Kṛti is the denoted sense of the affix The Grammarian comments that the Logician is wholly mistaken and far from a logical stand The Grammarian says that to him a root denotes both the action (Vyāpāra) and kṛti And as such in the explanatory sentence the farmer is explained by the word 'Pāka' and the later by the root Kr Hence the explanatory sentence cannot be helpful to the Logician Further the Logician cannot demand that all the meanings expressed by a single word need be explained by a single word only If he insists on this point, it is harmful to himself, because he too explains that of all the meanings expressed by verbal affix (i e kṛti number tense), kṛti is represented by the root Kṛ in the explanatory sentence 'Pākam karoti' and the rest i e number and tense, by the suffix 'Ti' in Karoti Thus there lies the fault of self-contradiction, Further the Grammarian says that, if we are to accept the Logician's principle, then we interpret it as "the meaning of the root shall be explained by the root only and that of affix by affix Thus the root Kṛ stands for the meaning of the root 'Pac' only but not of the affix

Further the Logician, taking it for granted that the root Kṛ denotes kṛti alone, develops his arguments But in fact there is nothing to substantiate his contention and on the other hand there is much evidence against it In insentient objects no effort (kṛti) is witnessed And as regards the usages "Naham spandam karomi" etc , they are explained on the same lines as the sentences "Kāṣṭāni pākam kurvanti" etc, are explained by the Logician He accepts activity in general to be denotation of the affix in these sentences i e. Kāṣṭhāni pākam kurvanti etc So also to the Grammarian Kṛti (Yatna) is denoted by karoti in sentences like 'Nāham spandam karomi' etc

Now as regards the argument put forth by the Logicians (author of Ākhyātavāda Siromani, Udayana etc) that the usages like "Ghatah kṛtaḥ Ankuro na kṛtaḥ,, etc. is proof in support of his theory, the Grammarian says that by accepting kṛti (Yatna) as the denotation of the affix in some places, and in some other places the action in general, then there is a possibility of sentences "Bījādinā ankuro kṛtaḥ" (Sprout is made by the seed) And another argument of the Logician is that the root Kṛ denotes yatna alone but not action (vyāpāra or Bhavanā) which is congenial to it, because, if it be so, every kāraka gets the designation agent' (Kartṛ samjñā) The Grammarian replies, that is an welcome feature in language and the BhāṣyaKāra, Patañjali accepts and allows such a possibility as in sentences quoted by him Sthālī pacati, Taṇḍulāḥ pacyante svayameva, Kāsthani pacanti etc

For a while let us set aside these arguments and counter arguments of the Logician and the Grammarian with reference to the meaning of the root Kṛ and let us investigate the opinion of the Mahābhāṣyakāra in the matter

The Mahābhāsyakāra Patañjali, while commenting on the sūtra 'Bhūvādayo Dhattavaḥ, (P 1 3 1) lays it down very clearly that all the roots like Pac etc., have identity of meaning with that of the root Kṛ,[1] i e the root Kṛ expresses only action in general (vyāpārasāmanya), and the roots 'pac' etc , specify the particularity in action Further the sentences 'Kim karoti' gives an import to the effect 'what is it he does', thus the question has import in knowing the Particularity of the action Here the samānadhikaranya (identity) is explained in the form of generality to particularity [2]

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1 Katham jnāyante kriyāvācinah pacadayah iti, yadeṣām karotinā sāmānādhikaranyam (M B on P 3 1 3)

2 "Sāmānyaviseṣaṇa bhāvena sāmānādhikaraṇyāt kriyā viseṣa vācinaḥ pacādayaḥ pratīyanta iti (Kaiyata on the above Bhāṣya)

Now as regards the argument of the Logician that in sentences like ' Vṛkṣo vardhate, (the tree grows) Ratho gacchati (car goes)" etc, the affix has secondary signification in substratumness, the Grammarian objects that, it is far from any accepted principle because the substratumness, qualified by the growth and movement existing in the tree and the car respectively, has no direct relation with kṛti, the denoted sense (in the Logician's theory) of the affix And even if the Logician tries to explain through some indirect relation (Paramparā sambandha), it cannot come under the scope of "sakya sākṣāt sambandha" There is no secondary signification in the meanings which are indirectly related to the object i e we resort to secondary signification only in those cases (meanings) which are directly connected with the primary denotation And this has been clearly explained by Mammata in his Kāvyaprakasa ' Prayojane na lakṣaṇā,sambandhābhāvat ' while dealing with Lakṣaṇa in words like gaṅgā in "gaṅgāyam ghoṣah" 1

Of course the Logician may argue that there is no hard and fast rule to accept the above statement of the Kāvyaprakasakāra which has its say mainly limited to poetics alone It is true Then Nāgesa explodes his last weapon on his opponents Grammar is the science which deals with words, their derivations meanings agreements etc Hence one has to abide by its rules and its interpretations as given by the authoritative people in that science like Pāṇini Patañjali, etc And everything is clearly mentioned in this śāstra, which word, or suffix has a particular

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1 Here the idea is this' In the sentence "Gaṅgāyam ghoṣaḥ", the word Gaṅgā has secondary signification in Tīra (bank) and the coolness, holiness etc are obtained through suggestion (Vyanjana vyāpāra) But a question is raised why not we accept lakṣaṇā for the word Gaṅgā directly in the collness and the holiness, and why we need this vyanjanā To this the answer is "Hetvabhāvāt pāvanāt vādau na lakṣaṇā, yogaḥ phalena no, na ca sabdārthasya tatasya and "Sākṣāt sambandha eva lakṣaṇā prayojaka iti bhāvaḥ (Commentary on the above)

sense Hence to use a word in a particular sense other than that permitted by this śāstra or vice versa (i e to assign a particular meaning to a word contrary to this śāstra) leads to confusion and the whole system of grammar becomes void The meanings and explanations of words, suffixes and sutras etc as given by the Grammarian should be accepted by all and one should not create or assign meanings as one likes, taking recourse to primary or secondary significations This is evident for those who are conversant with the Bhāṣya on sutras like Pratyayaḥ 'Pumyogadākhyāyām' 'Parasca' etc Otherwise, if one goes on creating and accepting secondary significations, then the sutras 'Kartṛkarmaṇoḥ kṛti' 'vyatyayo bahulam' etc become null, because there also we can resort to secondary signification thus avoiding the actual meaning of the sutras Therefore the Logician has to accept the suffix as denoting the substratum of action of result i e agent or object

In Pāṇinian grammar the arrangement of person (Puruṣavyavasthā) is governed by three sutras 'Yuṣmadyupapāde samānādhikaraṇe sthāninyapi madhyamaḥ' 'Asmadyuttamaḥ' Śeṣe Prathamaḥ' i e when Kāraka (agent etc) expressed by the affix has identity with the word Yuṣmad then the root takes the second person etc suffixes Similarly when the identity is with 'Asmad' it takes first person suffixes and in all other cases it takes the third personal affixes This is possible only in the Grammarian's theory, because to him the suffix denotes the agent or object kāraka And this system fails if we accept the Logician's theory that Kṛti is the denoted potentiality of the affix because there is no identity between the 'Kṛti and 'Yuṣmad' etc words

And suppose the opponent argues that on hearing the word 'Pacati' without any word in the nominative there does not arise any doubt whether the agent is one or not This is possible only when the number agrees with the agent Unless the agent is expressed directly or indirectly (through secondary signification) the number cannot agree with it Since Kṛti is denoted by the affix, there is no alternative except to accept secondary signification to the affix in the agent.

This argument of the Logician is based on the theory that the affix denotes Kṛti, but it is the very subject which is under dispute And as already mentioned it is now here experienced that Kṛti is the denoted potentiality of the affix Further the Logician takes it for granted that on hearing the word 'Pacati' there is no doubt regarding the number meaning of ONE But such a contention is also not correct For instance, when one says Anekaḥ Pacati definitely there arises the doubt whether the agent is one or not (i e one or two or more) Hence it is better to accept that the suffix denotes the agent etc

Further according to the Grammarian, on hearing the word 'Pacati' there rises an expectancy with reference to the particularity or quality of agent in the form 'Kaḥ or Kīdṛśaḥ'', because to him (the Grammarian) the agent is already denoted by the affix This is common experience This is not possible unless the Logician admits that the agent etc, is denoted by the suffix Otherwise the nature of the enquiry should pertain to Kṛti i e in the form 'Kīdṛśī kṛtiḥ'

Further in words where suffixes are not found e g. Ajarghāḥ, Acakat Ahan etc the Logician explains that Yatna (Kṛti), number and tense meanings are being denoted by the verbal root and in other places they are denoted by the affix Thus all these meanings are denoted by the affix in certain cases and by the root in some other cases Thus it is a clear case of prolixity But to the Grammarian all these are denoted by the root itself and the suffix is only indicative (Dyotaka)

Suppose the opponant admits that according to him too the affix is only suggestive i e. all these meanings are suggested by the affix then Kṛti or Bhāvana, which you (Logician or Mīmāmsaka) argue as the expressed sense of the affix has to become attributive to the meaning denoted by the root contrary to your view because a suggested meaning, in the presence of an expressed meaning cannot be a substantive Otherwise the import 'Pākānukūlā kṛtiḥ'' where Kṛti is substantive will not be possible

Pāṇini has laid down the following aphorisms in his case system 'Anabhihite (if the agent or object not expressed) Karmaṇi Dvitīyā, Kartṛkaraṇa yostṛtīyā etc Here the Logician explains the sūtra 'Anabhihite' as the 'number of the Agent or object not being expressed' 1 (by the affix Lakāra) Thus he tries to explain the case system But he cannot absolutely maintain it Because in instances like 'Caitrah Paktā', 'Caitreṇa dṛsto ghataḥ' etc the Kṛt suffix does not denote the number of the agent or object Hence according to the Logician' the word 'Caitra' and 'Ghata' in the above sentences should take the instrumental and objective case affixes respectively, in which case the sentences become absurd But according to the Grammarian the suffix denotes the agent or object itself, hence the said sentences are correct And it cannot be argued by the Logician that the Kṛti suffix also, though there is no specific rule to that effect denotes the number as well, by virtue of its nature 2 If we accept this argument of the Logician, then there will be no need to formulate sūtras like 'Kartari Kṛt' wherein it is clearly laid down that Kṛt suffixes are enjoined in the sense of agent i e Kṛt suffixes denote agent alone Here also by accepting "svabhāvāt tadvācakatvam" we can drop the aphorism Further these aphorisms are laid down to restrict a word in its denotation, otherwise there will be a state of chaos

Of course the Logician may argue that in sentences like 'Caitraḥ Paktā', even the Grammarian cannot avoid instrumental case for the word Caitra, because the word 'Paktā' is a complex word (vṛtti padam) So the whole form has meaning but not parts and as such the agent cannot be denoted by the affix And the Sutra Kartṛ karaṇayostṛtīyā' has scope for operation there too To this the Grammarian Nāgeśa replies that it is grammar which governs or controlls the behaviour of words i e it governs the base or suffix etc to express certain meanings in certain contexts And the Logician (or the Mīmāṃsaka) must be aware of the fact

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1 Kartṛkarmaṇī lakāra vācye ityasyayamarthaḥ-Tadgatasaṃkhya Vacyeti (Śabdacintāmaṇi)

2 Anuśāsanābhāvepi svabhāvat tadvācakatvam

if all the means to arrive at the meaning of a word, grammar foremost one [1]

And the Logician may argue that he is prepared to accept uffix to denote both the agent and number so that Anabhihite is 'if the agent or the number of agent etc is not expressed' in the instances 'Caitrah paktā', Drsto ghatah' Caitrena etc will be no impropriety of case suffixes But this proposition e Logician is not genuine, because such an acceptance is tter of prolixity And even if the porlixity is toleiated by opponent, since the necessary word-formation is explained, t leads to too many undesirable results [2]

Further if 'Anabhihite' means when number is not express- y the affix 'then in instances like Caitra iva Maitrah pacati' the number in Caitra is not expressed by the suffix 'Ti' the d Caitra is to be used in the instrumental case

Furtner even in sentences like 'Caitiah pacati' etc the ry of the Logician does not hold good because the number essed by the suffix cannot agiee with the word in the nomi- ve becausa it is prevented by the number of the nominative affix Noi can it agree with Kiti Hence in the sentence d above the Logician cannot prevent the instrumental case for the word 'Caitra' It also cannot be argued by the Logi- that the number expressed by tne case affix is only for gram- ical purity so that the number expressed by the Tin suffix es with the word in the nominative (Caitra in Caitrah Pacati) ch (word) is not attributive to any other word To this Gra- arian replies such as argument is far from logic because the e meaning and the number meaning are expressed by the same d, so the number meaning of the case suffix quickly agrees

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Vyakara opamana kosapta vak t vyavah ratasca, vakyasya sesad vivitervādanti sannidnatah siddhapadasya vidhah
Samkhyā kartrādyanyatarānabhidhane ityarthe gauravam durjñeyatvam ca, Tadbhinna bhinnasyaiva anyatara rupatvāt (L M (nbp) Tiñartha P 23)

with its base meaning whereas the number meaning, expressed by the verbal affix does not have such an affinity to agree readily with the nominative base meaning But to the Grammarian the number expressed by the affix agrees with the agent itself (because to him, the agent is denoted by the affix) and to the Mimamsaka, too it agrees with the agent obtained through presumption. Thus the arguments of the Logician that the word 'Caitra' etc takes the nominative case, if its number is not expressed by the verbal affix, is not correct Here the idea is this According the sūtra the second and third personal or first personal affixes are enjoined when there is an identity between the karaka agent etc with the words yusmad, Asmad etc But in the given instances no such word is there and 'Parama tvam,' 'Tvat kalpah', 'Ati tvam' are not the words Yusmad etc So how can you justify the personal affixes? To this the reply given by Kaiyata is that in the sutra the word Yusmad means not only the word form yusmad but where the agent etc expressed by the verb word has an identity with one possessing the meaning Yusmad word Thus Ati tvam does not have a meaning equal to that of the word Yusmad In this the third person is justified In other cases second person is justified.

Now as regards the validity of system of person in sentences like 'Parama tvam pacasi', Tvatkalpaḥ pacasi, Atitvam pacati etc , the Grammarian explains the word Samanadhikarana, in the sutra 'Yusmadyupapade samanadhikarane sthaninyapi madhyamaḥ (P 1 4 105), as identity with action because of non-difference between the action and its possessor [1] Of course the Logician may argue that grammar is only to teach the purity of words but not to decide the meanings or give interpretations as he likes But he is totally mistaken. Because it is clearly said by the Nyayabhasyakara that 'Padasamaya jñanartham vyakaranam saktigrahakam

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1 Paretu yusmadi kriyā samanadhikarane iti vyakhyanam, kriya kriyavatosca abhedāt tatsulabham (L.M (kk) P 746,)

1 Therefore the Logician is not at liberty to interpret the orisms of grammar as he likes to suit his arguments

Now the Grammarian argues that the explanation of the ician regarding the denotation of agent object etc by Kṛt su-es is not satisfactory

In the Ākhyatavāda Siromani the argument put for-ward by Logician as regards the meaning of the Kṛt suffix is the experi-e of identity between the substantive and the attributive as in tences like 'Caitro ganta, gato grāmaḥ' Mitrāpakṭri, 'gatam am' etc And the other argument is the identity in number l gender as can be witnessed in the above words These two uments, as the Grammarian feels, cannot help the Logician, on other hand they are more in favour of the Grammarians' theory.

If experience is the authority then, in the case of suffixes too we have the same experience of denotation of ent, object etc, as in the case of the Kṛt suffixes So there o (i e in the case of Tin suffixes) the Logician has to admit the ent etc, as the denoted sense of the Tin suffix, because the y same logic applies there too

And secondly, as regards the identity in number and gender Grammarian points out that the Logician's argument suffers m the fault of partial applicability There are many sentences, ere, in spite of the identity between the base meanings there is identity in number and gender, e g Vedāḥ Pramaṇam, Gavo anam, Jātyākṛtivyaktayastu Padārthāḥ (Nyayasūtra) etc, Fur-r there are instances where the Kṛt suffix denotes mere activity j 'Paktā jātaḥ' which meens 'pako jataḥ' Here the Kṛt suffix es not denote the agent because of the saying "utpanne vidya-ne vā tathāprayogasambhavena, kṛtyāsrayasyātmanaā janana-nbhāve ca"

Samaya pālanārtham cedam padalakṣyanāyāḥ,
Vaconvakhyānam vyākaranam (Bhāṣya on the Nyāyasūtra 2-1-56).

It is not open to the Logician to argue that in such cases there is a possibility of forming sentence like 'Caitre gantā' instead of Caitraḥ gantā because Caitra being the substratum of Kṛti the word takes the locative case According to the Grammarian such usages can be warded off in the same way as the Logician wards off such usages in the case of Tiṅ suffixes i e the meaning of the kṛdanta i e kṛti agrees by the relation of substratumness with the meaning of the noun word which (word) is in the same substratum as in the case of the kṛdanta word This kṛti has its subsratum-ness in the denotation of the noun ending in the same case affix as that of the kṛdanta word [1] If the Logician argues that since no kṛdanta is used to denote Kṛti therefore a Kṛt suffix does not denote Kṛti, but kartā etc , on the same lines the Grammarian also argues that no Tiṅanta word is found used to denote mere kṛti so a Tiṅ suffix too does not denote kṛti but agent etc Further in the absence of the denotation of the agent by kṛt suffix the Logician cannot argue that the case-system (Abhidhānānabhidhana vyavasthā) fails We explain it if the kṛti is not expressed, then the agent takes instrumental as in the instance "Caitreṇa pakvas-taṇḍulaḥ" and where the kṛti of the agent is expressed it takes nominative as in ' Caitraḥ pācakaḥ". Then the Logician may question the agreement of kṛti in sentences like "Bhoktā tṛpyati", for that the Grammarian says in such stray cases we accept lakṣaṇā to denote agent Thus the Logician cannot maintain that a kṛt suffix always denotes agent only but not kṛti Hence the Logician has to admit that Tiṅ suffixes too denote the agent, object etc which fact is cognised in the experience of the sages And to the Grammarian, the kṛt suffix denotes agent object etc based on the aphorisms 'Kartari kṛt etc If the Logician says that for him too, this aphorism authorises the kṛt suffix to denote agent etc , what harm is there for him to accept the same dictation of the Grammarian in the case of Tiṅ suffixes too?

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1 Ākhyātārthakṛteḥ prathamānta padopasthāpya iva kṛdartha kṛteḥ kṛdanta samāna vibhaktikanāmārthe eva āśrayatayā anvayasvīkāreṇa adoṣāt (LM (kk) P 746)

presumed by the Bhāvanā because these two are secured through different means of knowledge 1

Further take the sentence "Caitraḥ pacati" Here everyone including the Mīmāmsaka, accepts that there exists identity between Caitra denoted by the word Caitra and the agent denoted by the verbal affix Now the Mīmāmsaka's theory compells us to accept that this indentity (Samānādhikaraṇya) exists between the denoted sense of the word Caitra and the agent obtained through a secondary signification (Lakṣitakartra) of the affix i e agent obtained by lakṣaṇā If the Mīmāmsaka means this, then he has to forego several other tenets of his Śastra like the (pūrvapakṣa of) Aruṇādhikaraṇa' and Guṇādhikaraṇa etc

ARUṆĀDHIKARAṆA AND THE GRAMMARIAN —

Aruṇādhikaraṇa is explained in this way There is an injunction "Aruṇayā Ekahāyanyā Pingākṣyā Somam Krīṇāti" (one should purchase some with a cow red, one year old and tawny eyed) As the Mīmāmsaka says the words Ekahāyanī and Pingākṣī agree with the verb since they are Dravyas and they have the indentity of case relationship with the cow But the word Āruṇya is not a substance but quality so it cannot independently agree with the verb On this point the Mīmāmsaka formulates his purvapakṣa that the āruṇya agrees with every thing used for the purchase of Soma There he clearly rejects the argument that the word Aruṇayā denotes substance through implication and that substance obtained through implication agrees with Bhāvanā (verb) Thus taking it granted that a substance obtained through implication cannot agree with that obtained by direct expression, the Mīmāmsaka formulates the purvapakṣa At this point the Grammarian questions how the Mīmāmsaka can take a different stand regarding the denotation of agent etc by the affix and argue there that the agent obtained by implication can have agreement with that expressed by Devadatta etc in sen-

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1 Nahi Śābdamaśābdenānveti

Further, if the Logician's theory is accepted we cannot justify certain generally accepted propositions For instance, when the effort, subsisting in Caitra, congenial to cooking (inflamming etc) is withdrawn, and while the rice is boiling and the cook (Caitra) is standing, watching the rice, then if anybody puts a question "what does Caitra do" normally the reply is Caitra cooks (Caitraḥ pacati), but according to Logician's theory this reply is not possible because the effort (Yatna) is not there i e the verb cannot be in the present tense and the reply must be in past tense, because the 'Yatna' is a matter of the past [1] But to the Grammarian there is no such difficulty Because all that the cook does till the softening (Viklitti) is produced, comes under the meaning of the root Since such an activity (vyāpāra) is there in Caitra, a root can take the present tense

Now Nāgesa silences both the Logician and the Mīmaṃsaka with his shrewed arguments The Logician and the Mīmāsaka based their theory that the suffix denotes Kṛti or Bhāvanā, on the explanation of the word 'Pacati' as 'Pākam karoti' Nagesa says that, if it be so, to him the explanatory sentence of 'Pācaka' as 'pacati iti pācakaḥ' is an authority to show that the affix denotes the agent The tenor of the argument is the same as that of the logician in the case of 'pacati pakam karoti' In pācaka there is the root and the suffix In pacati also there is the same root and the affix The meaning we get from both the suffixes must be the same And in the case of the word 'pācaka' you accept the suffix denotes the agent On the same lines here also the suffix Tin should denote agent only Thus the suffix denotes agent etc The import we get from the dissolved constituents of a complex word must be identical with (import) that we get directly from that word We cannot and should not get different imports from the explaining words and the word explained Hence the Tin suffix denotes agent etc but not Kṛti or Bhāvanā,

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1. Kim ca kṛtau kartranvaye pakesatyam kāṣṭa jvalanādyanukūle yatne naṣṭe, pacyamanamodanam pasyati Devadatte pacatityanapattiḥ (LM(kk) P 747,)

Here, the Logician, of course may object that he cannot accept the explanation offered on the basis of 'Pacatīti' 'Pācakaḥ' he says the import we get from both the words is not the same even if it be accepted that the Tiṅ suffix denotes the agent because the import from the word 'pacati' according to the Grammarians is "Eka kartṛkapākabhāvanā i e here the agent is an attributive and the action is the substantive But the import we get from Pācakaḥ is Pākakartā i e here the agent is the substantive and the action is the attributive Thus the relation between the substantive and attributive is reverse in the imports hence there is no identity in the import from the words explaning the complex word and the word explained

This objection of the Logician is set aside by the Grammarian who argues though the relation between the attributive and the substantive is reverse it is not an impedimant in cognising ... as in the case of 'Ākṣikaḥ or 'Kumbhakāra' or Citra-...

... Nāgeśa goes a step forward and argues that ... Tiṅ anta word expresses the sense of complex word ... as in pacati-pācakaḥ, there in the import of that word the kāraka is predominant and the action is subordinate, but if the ... word is an independent one i e does not form a part of the ... there the action is predominant and the kāraka is subordinate In fact, Nageśa says that 'the sense of the complex word is same as that conveyed by the constituents of the vigraha. ... and there is no change in the substantive-attributive relation ...

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* Tatra ca viśeṣaṇa viśeṣya bhāvaṃśe samanārthatva virahe ... aṃśe vivaraṇatvaṃ sakṛnirṇāyaktvaṃ ca samānārthatvaṃ syāditi bhāvaḥ (Bhūṣaṇa under kārikā 34,)

Here the idea is this' Samasta padāt citrābhinna gosvāmīti ... viśeṣyako bodhaḥ, Tadvigraha vākyāt yatsambandhinyaścitrā gāva iti go viśeṣyakāsca bodho jāyate Tadvatprakṛtepi vastutastu samāna eva viśeṣya viśeṣaṇabhāvo vṛtyarthopadarśake ... ye (LM (kk) P 748) Further details vide Bahuvrīhi samāsa prakaraṇa P 1485

Thus the Grammarian establishes, with all these arguments, that a verbal suffix denotes substratum of the form agent or object but never does it denote kṛti, yatna or Bhāvanā

The Meaning of the Verbal Affix - A Critical Assessment :-

The whole discussion on this subject can be summed up as follows -

Let us take a sentence like 'Caitra cooks'. Here from the verb word we get the various notions such as action (vyāpāra), result (phala) substratum (Āsraya) in the form of agent or object, Time (kāla), number (saṃkhyā) etc According to the Grammarian, action and result are expressed by the root, hence the remaining are to be accepted as denoted by the verbal affix say Tiṅ Now as regards the denotation of Time and number there is no difference of opinion among the Grammarian, the Logician, and the Mīmāṃsaka, but as regards the substratums of action and result, denotated by the Ākhyāta they differ The Grammarian, speaking in a general way, argues that in the active construction the verbal affix denotes the agent, and in the passive construction the verbal affix denotes the object In the impersonal form of the verb, the meaning of the affix is simply the meaning of the root-- 'Bhāva' as it is called The Grammarian argues that his conclusions are based on the authority of Pāṇini's sūtras like Laḥ Karmaṇi ca , Dvyekayoḥ , etc and the Nirukta, and the Mahābhāṣyakāra's clarifications Thus according to the Grammarian the import of a sentence like 'Caitra cooks' would be 'activity favourable to cooking having a single substratum non-different from Caitra [1] In passive voice too the import is activity (favourable to softening) which (activity) has for its substratum one non-different from Caitra (favourable to softening) and which result has rice as its

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1 Eka Caitra bhinnāśrayako pākānukūla vyapāraḥ

substratum[1] In sentence like 'the pot perishes (Ghato Nasyati) the import is "activity favourable to disappearance" (Nāsānukūlo vyaparaḥ) The activity mentioned here is nothing but the existence of a collection of meterials of destruction which are of the nature of the counterpositives With reference to sentences like 'He knows (Jānāti) similar is the import i e. activity favourable to knowledge, is the meaning of 'knowing'

The Mimamsaka and the Logician do not accept the above theory of the Grammarian

According to the Mimāmsaka the verbal affix denotes Bhāvanā but not the agent or object He opines that this Bhāvanā is different from the action denoted by the root, This Bhavanā produces the action denoted by the root Thus in the verbal import Bhāvanā is the primery substantive He arrives at this conclusion based mainly on the explanation of the word 'pacati' as 'pākam karoti The word 'karoti' expresses the meaning of the suffix Tip in 'pacati' And according to the Nirukta, this is Bhāvanā (effort or activity) and it is primary The agent or the object is obtained by presumption (Ākṣepa) The agent so obtained agrees with the word in the nominative by the relation of 'identity' Thus the import of a sentence like 'Caitra cooks' would be 'effort (which exists in the agent not different from Caitra) congenial to softening (Eka Caitrabhinnakartṛsamaveta viklittyanukūlā bhāvanā)' In the passive voice the import is

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1 Taṇḍulāsrayika yā viklittiḥ tadānukūlo Caitra nisto vyapāraḥ Vai Bhu P 28 Here it is to be noted that according to Dikṣita and Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa even in the passive construction, the activity part of the root meaning is the primary substantive But according to Nāgeśa the result part of the root meaning is the primary substantive, This later view (i e of Nāgeśa) is more correct than the other one as it supplies the appropriate emphasis on the result part
According to Nāgesa the import in the passive is of the form "Eka Caitrāśriyikā ya vartamānabhāvanā tajjanya ekataṇḍulāśrayikā viklittiḥ'

'Effort which produces the result subsisting in a substratum not different from rice (Tandulabhinn-sritatvakarmatva samānādhikara-ṇaphalaprayojikā bhāvanā) [1] In the impersonal form of a sentence like 'Caitreṇa supyate' the import is of the form "Bhāvanā of sleeping having Caitra as its agent (Caitrakartṛka svapaḥ)" The word Bhāvanā (effort or activity) has been explained as "the particular activity of a doer conducive something to be (being) [2] This Bhavana is causal in form and as such is always transitive

Futher the Mimamsaka takes the 'age old maxim[3] 'pratyayārthaḥ pradhānam' as an authority for his theory Reading this with the Nirukta words Bhavapradanamākhyātam he arrives at the conclusion that the affix denotes mainly Bhāvanā In fact from a verb word the action is primarily understood But Mīmamsaka cannot accept the entire action to be denoted by the affix for the reasons already explained So it appears he has taken action to mean physical activity This physical activity is produced after some inner action (Antaḥ vyapara) and physical action (Bahya ceṣṭā-rūpa) This physical action is denoted by the root as (vyapara) effort, the internal activity is called Bhāvanā and is denoted by the affix And to substantiate it, he says the root Kṛ denotes it in the explanatory sentence Pakam karoti Besides this, we find no valid reason or argument on the part of the Mimamsaka The Grammarian does not accept this argument of the Mīmamsaka Aftier all the explanatory sentence, according to Nagesa shows that both the internal and physical activities are contained in the root meaning itself Thus the root Kṛ shows the action in general and the root 'Pac' denotes action in particular which cannot exist without the former [4] Since this internal activity is expressed by the root itself, there is no need to accept a separate denotation of it by the affix [5] Since agent etc is not expressed by the root it is logical to accept that the affix denotes the agent

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1 Bhā Cin P 114

2 Bhaviturbavanānukulo bhāvaka vyāpāra viśeṣaḥ

3 Vide refutation of the old Logician's theory

4 Nirviśeṣam na samanyam bhāvecchasaviśeṣānavad

5 Ananyalabhyaḥ sabdarthaḥ

etc Otherwise, the Grammarian argues that the Mimamsaka cannot satisfactorily explain Arunaadhikarana, Gunaadhikarana etc

In fact Kumarila, the very propounder of the Bhaatta school is not definite whether this Bhaavana is denoted by the root or the suffix or by the entire verb word But however basing himself on the maxim of pratyayaarthapraadhānya he says, let this Bhaavana be denoted by the affix Kumarila mentions clearly that neither the Sūtrakāra nor the Bhāṣyakāra ever said that Bhāvana was denoted by the suffix Though there is no logical reasoning (specific reason worth to be mentioned) in stating that the Bhāvana is denoted by the suffix, still it is conventionally accepted in the Śāstra that the suffix denotes Bhāvana 1 When we examine impartially it is clear that this convention has no approval or sanction of the sage, Jaimini or Śabara, the bhāṣyakāra The Grammarian establishes that his theory is based clearly on the Sūtras and the Bhāṣya of his sages The Prabhākara school of Mimamsaka also admits that the suffix in general does not denote Bhavana except in the case of the Lin affix

Now according to the Logician the suffix denotes Kṛti (effort i e internal action), which is not different from the subjectness (kartṛtva). This in essence is not different from the Grammarian's view point except for the fact that the former's view is less cumbersome in that subject is the substratum of activity To the Logician the meaning of substratum which is essential for the import of the sentence, is supplied by syntactical connection. His argument is mainly based on two reasons ' Brevity vs Prolixity"

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1 Kimca "Bhāvanā gamyamānā ca dhātupratyaya sannidhau, kasya vācyeti vispaṣṭam na kadacit pratīyate " Bhāvanā tu samudaya vyabhicarat samuditayorevartha ityapi sakyam vaktum Tathā ca sūtrakarabhāṣyakarābhyam bhāvārtha karmaśabdā iti samānādhikaraṇyamevasritam, Na bhāvārthatvena pratyayāḥ kathitāḥ Śāstre tu sarvatra pratyayartho bhāvaneti vyavahāraḥ Yadyapi anyad viveka karaṇam nāsti tathāpi prādhanyam pratyayarthadharmam dṛstuā nūmiyam pratyayārtha ityavagamyate (Tan. Vār. on Sutra 2 1,1)

When syntax itself can supply the meaning substratum (i e agent etc), it is not judicious to accept potentiality in the affix in that meaning also Thus according to him the import of the sentence in the active voice is "The substratum of activity favourable to cooking is Caitra" [1] In the passive voice, however, the import is one where the object is the primary substantive and the activity qualifies the result [2] The Logician fails to show any authority from the original texts to the fact that the affix denotes Kṛti but not the agent He has no special argument except that of the Mīmāṃsaka in this matter What is called Bhāvanā by the Mīmāṃsaka is called Kṛti by the Logician while sages like Jaimini and Gautama did not say anything regarding the meaning of the affix, but kept quiet thus accepting Pāṇini's theory, their followers tried to deviate from their sages They started to give their own interpretation and to substantiate their stand, they tried all the means at their disposal, but in many places they failed And in some cases they fell in line with the Grammarian,

Now leaving aside the sanction from the sages, let us examine the arguments of the three schools at their face value

Besides the meanings number and tense, according to the Logician and Mīmāṃsaka the verbal affix denotes effort (Kṛti or Bhāvanā) while to the Grammarian the affix denotes substratum i e the agent or the object The Logician has to secure the substratum from other sources To claim that the substratum of the effort is obtained through syntactical connection (saṃsarga) is not sound, because in a sentence consisting of one word like 'Pacati' there is no other word to speak of syntax If he argues that the number denoted by the affix supplies the substratum as one (Ekaḥ) etc then he will almost become a Mīmāṃsaka who supplies the subject itself by implication Further acceptance of two potentialities--one for the verbal root to denote physical activity and another for the verbal affix to denote effort involves

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1 Viklittyanukula vyāpāravān caitraḥ

2. Caitraniṣṭa kṛtijanya viklittyāśrayaḥ taṇḍulaḥ.

(constitute) prolixity Since the root denotes a part of activity i e physical activity, it is logical to allow the other part of the activity i e effort too, to be denoted by the root itself, so that we can secure the meaning of substratum from the verbal affix by direct denotation without resorting to other means Further the Mīmāmsaka secures the agent through another means of knowledge viz presumption (Lakṣaṇā) and to the Logician it is through saṃsarga But neither of them is justifiable because all verbal import (Śābdabodha) comes under verbal testimony (Śabdapramāṇa) only

The following are a few instances where the Logician fails to give a more reasonable and satisfactory explanation

In sentences like "Kāṣṭhāni Pākam kurvanti, Ankuro Na kṛtaā, Bījādinā kṛtah etc the Logigician cannot admit that the root Kṛ denotes effort (Kṛti) Such being the position it is a poor argument to say that the root Kṛ in the explanatory sentence 'Pacati-Pākam karoti' denotes kṛti

To the Logician the Tiṅ denotes Kṛti in some places and implies substratum (Āśraya) in some other places which is a matter of prolixity

The identity of the word Yuṣmad with the meaning of the Tiṅ as laid down by the Sūtra Yusmadyupapade[1] etc cannot be satisfactorily explained by the Logician

And the Abhidhāna-Anabhidhāna vyavasthā also cannot logically be maintained

And in the passive construction, the suffix does not denote Kṛti So no reply can properly be given to the question 'what is being done (kim kriyate) Further to the Logician the meaning 'Time' agrees with the Kṛti in some cases and with the action (vyā-

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1 Yuṣmadyupapade samānādhikaraṇe sthāninyapi madhyamaḥ (P. 1 4 105)

para) in some other cases It is a clear case of prolixity And the Mimamsaka also has his own drawback in answering certain questions put by the Grammarian in establishing the primary importance to that which is denoted by the suffix Further if it is only for the sake of primary importance that Bhāvanā is to be expressed by the Tin suffix the Grammarian says even if it is not expressed by the Tin suffix, its importance can be claimed on the basis of his own Jāti-vyakti sakti theory wherein he posits that even though Jāti is the denoted sense of a word for him, he has no objection to admit primary importance to the individual in necessary cases Otherwise the Mimāmsaka fails to show any reason why the presumed Karta should not be predominant over Bhavanā on the same basis of jati vyakti theory

The expressed number meaning has to agree with the unexpressed meaning, the agent And also by arguing that the agent etc is obtained by Āksepa or Laksana, the Mimamsaka cannot explain fairly well the conclusions he arrived at in Arunadhikarana, Gunādhikarana etc

Further in so far as it concerns usages like 'The car goes pertaining to insentient substances the theory of the Grammarians can offer more satisfactory explanation than the other two schools because to him (the Grammarian) activity (vyapāra) means both physical and internal activity Thus in such a sentence, in the view of the Grammarian there is no need to resort to implication, whereas in the case of the Logician and the Mimamsaka there is prolixity in taking recourse to the secondary meaning

Further if we keenly examine the verbal import of a sentence naturally there rises a doubt as to how far there is the necessity for accepting effort also in the meaning of the sentence, when there is the possibility of explaining the meaning of the sentence with the help of simple physical activity which is the meaning of the verbal root Of course effort can be presumed along with knowledge (Jñana) and desire (iccha)

Thus we can safely conclude that the theory of the Grammarian appears to be sound, because, in his theory the agent

ənoted by the verbal affıx The mental effort and the phisical /ıty are denoted by the verbal root And also the ınstances re thıs theory of the Grammarıan needs exceptıons are a few n compared wıth those of the Mīmāmsaka or the Logıcıan ıeır theory

And agaın ıt ıs the Grammarıan s theory alone that has the ·tıon of hıs sages whıle neıther the Mīmāmsaka nor the Logı- has the sanctıon of hıs sages Jaımını or Gautama Hence verbal affıx denotes substratum of the form agent or object nuncıated by the Grammar'an but not Kıtı or Bhāvanā as claı- by the Logıcıan





TIME (KĀLA)

Introduction :-

As already said, of the various meanings denoted by the Tiṅ affix, after the agent/object, the important meaning is 'Time' element The Time is a very peculiar entity which is beyond ones ken to understand or realise So there are many speculations among the Indian scholars As a matter of fact its philosophy is a very interesting one However we will review it in brief before discussing the Lakārārtha, through which this time element is generally made known in the verb word

Time is a peculiar entity which drew the attention of almost all scholars and intellectuals of the various doctrines and philosophies and we observe that it is a common practice of one and all to say that time is the chief factor in bringing about existence, maintence and destruction of things in the world Therefore every intellectual began to think of time and tried to define it in his own fashion to suit his own philosophy If we survey the entire literature on this subject we are to arrive at the conclusion that no one could definitely state what Time is, Time has defied a definition free of faults There are people who do not admit any entity called Time at all while on the other hand there are people to whom time is the creator himself [1] Thus these two types of thinkers form the two extreme ends in between which all other philosophers appear to traverse

Though the Grammarian looks at and deals with this time from an all together different points of view yet it is our duty to examine his views on this subject and the views of others as well Before analysing the views of different philosophers, the derivational import of the word 'Kala' is to be ascertained

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1 Sankhya sastra does not admit time as a separate and independent entity wile the Bhagavadgita says "Kaloham loka ksayakrt pravrddhah" (Bhagavadgita XI 32)

We come across the verbal root "Kala" in the First conjugation in the sense of to sound, count and again in the Tenth conjugation in the sense of 'movement, throw count[1] Taking these meanings into account, the derivational import of the word Kāla is given by Suśruta as "Kalayati, Kalayatiti va Kalaḥ" [2] Dallanācārya the commentator explains the said sutra as follows[3] - -Kāla is that which does not remain static even in its minute form It is Kala because it throws all beings into misery and joy or because it counts the days of every creature or to be in short, because it destroys every thing gradually

Vaiśeṣika System

According to this system kala is Nitya Vibhurakhaṇḍaḥ i e eternal (omnipresent), pervading (Vibhu) and single--partless (Akhaṇḍa) in character Conventional notions as moment, minute, day, year etc are derived by abstraction The activity of the sun, the moon etc is super imposed on it and is divided into parts only to conduct our worldly transactions, but in truth it is one Śankara Miśra holds that the relations of time are constant and irreversible[4] A clear distinction between time and direction is displayed in the Vaiśeṣika treatises There it is said that space (Dik) deals with coexistence and time with successions, i e space deals with visible objects and time deals with things produced and destroyed or rather with action[5] The Vaiśeṣika Sūtras regard time as the cause of things which suffer change but denied it of things which are eternal

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1 Kala-sabda saṃkhānayoḥ - Bhvādigaṇa, - and kala gatau, kṣepe, saṃkhyane ca - curadi gaṇa

2 Suśruta saṃhita 1-6-2

3 Sa kalaḥ sūkṣmamapi stokāmapi kalām bhāgam na līyate gatimatvāt sisto na bhavayati Anyetu na līyate ityatra kalīyate saṃkhyayate iti pathanti Vyakhyanayanti ca Kalīyate saṃkhyayate iti kalaḥ (Nibandhana saṃgraha, the commentary of Dallanācarya on the above Sūtra

4 Kim ca Niyatopaddhyunnayakaḥ kalaḥ anyatopādhyunnayika dik (Upaskara of Sāmkaramisra on Vai Su II-2-10)

5 Janyamātram kriyamātram vā kalopādhiḥ mūrtamātram digupādhiḥ (Siddhanata candrodaya)

The Sāmkhya View :

The Samkhya Philosophy does not admit the existence of a separate entity called Time This philosophy enumerates only twenty five original Tattwas in all Time is not mentioned among them They do not admit even space (Dik) among these They argue both time and space are only manifestations of Ether (Ākasa) 1

Vacaspati Misra condemns the Vaisesika theory regarding time He says that the Samkhya Philosophers hold those superimpositions alone on which the Vaisesikas depend for the division of the time which may be the direct causes for the reference of "future ' etc Hence away with the useless Time" 2

Therefore in the Samkhya theory another element in the shape of time is not admitted

Nyāya System .

The physical concepts of Nyāya and Vaisesika are almost the same In the Nyaya system Tmie is the uncommon cause of all experiences as past present and future It is the special cause of the cognition of priority and posteriority simultaneity, non-simultaneity and of the notions 'soon' 'late' etc

In the Nyāya system time is considered as one of the nine Dravyas and it is stated to have the qualities of number (Samkhyā) content (Parimana) separateness (Pṛthaktva) conjunction (Samyoga) and disjunction (Viyoga) 3

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1 Dikkālavakasat

2 Vide Vacaspati Misra's Tattvakaumudi on Samkhyakārika-33 "kalasca Vaisesikamate eko etc "

3 Samkhyadipancakam kaladisoḥ

Time is defined as the special cause of statements like past present etc [1] It is a special cause (Asādharaṇakāraṇa), because without the notion of time, usages like "This is past, future etc are rendered impossible The Muktāvalī defines it as the producer of the produced (objects) and the substratum of all the worlds [2]

Now the Logician argues that time is nothing but the very cause to which such a conception of order is traceable The existence of the cause is as real as the existence of the effect All the order referred to in this connection is in respect of activities (Sādhya) but not in respect of things made (Siddha vastu) Thus the special cause of the order of things appears to be space and that of activities is time This Time cannot be replaced by Ether (Ākasa)

Some Logicians like Ramakrishandhvarin, the author of Sikhamani hold that time is perceived as a qualification of objects of perception There is nothing as such sooner or later, before or after" apart from events and actions Hence time is a form of experience and is perceived by the sense organs as qualification of objects and actions Thus time is substantive reality 3

Raghunatha Siromani in his work argues that time is nothing different from God 4

Yoga System

According to the Yogasāstra, Time is an independent basic constituent Though the followers of the Yoga system closely follow the Samkhya system, they accept Time but not (Dik) Space

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1 Atītādi vyavohāra hetuḥ kālaḥ (Tarkasamgraha)

2 Janyānām janakaḥ kālaḥ Jagatāmāsrayo mataḥ,
Paratvadhī hetuḥ kṣaṇadiḥ syadupādhitaḥ
(Muktavalī-verse 4-5)

3 Nyaya Mañjarī P 136,137.

4 Dikkalau nesvarādatiricyete Mānabhavāt (Padārthatattva-nirupaṇam)

Yoga says like an atom, the minimal limit of matter, a m (ksana) is the minimal limit of time Further a moment is d as the time taken by an atom in motion in order to leave one (i e its place) and reach or occupy the next point ' [1] This m is so infinite small that it cannot come under the purview of p -tion of ordinary persons but its perception rests upon the s -ce Further this sequence of the uninterrupted success moments is called Time And the division of time into m hours days etc is only by a mental process No two mo can occur simultaneously because there can be no seq between things which occur at a time (simultaneously).

Here it must be noted that Grammarians accept this t of the Yoga system because its author Patañjali is the auth the Mahābhāsya Further it may also be bacause the time a has been sufficiently dealt with in the Yoga Sāstra, much said about it in Mahābhāsya

These moments are not visible to an ordinary eye Yogins with their intuitive knowledge (yogaodrsti) could co them and their succession And this succession of mome divided into days, months etc by superimposing the activi the Sun, Moon etc. That is the number of moments that from Sunrise to Sunset is counted and is called a ' and from Sunset to Sunrise, night Thus the succession o ments conditioned by these activities gives us the conce time, which an ordinary man feels perceivable In this way is eternal, pervading and single [2]

The Pūrva Mimamsa View

As the Yoga system, this system also accepts the ind dent existence of time. To them it is a substance (Dr This is one of the eleven substances [3]

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1 Yogabhasya on Yoga sutras 3-52
2 Detalied exposition in Yoga Bhāsya under III-13, III-52
3 Pṛthivyaptejo vāyurākāsakāla digātma manassabda Tan

But Nāgesa opines that Time is not a substance but it is only a mutation of Māyā He quotes Devipurana as "Vibhun nityo sthirah kalovasthā tasyatu hetutā" Another quotation he gives is from the Ramyana wherein "Kālapurusa" addressing Rama says "O Rama ! Killer of enemies" I am your son when you were the Brahman in the form of Being (Sattārūpa brahma-bhāve) I am born of Maya I conduct the creation, maintenance and destruction "1

The Advaita View :

In the Advaita Philosophy also time is considered as a power of Brahman This universe which is the illusory form of Brahman is devoid of sequence But the universe appears as having sequence i e there the manifestation of Brahman is irregular but this creation which is the result of such irregular manifestation is regular That is everything in this world undergoes a regulated change as Birth, existence, growth, change, decay and destruction It is to be noted that all these modifications do not manifest themselves simultaneously or in the reverse order This is due to the ability of suspension and permission effected by time power Thus Time is the power of the form of Avidyā of Brahman 2 A similar statement we find in the Bhagavadgita also, wherein Lord Krishna says that he himself is the Time causing the creation, maintenance and destruction of the entire cosmos 3

The Grammarian's View

Now coming to the theory of the Grammarians it is observed that neither Pānini nor Katyāyana has defined time or dealt

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1 Tavaham pūrvasadbhāve putraḥ parapuramjaya, Māyāsambhāvito Vira kālassarvasamaharaḥ (L M (kk) P 841)

2 Nirbhasopagam yoyam kramavāniva dṛsyate, Akramasyāpi Visvasya tatkalasya viceṣṭitam VP III-9-46

3 Kālosmi lokakṣayakṛt pravṛdho lokānsamāhartumihapravṛttaḥ (Bhagavadgita XI-32)

with its philosophy Both these sages use the word "Kāla" many of their sutras but nowhere did they define it It may that they have accepted "Kāla" as was accepetd by the tl scholars of different disciplines Whether it is a substance (Drav Power (Sakti) a unitary whole (Akhaṇḍa) or otherwise, it is undisputed fact all disciplines accepted a factor or indicate difference in the nature of any activity, such as a completed (pa action, continuing (Present) action or an action to be effect (future) etc Therefore the Grammarians as will be shown lat are satisfied with the notion of time to indicate the tense disti ctions Further Aṣṭādhyāyī is mainly a "Prakriyāgrantha" i concerned with the explanation of how a particular word is form to give a particular meaning Hence these sages might have n felt the need to investigate into the philosophy of Time

The View of Patañjali

Among Pāṇinians Patañjali is the first person to defir Time in his Mahābhāṣya According to him Time is that which seen as a cause for the growth or decay of objects And thi time when in close association with some action such as th movement of the Sun gets the designation of day, night etc i e Time being delimited by the movement of the Sun gets the nam day and it, in turn, when repeatedly counted, gets the name montl year etc ,[1]

Thus Time is that which causes (or trhough which) thing or objects to come into existence and undergo the six types o modifications

Again Patañjali commenting on a Sutra P 4 2 3 says tha Time is eternal[2] Thus reading the comments on P 2 2 5 anc P 4 2 3 put together we deduce that Time, according to Patañ

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1 Yena mūrtinām upacayścāpacayaśca lakṣyate taṃ kālamāhuḥ, Tasyaiva hi kayācit kriyayā yuktasyahariti ca bhavati rātririti ca Kayācit kriyayā, Ādityagatyā, Tayaivāsakṛdāvṛttyā māsa iti bhavati Samvatsara iti ca (M B on P 2 2 5)

1 Nityahi Kālanakṣatra (M B, on P 4 2 3)

jali, is an eternal entity which causes birth, growth and decay (objects The movements of the Sun, the Moon etc are superim posed on it and are called day, month, year etc As already sa Patañjali dealt with Kāla in his Yogasastra in detail

The Bhartihari's Philosophy of Time

Among Grammarians, next to Patanjali, it is Bharthari w dealt with the philosophy of Time The learned author devot an entire chapter "Kāla Samuddesa" in his Vakyapadīya to expl Time in all its subtleties There he gives an account, not only his own discipline, but of other disciplines as well His vie are not different from that of Patañjali The basic conception Time is in the form of a sequence of moments (Ksana) continu and all pervading (Vibhu) His views can be summarised follows .

This time notion is made use of not only by Grammari but also by every common man in his daily life This is the b cause for all the six types of modifications that occur in ev object

This universe is similar to a mechanical puppet whose n vements are controlled by time representing a puppet opera Every movement of each and every object including the plar that is to say in short, of the entire cosmos, is controlled by Just as a director of a play controls and directs every moven of an actor, so does time In every object in this world there diverse forces which can bring various changes in it For exar let us take a seed In it there exists a force (sakti) which ca sprouting another force causing flowering, another force budc and another force causing fruit and in like manner a numbe forces exists in it But all these forces do not act simultaneo If so, there will be nothing but a simple state of chaos naturally there arises a question "what is that which preven controlls all these forces and regularises them to act and with one after the other giving place to the next?" The reply is that supreme power 'Time' In the absence of such regularis in the form of suspension and permission (Pratibandha and

yanujña), all the six states may occur simultaneously or in an irregular way as fruit, sprout, flower, stalk etc [1] Though time is single, itself is manifoldly divided by differences resting on alien activities The true nature of a substance cannot be explained without any super imposition Just as due to the inherence of the genus cow (Gotva) etc, the reference to 'cow' etc are understood, in the same way, with regard to time, refernce is also made to "Time of creation, time of existence, time of destructian" etc due to the contact with activities such as creation etc But the differences of commingled activities are considered to be its peculiarities Divided by them, this term "TIME' effects diffenrent fixed limits For example the super imposed division by the activity of closing and opening of eye-lids time regulates the reference to Ksana, lava etc [2]

Bharthari explains that time is similar to a water machine (Jalayantra) Here the wheel in its cyclic rotations allows only some pots to take water and some others pots remain empty Similarly Time as it rotates allows only a few of the material causes existent in the beings, to operate while it prevents others Another important fact is that this time follows an order or the law of sequence in permitting or prohibitting these causes Thus by permitting and suspending (abhyanujña and pratibandha) these material causes from operation Time, causes or drives objects to undergo change Hence only, it is called Kala [3]

LIMITED INDEPENDENCE —

In this mundane world it appears as if every one acts independently of his own accord But it is not so Hari says that

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1 Utpattau ca sthitau caiva vinase capi tadvatam,
Nimittam kalamevahurvibhaktenatmana sthitam
Tamasya lokayantrasya sutradharam prackate,
Pratibandhabhyanujñabhyam tena visvam vibhajyate
Yadi na pratibadhniyat pratibhadham ca notsrjet,
Avastha vyatikiryeran paurvaparyavinakitah (V P 3-9-3,45)

2 Samsarginam tu ye bheda visesastasya te matah, Sa bhinnasthanam kalo bhadaya kalpate. (V P 3-?-8)

3 Kalayatiti kalah

no one can transgress the limitations imposed by Kāla (Time) Take a bird or a cow tied with a long rope to a post and left in a field It can move as it likes but only wtih in a limited circle i e to the extent the rope premits So also every object in this world moves freely and independently only in that limited circle as is premitted by Time 3 It is the case not only with animate objects but the inanimate ones also A building, a table, chiar or anything can hold its parts fast only for a limited period, may be, it is a few years, decades or centruries

Time gives permission to such material causes which bring strength to these beings and then some other material causes which keep the strength for a limited period Then this time with draws permission to these and permits other material causes which destroy the object Thus every thing which comes into existence in this creation (including planets) has to disappear one day or other and till such time its movements are governed by time

Division of Time

Time has an eternal course through suspension and permission Being divided by this it obtains the form of sequence As already said it is due to the difference of super imposition of alien activities with regard to a person or an object which posseses the states of existence and non-existence This single Time is called beginning, functioning and completion time And again this time having activity as its super imposition becomes past future and present which are divided into eleven forms 2 Amongst these, past Time is of five kinds Future time is of four kinds and

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1 Protibadhasya yastena citra viswasya vrttayah,
Tassa evanujanati yathā tantuh saunikāh (V P 3-9-15)

2 Vak III-9-37 Ekabasadhir ākārair vibhaktāh pratipadyate
Past P 3 2 110, P 3 3 102, P 3 2 111, P 3 2 115, P 3 3 132
Future P 3 3 13, P 3,3 164, P 3 3 15, P 3 3,135
Present P, 3 2,123, P 3 3 131

present is of two kinds Thus all together there are eleven divisions Of course this division of time into past present etc is an act of mental fabrication but in reality time is single Thus just to make clear of the distinction of the activities, this division of time is taught In reality time is unitary, but it is called past when the activity is finished When the activity is expected it is called future and when the activity is present in the form of a flow of moments, it is called present Thus this three-fold division of time is possible This is all apparent

Power of Time :

There are three powers of the single and undivided time which remain firm They are called present power (Vartamāna-sakti), past-power (Bhūtasakti) and future power (Bhavisyatsakti) Thus by coming in contact with them all the existing beings appear and disappear [1]

Of these three powers, two powers i e the past-- and future powers effect concealment of existing beings, while the present power makes the form of beings visible [2]

Now a question may be asked why does not the remanifestation of beings covered by past power take place in the same way as that of those covered by future power and present power? The answer is like this Future power does not obstruct present power which is associated with creation i e in the presence of capable cause future-power gives permission to bring an object into perception and it (Future power) retreats from there But the past power is not of such a nature

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1 Ekasya saktayastisrah kālasya samavasthitāḥ, Yatsambandena bhāvānām darsanādarsane satam (V P 3-9-49).

2 Dvabhyām Sa kāla saktibhyām bhavanām bhānām Varnātmakah, Saktistuvartamānākhyā bhāvarūpaprakāsinī, (V.P 3-9-50).

Now some scholars opine that time has only two powers effecting, Suspension and Permission The state of an object i e controlled by either the past power or the future power is the same i e invisibility And (that) the state of an objeet controlled by the present power is visible Thus there is only one power both in past and future courses characterised by suspension, belonging to time The second power of time is characterised by permission effect the manifestation of beings [1]

But this is not correct There is a fundamental difference in nature between the Future power and Past power The beings or objects which are under the sway of the Future power can be brought into existence through present power But those which are under the sway of the past power cannot be brought back into existence Thus these three powers are distinct in their nature

Now Bharthari sums up different views on the real state of time according to their sources Some call it 'Shakti, some Ātma and others a deity (Devata) and some others call activity itself, is time [2]

However according to Bharthari, Time is an independent power of Brahman [3] This has already been established in the Brahmakanda Due to the experience of objects (being) created, maintained and destroyed through a series of causes, it should be admitted that there is a time power Thus it is appropriate to accept that time is the independent power of the self-existing spirit (Brahman)

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1 Dve eva kālasya vibhoḥ keṣāṃcitcitchaktivartmanī, Karoti yābhyām bhāvāmunmīlana nimīlane (V P 3-9-56)

2 Śaktyātmadevatāpakṣe bhinnam kālasya darśanam. V.P 3-9-62.

3 Kalākhyā svatantrysaktiḥ Brahmaṇaḥ iti tatrabhavadbhartṛhererabhiprāyaḥ For more details Helaraja's Commentary on V P 3 9-62 63,64 ibid

Review

Thus the views of Bhartṛhari regarding the time can be summarised as follows

Time is single, all pervading and eternal. Its physical farm is a kṣaṇa (moment) These moments continuously shoot out from Brahman They are not visible to the naked eye of a common man. Only people possessing super natural vision can see time in its naked subtlety Hence the great sages, in order to facilitate the notions of time to an ordinary man, perceived successive flow of the moments, in the mind They divided the flow into bits as Lava, Pala, Muhūrta, day, week etc with the help of the activity of the objects such as Ghaṭī Yantra, Sun's movement etc duly superimposed on time Time is different from activity and is delimited by it

Time is the material cause for the birth, existence and destruction of this mundane world Tne notions such as Past, Present and Future are mental fabrications only Time has many powers as "Pratibandha, abhyanujñā, krama, jarā, bhūta, bhaviṣyat and vartamana etc

Reality of Time

Time is the creative power Time and its powers are the real so long a man is under the influence of Avidya (illusion) All these time divisions etc are only with reference to a common man who is under the spell of ignorance (Avidya) But once a man attains true knowledge (Brahmajñana or Vidyā) the entire universe is recognised as mere illusion. Thus the Time which is the first creation of Māya sakti (Avidya) disappears together with the entire Universe (Vak III-9-62-72))

The View of Kaiyata

According to Kaiyata, time is not different from activity

It is unitary and eternal 1 He looks at time as the activity of the Sun which is well known among the people All other activities are referred with respect to this (sun's) movement Further in our daiby life we find people use words day, week, month etc to denote time' which (i e day week, month etc) is nothing but repeated activity of the Sun Hence Kaiyate states that a particular-known activity (of the Sun etc) itself when it delimits action produces a knowledge of another activity, is called time [2]

Kaiyata does not favour the view that Time is something different from activity This type of distaste is clearly indicated by him while commenting on the Bhāṣya on P 3 2 84 (Bhute) There he says some people say that time is eternal and is the cause to permit or suspend the existence, growth and decay of objects, and there such usages as month etc and past, present, future are the interrupted limitations of the Sun s activity superimposed on it But others (Anye) sav that the famous activity of the Sun, which is the cause of differentiating other inferior activities, and spoken as day etc is Time" Here from the word 'Kechit' we can understand that the statement under this caption is not acceptable to the author Thus from the Pradipa on P 3 2 84 it is clear that Kaiyata favours the theory that famous activity of the Sun is Time Similar views are expressed by him while commenting on the Bhāṣya on P 4 2 3 etc

It is observed that long before Bhartihari, there existed a a section of people who looked upon Time as nothing different from the Sun's activity Hari records their doctrine also in his

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1 Tadyuktāditi-Kalastu nityo vyāpīceti (Pradipa on M B 4-2-3)

2 Iheti-Prasiddha parimaṇa kriyaiva kriyāntara paricchedat kala ityuktam Tā iti tāsāmeva kālarūpatvat kālasya ca kriyādhikaraṇatvāditi bhāvaḥ (Pradīpa under M B on P 3 2 123 Vartamāne Lat)

Vākyapadıya.[1] And Kaiyata appears to be a follower of this section of people

Views of Later Grammarians :
Dıksıta and Kaundabhatta

Even among Grammrians there exists a difference of opinion regarding the conception of Time Dīksıta and Kaundabhatta opine that time is not different from action (Krıyā), while Nāgesa disagrees with them Now let us examine the views of Dsksıta and Kaundabhatta

According to these two Grammarians Time is not experienced as something different from actions[2] There is nothing called Time which has pastness, presenteness or futurity. It is only action which is spoken of as past, present or future Therefore there is no proof to accept time as different from action Further by accepting Time as a separte entity we have to create its determinant also which is a matter of prolixity[3] And also they argue that their theory is in conformity with that of the Bhāsyakāra They quote Bhāsya on P 3 2 123 Bhasyakara expresses a doubt as to "how to justify the use of different lakaras (Tenses) in the case of eternal objects like mountains, rivers, Ātman etc which have neither a beginning or an end", bacause they do not have such activities as commenced and not completed etc

Now Kaundabhatta argues if there is Time which is different from action, then there is no need for Patañjalı to entertain such

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1 Āditya graha naksatra parıspanda mathapare, Bhınnamāvrttı bhedena kālam kalavido viduḥ (V P 3-9-76) and Krıyāntara-parıcchede pravıtta ya krıyām pratı Nırjñātaparımāna sā kāla ityabhıdhıyate (V P 3-9-77) Bhūte P 3-2-84, Naksatrena yuktah kālah P 4-2-3

2 Vyāpārasantānātırıkta kālasya anabhyupagamat, Mānābhāvāt (Vai Bhūsana-Kārıka 22, Vartemāne parokse etc)

3 Atırıkta kalpane tat saktasyāpı kalpanāpattau gauravāpattesca (ıbıd)

a doubt how to justify the different tenses. beause they can be justified taking the time factor only into account Therefore this entertainment of doubt, confirms that Time is not different from action

And peculiarly the reply to the above doubt also confirms the view that Time and action are one Patañjali solves the problem by saying the activities of the then existing kings are taken into account, and super imposed on these objects Since the activities of these kinqs have a beginning ending etc. due to their superimposition, use of defferent tenses is justified. Thus if Time and Action are different, they argue, there is no need for Patañjali to take the actions of the then existing kings into account to justify the use of different tenses Further Kauṇḍabhatta quotes Kaiyata on this [1] Kaiyata says that as the state of kings varies, it is a past, future or present owing to kings that are gone or are to come or are in existence It the is difference in their states that causes a difference in the state of mountains etc Thus time is but a collection of activities As a matter of fact or practically time is not some thing different but action only [2]

THE VIEWS OF NĀGEṢA —

Nāgeṣa does not agree with the views expressed by Kaiyata, Bhāttoji Dīkṣita and Kauṇḍabhatta According to him Time is definitely different from action It is a delimitar of action He accepts the tenets of the Yoga Sāstra as far as they are concerned with Time He fully falls in line with Bhartṛhari

Nāgeṣa defines Time as that continuous flow of Kṣaṇa which are but a very momentary which is manifestation or modification of Prakṛti These moments continuously flow out from

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1 Evameva siddhānta bhāṣyam kaiyatopi vyacaṣte
"Tatra rajñām sthiti bhūtādi bhedena bhinnā Parvatādi sthiyadeḥ bhediketi kriyārūpatvam Kālatraya yogaśca upapadyate ityarthah" (ibid)

2 Vastutaḥ kālo nātiriktah, kimtu kriyaiva (ibid)

Brahman and so Time is eternal The words lava, pala, day, night month etc denote different numbers of moments or to say a certain number of moments is called Lava or minute, and a certain number of minutes a day etc [1] And these moments are mentally perceived and are differentiated with the help of various activities

Refutation of Kaiyata's Theory :—

Nāgesa gives a bitter attack to the doctrine of Kaiyata and his followers viz Dīksita and Kaundabhatta He says that if we accept their theory there is the unwelcome possibility of a statement like 'The pot exists in the sun's activity' on the lines of statement" The pot exists in Time [2]

This theory of theirs receives a severe criticism from Nāgesa Nāgesa argues that it is an accepted fact of all disciplins that an action lasts for at least three moments If time and action are one and the same then the statement Triksanāvastāyī Kriyā becomes non-sensical So this notion of moment is not possible in Kaiyate's theory Of course it may be argued that the very contact with the later place is the destroyer of the contact with the previous place Therefore the activity limited by it can be construed as Moment (Ksana) [3] But the argument is not valid If the activity limited by the contact with later place (uttaradesa samyoga vacchinna kriyā) is itself a ksana, then the argument suffers from the following defect—

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1 Prakiteh parimānasya vivartasya vā atibhangurasya vibhoh ksnasya dhārāyāh kālatvāt, Tasyaiva ksanasya pracayavisesaih pala lava ghatī muhūrtāhorātradi dviparārdha paryanta vyavahārah (L M (kk) P 839).

2 Yattu Prasiddha parimānā sūryakriyaiva kriyāntara pariccheda hetutwāt kalah, kālatvenaiva rūpena tasyāh kālika sambandhāvacchinnādhāratvena "Etat kriyāyām ghatah" iti na prayoga iti. L M. (kk) P 847

3 Tanna Kriyāyāh triksanāvasthāyitvena ksana vyavavahārānāpatteh (ibid)

limited by the contact with later place exists in Firstly the activity limited by the antecedent tion, Secondly activity limited by antecedent lasa) and finally the activity limited by this hese three stand in swarūpa sambanadha, be- negation also lasts till such time

tivity limited by the contact with latter place d as a moment, because it takes at least three ippose it is argued that this ' uttaradesa Samyo- is different from the above three types, then hat activity is time does not arise 1 Therefore d that time is different from action

argument that special activity i e the activity tact with the the later place, is Ksana, is some still there lies another defect in Kayata's theory

ollows In a single moment a number of activi- ted by the contact with later place-may occur ty is a ksana then a number of ksanas occur in ch is absurd In a single moment a number of ilt but not a number of moments And we do experience Further this activity of the Sun, ne, can be limited by the activity of some other se it (the Sun's activity) losses its eligibility to be

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visesya visesana tatsambandharūpatve
sthiratvena ksana vyavahārāsambhavāt
atiriktam tarhi paribhāsāmātramevātirikto na
(kk) P 847)
am jñanavisesam Tat jñanam tatsāmagrya-
cideva bhavati Tathā ca vijātiya jnāna visesa
a, tajjanya vibhāgaprāgabhāvau ksanasabdapra.
tyaruceraha. (Kuñcika-Commentary-L M.

termed as Time[1] It should not be contemplated which action can delimit the Sun's activity because the creator's activity delimits it It is well established through many Vedic scriptures that creator himself is the time (īswarasyāpi kāla niyāmakatvena kāla-vyavahāra ' si tyadisu prasiddhaḥ)

Therefore the theory that Time is action itself cannot be accepted And ' it is also a single unit but differently referred owing to the various adjunctives' is also not correct as already shown

Now regarding the Bhasya concerning the usage of different lakāras with respect to eternal objects, Nāgesa claims that bhāsya was misunderstood by them It has been already stated that Kaundabhatta etc opine that the Bhasya on Vartamane Lat, is in favour of them According to them if there is anything called time, as distinct from action, then there is no need for Patañjali to raise a doubt, Even if a doubt is raised it should have been replied as "Rājñām ye kālaste tisthateradhi karanam" instead of taking recourse to activities as (Rajñām yaḥ kriyaḥ taḥ tistateradhikaraṇa-ma) Thus the very way of doubting and the way in which the doubt is cleared, clearly shows that the Bhāsyakara is of the opinion that Time is not different from action

Nāgesa refutes the above argument. According to him the words 'Yāḥ kriyāḥ' mean the time-divided activities i e the activi- of these kings duly qualified divided by Time Thus the time-qualified-actions are superimposed on the (existence of) mountains, self etc and appropriate tenses are used Of course it is true that Bhartṛhari says "well known actions like those of kings, cooking etc have dissimilar parts Through association with them, actions having similar parts are diversified "[2] Nagesa explains here the association (Sahacarya) comprises of time (Kala-

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1 Sūrya kriyāparimaṇatvasyāpi kriyāntarādau svīkāre anavasthā pattesca (L M (kk) P. 848 last line)

2. Prasiddhābhedā vyāpārā virūpāvayavakriyaḥ, Sāhacaryeṇa bhidyante sarūpāvayava kriyāḥ (V P.3-8-81)

ghatita), i e here the words 'those activities' (Yā kriyah) refer to time which divides the activities of the kings [1]

This argument of Nāgeśa is in concurrence with the Harikarikā which states "Every being is altered through alien activities but the soul of this being is not changed Therefore the standing of mountains etc is altered through an state" [2] And the commentary of Helārāja clearly states that a division of Time is applicable even to long standing objects like mountains, rivers etc on account of a difference of existence caused by their relation with the existence belonging to other things associated with them [3] The activities such as self-maintenance (Ātma satta) and the standing of mountains etc and their component activities similar in all the three times and hence their difference cannot be determined Therefore the state of the three times i e past, present and future their sequence, the nature of their accomplishment which subsists in the activities of the kings are attributed to the standing of mountains [4]

Another objection to accept the theory of Kaundabhatta is as follows If kala and kriya are one and the same, then activity cannot be the differentiator of itself, and it is also not in conformity with Bhartrhari s statement time is the dividing factor of activity [5]

Refutation of the Vaisesika Theory

As already stated in the Vaisesika theory time is one undi-

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1 Tatra kriyāpadasya tatparicchedaka kalaparatvena Tadīya kālasya parvatādi sthitavātmasattayam carope ityasayāt (L M (kk) P 848,)
2 V P 3-9-80 Paratobhidyate Sarvam
3 Parvata nadyānāmapi bhinna iti paropādhiritityuktameva. (Helārāja on V P 3-9-80)
4 ibid Helārāja on V P 3-9-80
5 Kriyābhedaya kālastu samkhyā sarvasya bhedikā (V.P, 3-9-2-2). Kālo amūrta kriyāparicheda hetuḥ (ibid Helārāja).

vided i e. (Single) eternal and all pervading. But Nāgeśa does not accept this theory According to him Time is the basis (substratum or the determinant) of action A single and unitary Time cannot be an attribute or adjunct to different activities More over usages such as 'Now the pot exists (idānīm ghaṭaḥ) will not be possible because it is not possible to call that Akhaṇḍakāla in terms of Khaṇḍas such as "Now, then etc" Thus the continuous and the well known activity of the Sun also cannot be the basis or the adjunct of other activities, because, if an activity can be a limitor of another activity then by accepting another activity to qualify this Sun's activity, it can be shown that the movement of the Sun cannot be called Time [1] Therefore it is not reasonable to say that Time is eternal, all pervading and unitary. And in support of his statements he quotes the Bhāṣya under Sūtra P 2 2 5 [4]

Thus Nāgeśa establishes the existence of Time distinct from Action It is in the form of Kṣaṇa and is the creative power of Brahman

EVALUATION

Thus summing up the views of the Grammarians we can say according to them Kṣaṇa the infinitesimal bit, is the real form of Time This Kṣaṇa is most unstable and perishes in the next moment But this does not mean it is nothing Definitely it is a substance (Dravya) These moments continually shoot out from the Creator This continuous flow of moments follows a sequence It is the basis of every object for its existence or otherwise This sequence of moments is cognised mentally and is divided into day, night etc. by super imposing the activities of other objects such as the Sun, Moon etc This mentally perceived time is divi-

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1 Kālasyādhikaraṇatvenaiva tattatkāryam prati kāraṇatayā upādhyanāliṅgatasyedānīm ghaṭa ityādi vyāvahāropayogyādhikaraṇatvāsambhavena parichinna sūryayā upādhitvāsambhavena tatparichedakāntara svīkāre anavasthāpatyādoṣat (L M (nbp) P 177)

2. P 2 2 5, Kālāḥ parimāṇinā. And also "Yena mūrtinām upacayāpacayāśca samvatsara iti ca bhavati" (M B on P 2 2 5).

ded in the intellect as past, present, future etc to suit our daily transactions This type of Time distinctions are indicated by using different lakaras

Now on a close observation of the various theories and doctrines as propounded by the various disciplines we can deduce he following facts ·

1 All the philosophers did unanimously accept the notions past, present and future (the distinct mental fabrications) of actions and hence justify their usages like Gacchati, Agac-chat, Gamiṣyati etc
2 They differ on the point whether Time is to be reckoned as a separate entity (substance Dravya) or not
3 Whether Time is in the form of the sequence of the infinite-simal bits called moments (Kṣaṇas) or is it one single unitary whole
4 Whether time and activity are one and the same or not

Now it may be questioned what the true nature or philoso-phy of time is? Stricly speaking it is not the duty of a Grammarian to investigate into this type of philosophy of Time It is sufficient for him to accept the notion of Time based on which the diffe-rent stages of the actions as past action, present action and future action can be expressed In this connection it is worth noting what Bhartṛhari says on this point 'Whether it is only something having an existence in the mind or whether it has an existence outside the mind, expression in words is not possible without recourse to the notion of Time 4

Therefore it is enough for a Grammarian without going deep into its philosophy, to accept Time as generally accepted by society at large to explain the usage of different words such as Abhūt, Bhaviṣyati, Bhavati etc to indicate different activities in different stages And this Time notion is the basis for all Tense distinctions in any language.

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1 Jñānānugataśaktim vā bāhyam vā satyataḥ sthitam,
kālātmānamanāśritya vyavahartum naśakyate V P 3-9-58

AGREEMENT OF TIME (KĀLĀNVAYANIRŪPANAM):

According to the Grammarian the Time element expressed by the Tin suffix agrees with the action denoted by the root, by temporal relation (Kalikasambandha) The authority for such a conclusion is the sutra of Panini "Vartamane Lat" (P 3 1 183) Thus the sutra read with the governing sutra "Dhatoh" (P 3 1,91) gives the meaning 'when the root meaning is intended to be expressed in the present tense, the suffix Lat is enjoined after the root' The root denotes both action and result So the question arises with which of the two the time element agrees The Grammarian says that the time element agrees with the action denoted by the root, so that the import is that the Lat suffix is enjoined after a verbal root when the activity denoted by it is intended to be expressed in the present time

If we say that the tense part agrees with the result part then the import of the sutra runs " When the result exists in the present time, then the suffix Lat is enjoined after the root 1 Thus when Caitra is cooking and the result 'Viklitti' (softening of the rice) has not yet come into existence, we cannot say "Caitra cooks", because the result is not present at that time Similarly though the action of cooking is completed and the result exists, then we have to use the sentence 'Caitraḥ Pacati but not Caitraḥ Apākṣit' Hence in order to avoid such an inconsistency we should not interpret that "the Lat suffix is enjoined after a verbal root when the result exists in the present time "

In a like manner we can argue that the time element cannot agree with the karaka (agent or object) because whenever the cook Caitra is there without performing the act of cooking we have to use the sentence "Caitrah Pacati ' which usage is against experience 2 Further, such usages as "Caitraḥ Apākṣit" 'Caitraḥ

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1 Phalasya Vartamanatve dhatoh Lat syat iti bodhah

2 In the import of the sutra in the present instance runs as Kartuḥ vartamanatve Dhātoh Lat syat

Paksyati' etc will not be rendered possible when Caitra is pre
Hence if the time element agrees with the action, wheneve
action of cooking is in the present time, then the suffix L
enjoined after the root, when the action is completed ther
root gets enjoined with the suffixes like Lit or Lan etc Thu
can explain, the usages like 'Caitra cooks' etc properly in ac
dance with experience Therefore taking all these probable w
usages into account, the Grammarian decides that the time ele
agrees with the action denoted by the root Thus so long
activity of cooking exists we use the sentence "Caitrah Pa
When this activity is completed we use the sentence "Ca
Apaksit" When the activity is to be brought into being, we
Caitrah Paksyati (Caitra will cook) etc And it is also lo
that the time element should agree with action which is pri
among all the meanings expressed by a verb word 1

Appaya Diksita in his 'Siddhantalesa sangraha' argues
at least in certain cases the time element should agree with
result part of the meaning denoted by the root 2 It is like
A man is suffering from the disease 'Vāta', He cannot stand.
he makes an effort to get up So in this stage, because the
an activity of the form of effort, there is every possibility of ma
a wrong usage as "Ayam uttistati" So Appaya Diksita conte
that if we accept the agreement of the Time element with the
sult, since no result is produced in the above said case, there
be no possibility of making wrong usages as "Ayamuttist
This argument of Diksita is not logical, Nagesa says, becaus
speaker cannot find the effort existing in the diseased pe
there will be the possibility of making a usage as "He does
stand" Even if he infers that the diseased man has that e
then the sentence will be of the form Ayamuttistati, kintu ph
na jayate But normally in such cases the sentence will be of
form "He tries to get up (Uthānāya yatate) 3 Hence even in
cases there is no need of the time factor to agree with the r
part

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1 Gauna mukhyayoh mukhye karya sampratyah

2 Siddhanta Lesasamgraha- Chaoter IV-2 3,

3 Ata eva tatra uthānaya yatate ityeva prayogah (L M p 15

The View of the Mīmāmsaka —

It is an undisputed fact that time element agrees with that meaning which is primary among all the meanings denoted by the verb So the Mimamsaka argues that the time element agrees with Bhavanā, because to him Bhāvanā is predominant among all the meanings denoted by a verb word Further, since Bhāvanā and Time are expressed by the same Tin suffix, on the law of frugality, there can be an agreement between them (Ekapadībhidhānāt) Khaṇḍa Deva says that the time element generally agrees with kṛti the meaning of the Tin suffix [1] However in the case of verbs like 'Jānāti', 'Karoti' etc the time element agrees with substratumness (Āsrayatva) which is denoted by the suffix And in the case of ' Nasyati'' the time element agrees with the counterpositiveness of destruction (Nasa pratiyogitva) In the case of the negative sentences lil e ''Caitraḥ na pacati'', the time element agrees with Bhavanā by the relation of counterpositiveness of the absence at that particular time, or may directly agree with Bhāvanā [2]

Now since the Grammarian does not accept that there is something called Bhāvanā being denotep by the suffix he does not accept the Mīmāmsaka theory The Grammarian points out that in instances like 'Jānāti', when Caitra does not possess the knowledge, because there always exists substratumness, wrong usages as ''Caitraḥ janati'' will result. Further when Caitra remains quiet without any action, simply observing the boiling rice, then the popular usage 'Caitra cooks' will not be rendared possible since there is no kṛti or Bhāvanā at that instant Most probably to avoib the said faults, Khaṇḍa Deva seems to have reluctantly admitted the agreement of the Time element with Bhāvana through the action denoted by the root [3] However his final decision is

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1 Atra sarvatra kṛti sabdo bhāvanaparaḥ (Bhā Rah P 51,)

2 Nañ samabhi vyāhāre tu tatkālīnābhava pratiyogitva sambandhena (sākṣādeva vā) tasyāmeva' (Bhā Rah P 51,)

3 Evam laḍādivācya kālopi pārstikānvayalabhya Dhātvarthadwārā Sākṣātsambandhenaiva va, Bhāvananvayi (Mī Kau Bhāvarthādhi karana)

that the time factor agrees directly with Bhāvanā as is stated in his Rahasya, which is a later work

The View of the Logician

It has been observed that according to the Logician the Tiṅ suffix denotes Kṛti but not the agent or object, and this kṛti is primary with reference to the other meanings expressed by the verb word So the Logician argues that the time element directly agrees with kṛti itself Of course, in cases where the Tiṅ suffix does not denote kṛti as in the sentences "Ratho gacchati, Caitraḥ jānāti karoti" etc , the time element agrees with the meaning of the root viz action (Vyāpāra), and through it agrees with the word in the nominative by the relation of substratumness Thus from the sentence 'Caitraḥ pacati' we understand that the kṛti exists in the present time (Vartamanakālikī kṛtiḥ) Further in the absence of kṛti in Caitra, though there exists Vyapara of the form of 'flame being in the contact of the pot etc , popular usages like 'Caitraḥ na pacati' are rendered possible And when we say "He cooks" there will not be any doubt, whether there is an effort or not in Caitra congenial to cooking [1]

As already said in the case of 'Jānāti' the time element agrees with the meaning of the root for the reasons already mentioned [2] In the case of verbs Nasyati and the like as in Ghato Nasyati etc Raghunatha, the author of the Dīdhiti, is of the opinion that it is better to hold that the meaning, counterpositiveness (Pratiyogitva) of the verbal affix cannot agree with the present tense denoted by the Lat suffix, inasmuch as Dhvamsa is presennt in both the time present and future Hence he proposes that the Lat affix in such cases be endowed with an additional meaning "utpatti" with which the time element denoted by the affix may

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1 Ayam pacatītyukte idānīmayam pakayatnavān na vā iti samśaya nivṛtth (Vyu Vā. P 595)

2 Jñānādyasatve api Tadasrdyatvādi sambandhe sati "jānāti" ityādi prayogāpatteh (Vyu Vā' P 596)

be made to agree 1 Gadādhara does not favour this suggestion of Raghunātha, to create an additional meaning 'utpatti' in the Lat affix and he prefers 'utpatti' to be a relation instead of the expressed sense of the Lat suffix 2

The Grammarian points out that there lies prolixity in the theory of Logician, because in some places like 'Pacati' the Time element agrees with kṛti and in some instances like 'Jānāti' 'Nasyati' etc the Time element agrees with Vyāpāra the meaning of the root Thus we have to create two cause and effect relations3 which is a matter of prolixity, Hence if it is accepted that the Time element always agrees with Vyāpāra, the meaning of the Root, then we need create only one'cause and effect' relation 4 Thus in view of breivity, the Grammarian's claim that the "Time element always agrees with Vyāpāra the meaning of the Root," appears to be more reasonable

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1 Nasyati ityādau kriyāyām kālānvayasvikāre nasytyādāvapi Nasyati ityādi prayogaḥ syāditi tatra utpatterapi ladādyarthamupagamya Tatraiva kalanvayam Dīdhitikṛdupa jagāma (Vyu Vā P o93)

2 Vartamānakālasyotpatti sambandhena dhātvarthe 'nvayaḥ ityapi Vadanti (Vyu Va P 594,)

3, Ākhyātārtha kālaprakāraka bodham prati visesyatayā Ākhyatārtho kṛti jñānām karaṇam Ākhyātārtha kālaprakāraka bodham prati visesyatayā dhātujanyopasthitiḥ kāraṇam

4. Ākhyātārtha kālaprakāraka bodham prati visesyatayā dhātu janyopastitiḥ kāraṇam

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PERSON (PURUSA)

A verb word, besides expressing Being (Vyāpāra) as process, conveys certain other notions such as Time, Person, number and aspect Of them the time-notion has been dealt with in the foregoing pages Now we discuss the notion 'Person'

On a close observation we find that Pāṇini did not use the word 'Puruṣa' in its technical sence anywhere in his Aṣṭādhyāyī He simply used the words "Prathama, Madhyama' and Utttama 1 The earlier grammarians used this word Puruṣa in its technical sense The word 'Puruṣa' originally stands for the 'Supreme self' or active consciousness (Caitanya) which exists in every object, though it is not distinctly experienced in some cases The Philosophy of 'Person'', as viewed by the grammarian is explained by Bhartṛhari in his Vākyapadiya 2 The earlier grammarians used the words ''Pratyakta and Paratva'' to denote the same that is denoted by the words "Uttama and Madhyama" The word Prayakta means the supreme consciousness which invariably exists in everyone i e Jīvatman And this notion is called Uttamapuruṣa 3 Thus when the Tiṅ suffix can suggest this notion that the action (denoted by the root) is being co-inherent with the ego-sense in the self (denoted by the first personal pronouns Aham etc) i e the speaker himself, then it is a case of uttama puruṣa Hence we use the first personal suffixes to convey this sense

Similarly by 'Paratva' is meant that the action, denoted by the root is being co-inherent with the ego-sense, not in the speaker but in the one addressed So when this notion is to be con-

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Tiṅastrīṇi prathama Madhyamottamāḥ, Asmadyuttamaḥ, Yuṣmadi madhyamah, śeṣe prathamaḥ V P 3-1̣-1 to 9

2 Pratyaktā Parabhavaścāpyupadhi kartṛkarmaṇoḥ, Tayoḥ stutiviśeṣeṇa vacakau madhyamottamau (V P 3-10-1)

3 Pratipuruṣan pratiniyatam vancati ceṣṭata iti pratyan, antaryāmi jivatma, Tadbhāva uttamapurusa vacyorthaḥ

veyed we use the Second Personal suffixes [1] Pratyakta i e the fact of being co-inherent with the ego sense, and Parabhāva, i e the fact of being different from that are both normally possible only in sentient beings Thus Pratyaktā as a notion is an attribute of the agent or object as suggested bv the Suffixes (Mi, E) in the words Pacami or Pacye

Now as regards the second person suffixes, they also indicate that the person addressed by the speaker is the substratum of this ego-sense along with the action denoted by the verbal root concerned The fact that this ego sense is being co-inherent with the one who is addressed by the speaker (denoted by the second personal pronoun Tvam etc) is a property of the agent or object and is suggested by the words as Pacasi or Pacyase Where such a fact that the ego-sense is co-existent with the speaker or the one addressed, is not definitely known (or is not intended to be conveyed) the third person suffix is used Here the suffix denotes the agent or object but is not capable of suggesting wheter the agent or the object is associated with the ego-sense i e sentiency The fact that the agent or the object is sentient or not is to be known through some other word but not throught the suffix [2] For example in 'Bhavan gacchati', the Tin su fix does not indicate whether this ego-sense is coexistent with the agent or not, but that fact is known by the word 'Bhavan'

The supreme consciosness or egosense which exists in the agent who is the speaker himself is denoted by the first personal pronouns, I We etc Similarly the supreme consciousness or ego-sense, which exists in th agent who is different from the speaker, but one who is addressed, is denoted by the second

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1 Madhyama vacyah sa hi kartikarma visesanabhūtah, Prasnādivisaya bhāvopagamana yogyah svatmanah parah svavācakat purvavad bhinnat pratiyate (Helaraja uhder V P 3-10-1)

2 Ata eva Kartikarma visesanatvat purusasya bhavavisayatanāstati, tatra lakāre madhyamottamayoraprayogah Pratyaktāparabhavautu sabdāntaraprayogavaseyau (Helaraja on V P III-10-1)

Personal pronoun 'thou', 'you' etc Hence where such ego sense is indicated by the verbal suffix itself then the words denoting it as I, or you are not used in the sentence

Now it may be questioned whether if the third personal verbal suffix does not denote the consciousness existing in the agent then, how is it, on hearing the verb 'Jānāti' etc we are experiencing that the agent is a sentient being To this, it is replied that such an experience is caused not by the verbal suffix, but with the help of the word 'to know' whose agent is a conscious being Thus the meaning of the root (like jñā, Budh Cit, etc) itself can only be the attribute of a sentient Being When the root itself does not mean something which is the property of a sentient Being, the Third Person suffix cannot denote sentiency as in "Kūlam patati '

Now, one may question the usage of the Second Person suffix in the Vedic sentence 'Sṛṇotu grāvāṇaḥ (O! Stones! Listen) where the agent of action (hearing) is something insentient Helārāja explains this as a case where sentiency is attributed to insentient entities, The first and second person suffixes can express either type of sentiency, be it real or attributed as associated with the Ego-self (Pratyakta) or with the other (para) 1 Hence in the present case, the speaker attributes sentiency to 'stones' and thus the usage of the second person suffix is justified But this explanation of Helārāja is not acceptable to Nāgeśabhatta

Ngaeśa explains this instance in a different way in his 'Laghu Mañjuṣā 2 According to him there is no attribution of sentiency to anything The Bhāṣyakāra explicitly states that everything in this creation is sentient in itself 3 In some objects this sentiency is clearly visible and in some other cases as in stones etc ,

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1. Sva, parādhisthānam bhāvikamadhyaropitam vā ābhyāmābhidhīyate kartṛkarmopādhibhūtam (Helarāja V P III-10-2)
2 Tatrahi cetanadharmasyacetane āropamanuktvā sarvasya cetanatveiyam siteḥ sadhyasādhanatvenoktā (L M (nbp) P 246)
3. Sarvasya cetanatvat (M B under P 3 1 7)

it is not visible. But when the speaker specifically wants to draw the attention of the hearer to this particular notion also, he uses second or first person suffixes Similarly when he wants to avoid this particular notion of ego-sense, the Third person suffixes are used as in the sentences "Bhāvān gacchati" and the like. Thus the Third Person suffix does not have any reference to this notion of sentiency or otherwise Of course there are some persons who are of the opinion that the Second Person suffix is used only to draw the attention of a person But this opinion is not correct, because, such an experience is not there from sentence like 'Tvam pecasi'

Thus to conclude, the first person verbal suffix denotes the agent or object in whom the action or the result denoted by the root coexists along with the Supreme ego-sense that can be denoted by the first person pronouns Similarly, the second person verbal suffix denotes the agent or object in whom the action or the result denoted by the root co-exists along with the ego-sense that can be denoted by the Second Personal pronouns i e one different from the speaker But the third personal verbal affix does not speak of the ego-sense that can be denoted by the word 'I or 'you' etc Hence we cannot say whether there is sentiency or not in the agent or object denoted by the verbal affix One thing is to be noted The notions of Ego-sense i e consciousness or sentiency are attributive to the agent or object, yet they do not have a place in the verbal import

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NUMBER (SAMKHY)

Of the various meanings denoted by the verbal (Tin) suffix umber is one Now one may ask "what is number and how is a ro ledge of it produced" To this we find many replies St tly speaking, there is nothing called Number which can exist in pendently Number is a mere mental conception or abstraction We always speak of number with respect to things as one th ng two things etc, Hence the Vaisesikas define number as a quality residing in a substance Number can never be perceived apart rom the things where it is found Every object in this world is single n itself but only wher it is in company the question of numb r arises Thus the notions two, three etc arise when there is multiplicity of things Excepting unity the rest of the numbers exist n more than one thing, Number qualifies not only substance but also another number as one-hundred, two-hundred etc The word 'Number' does not stand for or represent any particular numeral but it is a common name given to all numerals like one, two etc Not only this, number can be thought of as a substance -ata , sate, satani etc Number helps us to introduce distinction things

Bhartrhari records different views regarding the nature of Number [1] Some scholars opine that unity or oneness is the basis of duality etc, because if we want to make a distinction among the objects, this knowledge of unity preceeds all such distinctions Without this oneness other numbers such as two etc cannot come into existence In this connection Hari records two views According to the Vaisesika the two unities are the source of duality etc Some other scholars view that duality etc is a collection of two unities etc related to each other by the peculiar relation called 'Paryapti'

Geneally speaking 'Number' is difined as the special cause of counting [2] Annambhatta defines it as the peculiar cause of

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1. Vide V P 3-2-1 to 32
2. Ganana vyavahare tu hetuḥ samkhyabhidhiyate (Muktavali Verse 106)

the usage one-ness etc.[1] This number concept results from the 'Āpekṣābudhi' of the form "this is one, this is one" etc. Of course the Grammarian is not concerned with the question whether number can really be perceived apart from the things in which it is said to inhere After all numerals present us some property to help us distinquish things As a matter of fact number really belongs to substances (Dravyas), but it is the peculiarity of language which presents 'numbers' as existing in other things different from Dravya, such as qualities, universals and non-existence etc , otherwise it would not have been possible for us to make usages as 'twenty four qualities two universals, four non-existences' etc

ABEDAIKATVA SAṂKHYĀ —

Besides the number 'ONE' the philosophers accept another peculaiar number Abhediakatva-Saṃkhyā' i e 'the number one in general' The nature of this number is well explained by Hari[2] In compounds like 'Rājapuruṣa', the first number (Rājan) expresses sattva i e a substance which is concrete' So it must have a nuuber, but no particular number is understood Hence it is accepted that it expresses "number in general" From this, depening on the context, any required number can be made out Hence this is called "undifferentiated singular number'. Some other scholars explain the nature of this number in a different way Just as the singular number excludes duality, plurality, and duality excludes plurality and singularity etc in the same manner the 'Abhedaikatva' excludes all particularities i e singularity etc Thus it is viewed as possessing the common property of all numbers Only the context decides what particular is denoted by this Thus in other words it is looked upon as a kind of universal

As already said the Grammrian is not concenred with matters like, whether numbers are real or not, whether there is really plurality or singularity in a particular object etc . He is mainly

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1 Ekatvadi vyavahāra hetuḥ saṃkhyā (Tar.Sam)

2 V.P. 3-14-99 to 105

concerned with the notions which help in explaining the word-forms' Thus with this brief note on the philosophy of 'Number' now let us examine the nature of number expressed by the verbal (Tiṅ) affix

Now, as alraedy accepted, number is a quality Hence the number expressed by the Tiṅ suffix has to qualify a substance, so much so the question is what is that which the number qualifies, or in other words what is that with which this number agrees On this point also diverse opinions exist in the scholarly world

The Logicians decide that number expressed by the Tiṅ suffix agrees with 'the word in the nominative case which (word) is not an attribute to another

However some scholars among the Logicians argue that the Tiṅ suffix has no denotation in the singular number but only in dual and plural numbers

Among the Mīmāṃsakas a section argues the number expressed by the Tiṅ suffix qualifies or agrees with the agent or object (as the case may be) obtained by presumption through Bhāvanā The other section argues that this number agrees with Bhāvana itself

Even among the Grammarians some are of the opinion that the number meaning agrees with the agent or object meaning expressed by the same Tiṅ suffix, while some other scholars are of the view that this number agrees with 'Activity' (Vyāpara) expessed by the verbal root after which this Tiṅ suffix is enjoined

The View of the Logician :

According to the Logician the Tiṅ suffix denotes kṛti besides other meanings And this Kṛti agrees with the word in the nominative (which is not an attributive to any other word), because it (the Kṛti) cannot agree with any other kāraka as they do not

have the expectancy of action or Kṛti [1] Hence the number also, being expressed by the same Tiṅ suffix agrees with the same thing with which the Kṛti agrees Thus Kṛti and number agree with the same entity[2] which is an attribute to another

Hence in the case of sentences in the active voice e g Caitraḥ Taṇḍulam pacati, the Kṛti agrees whith the meaning of the word Caitra, in the nominative So the number also agrees with it But in the passive voice i e in sentences like "Caitreṇa pacyate taṇḍulaḥ" Kṛti agrees with neither the word in the nominative (Taṇḍula) which cannot be the substratum of Kṛti, nor can it (Kṛti) agree with the meaning of the word Caitra in the instrumental case the expectancy of which is satisfied by the meaning of the instrumental case affix Similarly in instances where non-sentient things are agents, as in sentences like "Ratho gacchati", Kṛti expressed by the Tiṅ suffix cannot agree with word in the nominative This being the position how can we explain the agreement of number expressed by the Tiṅ suffix To this it is replied that in the passive voice, Kṛti agrees with the word in the nominative, not directly, but through succession (Paramparayā) Strictly speaking number agrees with the substantive of 'Yatna' This may be in the form of Yatna or Vyāpāra Thus in the active voice, Kṛti agrees directly with the word in the nominative (i e agent) In the case of the passive voice, it agrees with the meaning of of the word (Taṇḍula) in the nominative of course through succession (Paramparayā) [3] Similarly we can explain the agreement of number meaning with the word in the nominative in the case of sentences like Ratho gacchati grāmam, Rathena gamyate grāmaḥ etc. where yatna agrees with Ratha, Grāma respectively Hence the number meaning expressed by the Tiṅ suffix along with yatna agrees with the Ratha, grāma resspecti-

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1 Bhāvanā ca suddham pratipadhikārthamātram ākāmkṣāti Nahi vyāpāravantam vyāpāraḥ śrayate (Nay Ku V-II)

2 Ekapratyaya vācyatva niyamāt (ibid)

3 Caitreṇa pacyate Taṇḍulaḥ ityatra caitra vṛtti yatnajnaya vyāpārajanya phalāśrayastaṇḍulaḥ pratiyate iti yatnasya paramparayā taṇḍula eva viśeṣyah (TTV Cin P 838)

vely. Hence the number meaning expressed by the Tiṅ suffix along with yatna agrees with the word in the nominative only either directly or indirectly as explained

In the case of impersonal sentences like Caitreṇa supyate, gaganena sthīyate etc there is no word in the nominative with which yatna can agree Hence Kṛti agrees with the meaning of the root itself, so much so number also agrees with the meaning of the root only [1] Thus the Logician explains the system of agreement of the number meaning of the Ttn suffix

Now the question before us is like this Of course in sentences like Caitraḥ pacati the word in the nominative does possess Kṛti so it has a natural expectancy of Kṛti to agree with it But this word (Caitra) does not have the expectancy of number since the number expressed by the Sup' suffix agrees with it, whence this word does not have any further expectancy of another number Therefore how does the number expressed by the Tin suffix agree with the word in the nominative To this we find various replies from different scholars (Lagicians)

Gangeśa records the opinion of certain scholars as arguing that Tin does not express number at all, it is not possible to say that the Sup suffix does not denote number, because in sentence like "Caitraḥ Rājā (caitra is a king) we have the knowledge of number eveu in the absence of the Tin suffix. If it is suggested that the verb word 'Asti' is supplied then undesirable results will have to be accepted But this argument of these scholars is refused by Gangeśa Gangeśa points out that the Sup and the Tin suffixes express the same number and hence only it is the identity (Samānādhikāraṇya) What we mean by Samānādhikāraṇya, is having the same number expressed by the Sup and Tin suffixes but existing in diffetent place [2]

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1 Karma ca tatra nastyeva, ato dhatvartha eva bhavanaviśeṣyaḥ Phalatvad viṣayatvādva tatra saṃkhynvayaḥ (TTV Cin P 8.9)

2 Eṣa eva rītirīti-Ekasaṃkhyābhibhayakatvenaiva samānadhi karaṇyaṃ natvekatra vṛtyetyarthah Anyatheti-idameva samanādhikaraṇyamityabhimanah (TTV Cin Txt and Comm P 841)

Another solution to the problem on hand as suggested by some other scholars is like this [1] They, the modern scholars, argue that the Sup suffix denotes the number of the base, whereas the Tiṅ suffix denotes the number of the meaning of the word in the nominative As such there is no irrregularity in the agreement of the number meaning denoted by the Tiṅ suffix with the meaning of the word in the nominative This is possible due to the inherent nature of the two, and if you ask what is the meaning of the word in the nominative, it is Kartā or Karman Further in sentences in the impersonal form like Caitreṇa supyate etc the number meaning of the Tiṅ suffix does not agree with anything i e even with the meaning of the root, because though there may be two or more acts of sleep yet no dual or plural number is found in usage Thus the Tiṅ suffix is only for grammatical purity of the word since simple roots should not be used

Raghunātha Śiromaṇi[2] and Jānakīnāth Bhaṭṭāchārya[3] endorse the views of these modern scholars as explained above

Gadādhara, the author of the Vyutpattivāda argues that the Tiṅ suffix does not express the singular number[4] since it cannot have agreement with the word in the nominative (in the singular number) For instance in sentences like ghatoasti (The pot exists) the singularity in the pot is understood from the number expressed by the Sup suffix itself Of course it cannot be argued vice-versa; because in sentences like 'Caitreṇa dṛṣṭo ghataḥ' we have to admit that the nominative suffix in the word 'ghaṭaḥ' denotes the singular number Gadādhara accepts that the Tiṅ suffix denotes dual

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1 Navīnāstu supaḥ prāk ṛtyarthagata svārtha saṃkhyābodhakatvam Tiṅah prathamānta padārthagata saṃkyabodhakatvamiti vyutpattireva Vyutpattiśca tatsvabhavam, tacca phalonneyam Prathmantapadārtha kartā karma vā (TTV, Cin P 844-845)

2 Ākhyātavāda Śiromaṇi P 924-33

3 Nyayasiddhantamañjari P 217-220

4 Ākhyātaikavacanasya saṃkhyārthakatve vivadante niskarṣānusāriṇah (Vyu. Va P 179)

and plural number because in sentences like Maitro Caitrasca gacchataḥ, Caitraḥ Maitraḥ Devadattasca gacchanti etc, There is no Sup suffix to produce the knowledge of plural number, we have to admit that this knowledge is produced by the verbal suffix Tin Thus in the verb meaning the duality or plurality as expressed by the dual or plural number of the Tin suffix agrees with the base meanings of Caitra, Maitra etc by the relation called paryāpti but not with action, the meaning of the verbal root Further the singular number as expressed by the Tin suffix is only for grammatical purity,[1]

Of course as regards the agreement of the number with the word in the nominative, where kṛti also is found to agree, there is no difference of opinion between Gadādhara and others

Gadādhara's view--"that the Tin suffix does not denote the singular number i e the singularity of the singular number expressed by the Tin suffix does not find place in the verbal import or does not have an agreement with the word in the nominative, hence it does not express singular number '--is not logical It is much porlix To explain the verbal imports of different sentences we have to create different karyakāraṇa bhāvas Hence in view of brevity, as suggested by Raghunātha Siromaṇi[2] and others it, is better to accept that the singularity of the singular number expressed by the Tin suffix agrees with the subject or object in the nominative affix

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1 Caitra maitrapadottara subekavacanam cātra sadhutva mātrārthakatvāt nirarthakameva, caitramaitradvaye subekavacanarthaikatvasya badhitatvena anvayasambhavādityanusandheyam (Ādarsa Commentary on Vyu Va)

2 Caitro Maitrasca gacchataḥ ityadau vināpi tādisa supam dvitvādipratyayāt laghavādeka vacanatvādinaiva ekotvādau saktatvacca (AKV Sir)
Tathā ca āyātamakhyātaikavacanādepapi ekavacantvādiṣu saktyā ityarthaḥ. (ibid Comm)

Thus according to the Logician the number meaning of the Tiṅ affix agrees with a word in the nominative, which (word) is not an attribute to another word[1] but a substantive of Kṛti or vyāpāra either directly or indirectly as the case may be It is judicious that the attributes expressed by the same word should agree with the same substantive[2]

THE VIEW OF THE MĪMĀMSAKA :

The Mīmāmsaka does not accept this stand of the Logician that the number meaning of the Tiṅ suffix agrees with the word in the nominative He is of the opinion that the number expectancy of the word in the nominative is satisfied by the number meaning expressed by the Sup suffix enjoined after the nominal base Further it is proper in all respects that the Sup suffix being very close to the nominal base, the number meaning expressed by it readily agrees with its base meaning even before the number meaning expreseed by the the Tiṅ suffix could agree with the base meanging[3] Further in sentences like 'Sthālyām pacati' (He cooks in a pot) Kāsthaiḥ pacati (He cooks with fire-wood) Khādiram vīryakāmasya yupam kuryāt etc, where the word in the nominative is not available, there is no impediment in having the verbal import Hence it is not open to the Logician to argue that the knowledge produced by the word in the nominative is the cause of the verbal import in which Kṛti is a substantive, Nor can it be argued that the word in the nominative will be supplied into the above sentences If it be so, the Mīmāmsaka says instead of supplying the word denoting the agent, it is better to admit that the number agrees with the agent obtained through implication by the same suffix which expresses the number Thus the argu-

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1 Tiṅupāttaikatvādi samkhyā tvadanyāviśeṣaṇībhūte prathamānta padopasthāpye Caitrā dā vaśrayatāsambandena anvetīti tāvadavivādam (Bha, Rah)

2 Ekapadopāttānāmekaviśeṣyakatva mautsargikamitinyāyāt.

3, Bhā. Rah.

ment of the Logician that the number agrees with the word in the nominative or with the substantive of the Kṛti etc is refuted 1

Further in the Mīmāmsaka system Bhāvanā is the main substantive in the verbal import of a sentence So all the meanings of other words have to agree with it but not with the word in the nominative To the Logician, the agent or the object is not obtained either by denotation or presumption but by syntactical relation So the Mīmāmsaka argues that since Bhāvanā is the primary substantive and the number is expressed by the same Tiṅ suffix which expresses Bhāvanā as well, it is logical that the number meaning agrees with Bhavanā directly or through the agent or the object which is obtained by presumption (Ākṣepa).

Now if the Logician demands the Mīmāmsaka to accept that Bhāvanā also agrees with the substantive of the number on the basis of the maxim "The meanings expressed by the same word should have the same substantive and also in view of brevity in creating a single cause and effect relation in the verbal import, the MīmamsaKa (Khaṇḍadeva) is ready to concede the demand and accept that both the Bhāvanā and the number meanings expressed by the same Tin suffix agree even with agent or object which is obtained throuoh presumption but never does the number agrees with a word in the nominative 2 Thus Mīmāmsaka in general accepts that the number meaning of the Tin suffix agrees with the agent or object obtained through presumption

Khaṇḍdeva however differs on this general line and prefers to hold that the number expressed by the Tin suffix directly agrees with Bhāvanā only His argument is very simple Since

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1 Bhā Cin

2 Ekapadopāttānamca viseṣyakatva mautsargikamiti nyāyena, Ekakāryakāraṇabhāvaklpana laghvānurodhena ca, yadisamkhyaviseṣye Bhāvanāuaya ityāgrahaḥ tadā astvakhyata lakṣya eva kartradau ubhyānvayaḥ Na tu prathamāntapadopasthāpye (Bhā Rah.)

Bhāvanā is the primary substantive in the verbal import, naturally the number agrees readily with Bhāvanā which is expressed by the same suffix instead of waiting for the agent or object to be obtained through presumption He finds no reason to over-look the primary substantiveness of Bhāvanā [1] And this number agrees with Bhāvanā with the simple relation of subsisting in the same substratum (Samānādikāraṇya sambandha) Otherwise there results prolixty in creating too many kārya-kāraṇa bhāvas in different instances [2] Hence the number agrees with Bhāvanā only

The View of the Grammarian :

The Grammarian also does not accept the theory of the Logician mainly on the basis of prolixity in creating various cause and effect relations to explain the agreement of number in different sentences According to the grammarian the Tiṅ suffix besides number, expresses the substratum (agent or object) but not Bhāvanā or Kṛti Number also is an attributive to the agent or the object

Now one may be inclined to accept the agreement of the number expressed by the Tiṅ affix with its base meaning just like the nnmber expressed by the Sup suffix which agrees wtih its base meaning. But Dīkṣita and Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa do not accept this suggestion They opine that it is logical to admit the agreement of the number the 'Āśraya' due to the force of closer expectancy between the number and āśraya than between the meaning of the root and the number of the suffix [3] Kaiyata also expresses the same view [4] According to the Grammarian recalling of the sub-

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1 Bhāva pradhānamiti smṛtisaṃkoce pramāṇabhāvat (Bhā Rah)

2 Kārya-kāraṇabhāvādi kalpanāgauravāpatteśca (ibid)

3 Dhātvarthāpekṣayā prattyasattyatiśaya sattvat pratya -yārthe, dharmiṇyeva pratyayārthasaṃkhyayā anvayo yuktaḥ (TTV, Dar)

4 Vide Pradipa on the Bhāṣya on P 2 3 1 3 "Pacatiti kartureka- tvam Tiṅabhihitamiti prathamānasyadityarthaḥ

stratum of the meaning of the Tin suffix is the cause of the verbal import wherein the number (meaning of the Tin) is the attribute 1

According to the Logician, the number has to agree with the word in the nominative But this theory fails in sentences like 'Candra iva mukham dṛsyate' because there are two words in the nominative Similar is the case in sentences like "Devadattaḥ bhuktvā vrajati' etc So to avoid inconsistency the Logician qualifies the word in the nominative as ' not being an attributive to another word" (Anyaviśeṣaṇībhūta) Further in sentences like Caitra! Maitrah grāmam gacchati"' the Logician in order to avoid the agreement of the number with Caitra, has to further amend his definition by adding another word 'Sambuddhyanta-bhinna' Even then the Logician cannot properly explain the number meaning agreement in sentences like , Caitra! Gamanaya" Thus to avoid these irregularities, the Logician has to bring in many adjectives qualifying the "word in the nominative" But the Grammarian as explained, is free from such a prolixity Thus this theory of the Gramarian in general is more logical, simple and is nearer to experience However Nagesabhatta differs from this general line of thought

THE VIEW OF NĀGESA :

According to Nāgesabhatta the number meaning expressed by the Tin suffix agrees with the meaning of the verbal root, i e in the active voice it agrees with vyāpāra and in the passive voice it agrees with result Further it is not proved that the number expressed by the Tin suffix is attributive to kartā or karman in the sense of which the Lakāra is enjoined, even by reading the sutras Laḥ Karmaṇi ca Dvyekayoḥ etc as a single sentence Nor one can repeat the words karmaṇi etc because there is no such an authority governing the repetition Hence it is proved that the number does not agree with the meaning of the Lakāra Thus the number naturally has to agree with its base meaning (Root-meaning), so

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1 Ākhyātārthasamkhyaorakārakārakabodhe Tiṇarthasrayopa sthitiḥ kāraṇanrtya eva kāryakāraṇabāvaḥ

there will be similarity in the behaviour of Sup and Tiṅ suffixes i e just as the meanings of the sup suffix agree with their base meaning, so also the meanings of the Tiṅ suffix also agree with the root meaning, after which it is enjoined

Further to the Grammarian, the primary substantive in the verbal import of a sentence is vyāpāra, denoted by the root. Further among the various meanings expressed by a verb word action is primary and agent, or object, number etc are, all attributives Now, since agent, number are attributes they should not agree between themselves[1] Further it is more rational that the agent and number should agree with the same thing.[2] Otherwise we will be failing in adhering to the maxim[3] "Suffixes express meanings which duly agree with their base"

Nāgeśabhaṭṭa claims the support of Kaiyata, Hari, Helārāja etc for his theory. Kaiyata while explaining the Bhāṣya on the Sutra ' Sārvadhatuke yak', says that "by superimposing the number of the subject or object on the action we find the action also is diverse ' [4] And the number of the Tiṅ suffix expresses this diversity of the action Here one may question since action is one, how can there be number agreement with it That is why, when we say 'Pacanti' there will not be any doubt about the number of agents Further Hari also clearly mentions "Though action is one, it is diversified by the number subsisting in the means (agent or object) when it is expressed by a verb word" [5] Helārāja while commenting the said Kārikā says in unequivocal terms that the verb expresses action as qualified by the number

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1 Guṇānāmca parārthatvat
2 Ekapadopāttānāmeka viśeṣyakatva mautsargikamiti nyāyat
3 Pratyayanām prakṛtyarthānvita svarthabodhakatva vyutpatti virodhapatteh (L M (nbp) P 134).
4 Ata eva sādhane na dvitvadisamsayah kriyagata samkhyaropasya sādhanagato samkhyājñāna nimittatvat (L M (nbp) P 134 last few lines)
5 Ekatvepi kriyakhyate sadhanāśraya samkhyaya, Bhidyate na tu linakhyo bhedastatra tadāśritah (V P 3-12-16)

of the substrata of the means which is a power and not by number of the power (sakti) only Such is the nature of the capacity of words to convey their meaning which is not a matter to debate.

Further the statement "Hataśāyikāssyyante etc of the Bhāṣyakara also strengthen the theory of Nāgeśa Further Punarāja the commentator also expresses that the action denoted by the root is diversified, because of its relation with the Kārakas (agent or object) expressed by the suffix [1]

Now if any one asks how action being one, it is possible to superimpose diversity on it, Nāgeśa replies it is in the same way as the qualities like Rūpa, Rasa etc differentiated by number which also is a quality Thus when a quality (which is not a dravya) can be spoken of as possessing number what harm is there if action (which also is not a dravya) is spoken of (by superimposition) as possessing number. Thus Nāgeśa opines that the number meaning of the verbal affix (Tin) agrees with the meaning of the verbal root

A Critical Appreciation :

When we examine the views of the Logician, Khaṇḍadeva and Nageśa it is observed that they followed a particular principle viz, the suffix meaning should agree with the primary substantive in the verbal import To the Logicia the word in the nominative is the primary substantive, so the number meaning agrees with it But this theory suffers from heavy prolixity as explained and hence not acceptable


Khaṇḍadeva follows the same view held by rhe Logician and argues that number agrees with Bhāvanā which is the primary substantive in the verbal import of the Mimamsaka And he has also an advantage that Bhavanā and number are expressed

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1 Pratyayavāeyakarakabhede tatsambandhāt dhātvarthe kriyāyā api bhedaḥ pratiyate, yatha pacataā pacanti iti (L M (nbp))

by the same suffix But the question is whether there is anything called Bhāvana apart from Vyāpāra.

Nāgesa also on the the same lines, argues that the number meaning expressed by the Tin suffix agrees with the meaning of the root, which is the primary substantive in the verbal import of a sentence As already explained, Nāgesa has scored many points over the others in justifying his theory and also in porving the weak points in the theories of others In fact when we say two or more persons are cooking, every individual agent has an activity in him Thus this diversity of the activity only is expressed by the number meaning of the verbal affix It is very apt when viewed from the point of logic and has the sanction of the Bhasyakāra, Hari etc grammarians as well Thus without prejudice to the sanction of the sages, the Bhāsyakāra and other authoritative commentators, it is more justified to accept the number meaning expressed by the Tin suffix, agrees with the meaning of the verbal root



UPAGRAHA

ıtroductıon

We know that ın Sanskrıt a verb word reveals a number meanıngs both expressed and suggested Further we know at a verb word ıs made up of many elements such as root suffıx, efıx, ınfıx etc Such beıng the case the grammarıan fıxes the rıous meanıngs that are eıther exprеressed or ımplıed, to each these elements In doıng so the verbal suffıxes ı e Ātmane-da and Parasmaıpada express the Agent (Kartā), the Object arma) or the Actıon ıtself (Bhava) Tense (Kāla) Number amkhyā) and Person (Puruṣa) Besıdes these meanıngs these rbal endıngs, by ımplıcatıon, express a pecuılıar shade or change meanıng of the root Thıs ıs otherwıse called the sense of ıagraha

"Upa gṛhṇātītı upagrahah" The change revealed ın the anıng of the verb eıther extollıng, or restrıctıng, or altogether ınging ıts orıgınal meanıg, by these Ātmanepada and Paras-ıpada suffıxes, when they are replaced one by the other, ıs led upagraha In fact thıs word ıs not found eıther ın the ukta of Yāska or ınthe PrātıśāKhyas Pāṇını dıd not use thıs rd ın hıs Aṣṭādhyāyī But ıt ıs a word whıch was already popu. ın the tımes of Pāṇını Pātañjalı and Kātāyana.

However we come across thıs word ın Mahābhaṣya at r places under the sūtras P 3'1,40, 3 1 67, 3 1 85 and 3 2 127 4

P 3 1 40 Kıñcānuprayujyae Lıtı (Bhāṣya) Nıṣthāparasya anuprayoge puruṣopagrahau vıśeṣıtau syātām

P 3 1 67 Sārvadhātuke yak (Bhāṣye) Tınabhıhıtena bhāvena kālapuruṣopagrahāh vyājyante

P 3 1 85 Vyatyayo bahulam (Bhāṣya) Suptınupagraha lınganarāṇām

P 3 2 127 ṭau Sat (Var)upagraha pratıṣedhasca (Bhāṣya) Upagraha pratıṣedho vaktavyah

According to the Kasika on P 6 2 134 this word is found in a variant reading of that Sūtra current in those days and the grammarians earlier to Pāṇini used it in the sense of a word ending in Sixth-case (Ṣaṣṭyantam Padam) 1 This word is not used in this sense (ṣaṣṭyantam) in grammatical literature, but was considered as a technical term used by pre - Pāṇinian grammarians Helārāja commenting on the Vākyapadīya clearly states the above fact.2 This ward seems to be very popular during the period of even Kaiyata Neither Kātyāyana nor Patañjali felt any need to explain this word 'Upagraha,. Even Kaiyata explains this word only once and then he equates it with Ātmanepada 3

Different Explanations -

Now let us see what this Upagraha is

The Bhāṣyakāra says it is one of the several meanings of a verbal suffix' According to him besides other meanings the tence, person and Upagraha are the meanings denoted by a root ending in a verbal suffix, while a root ending in a nominal suffix (kṛt) cannot denote these meanings 4

According to Kaiyata upagraha is of many forms liKe the fruit of an action being enjoyed by the doer or the other 5

Nāgeśa explaining the Bhāṣya on P 3 1 85, says that upagraha suggested by the suffixes in the place of Lakāra idicates the self enjoying the fruit or otherwise As this indication is made

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1 Cūrṇādīnyaprāṇi upagrahāditi pāṭhāntaram Tatra Upagraha iti ṣaṣṭyāntamevatpūrvācāryopacāreṇa gṛhyate (Kāśika on P 6 2 134)

2 Upagraha iti pūrvācāryaiḥ abhyupagataḥ pūrvācārya prasiddhopagraha śabda vācyah ayamarthaḥ vyavahṛīyate (Helārāja on V P 3 12 1)

3 Upagrahasyeti ātmanepada Saṃñjayāḥ ityarthaḥ (Pradīpa on P 3-2-127)

4 M B on P 3,1 67

5 Upagrahah Aneka prakārakaḥ, Svārthaparārthatvādikaḥ (ibid Pradīpa)

by parasmaipada and Ātmanepada suffixes, by implication (Laksanayā) upagraha means those suffixes which convey the sense whether a thing is being done for one's ownself or for others 1

Khandadeva also explains this word in his Bhātta Tantra Rahasya in a similar way The meaning of this peculiar upagraha in the form of Ātmanepada etc (i e Parasmaipada) is of the fact whether the fruit of the action is enjoyed by the doer himself or by others 2

Jinendra Budi, the learned commentator on the Kāsikā explains this word in a more lucid way For him it primarily means an action or a pecularity in action suggested by the verbal suffixes As these suffixes are Ātmanepada and Parasmaipada, the word is secondarily applied to these suffixes 3

The words "Upagraha visesa' occur several times in Sābara Bhāsya and in each case it means a particular voice (Active, Passive or Middle) 4

However this word, or to be precise, the various meanings that are given to the word caused great confusion And in course of time, it became difficult to understand what the word UPAGRAHA actually means and its scope According to Helārāja this word became an "Alaukika" in the sense, it was not understood by an ordinary man or scholar.5 Thus this word which was very popualr during the period of Pānini, Kātyāyana and

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1 Upagraho lādesavyangyah, Svārthatvādih, iha tatpratītinimitte parasmaipadātmanepade upagrahasabdena lakshnayocyate (Udyota on P 3 1 85)

2 Upagraha Visesarūpasya Ātmanepadādeh arthah, Kartrgāmitvādi (Bhā Rah)

3 Lādesavyangyo kriyā viseso mukhya upagraha, iha tadvyatirikta nimittatvāt parasmaipadātmane padayo rūpagraha sabdo vartate (Kāsikā on P 3 1 85),

4 Svārthena cāgnayah prayuktāh. Katham, Upagraha visesāt. Upagraha visesehi bhavati (Sābsrabhnsya)

5 Idanīm Ākhyātārthamupagraham vicarayitum, svarūpasya alaukikatvāt pradarsayati (Helārāja on V P. 3-12-1)

Patañjali, might have become too baffling to understand or might have lost its currency, so it could not properly be understood by latter grammarians Hence Bhatihari took up this task of explainnig it fully and devoted an entire section in his Vakyapadiya to this (Kāṇḍa III - Section 12-Upagarha Samuddesa)

It is to be clearly understood that the word upagraha is not the name of any particular or single meaning denoted by the Ātmanepada and Parasmaipada suffixes, but it is the particularity of the meaning caused by enjoining these suffixes after the same root If this peculiarity of the meaning is expressed by any other element in the verb-word then that peculiarity does not come under upagraha Another fact is that this peculiarity which comes under upagraha is said to be suggested or indicated (Dyotita) but not expressed (Vacya) by verbal endings After Bhartihari, this topic was concisely but clearly discussed by Nagesa in his Laghu Mañjūsa All the latter grammarians who dealt with this upagraha, have in fact explained it either by elaborating or abridging the theme of Bhartihari Therefore now let us examine what Hari says on the subject

Hari defines upagrha as that "which is understood as the peculiarity of the meaning caused by enjoining the various suffixes (Parasmaipada and Ātmanepada) [1]

As already said, this word upagraha suggests a number of meanings (ideas or notions) As Hari says, in some places these are in the form of means (Sādhana) and in some places they are attributive to the means [2] Here the word "means" stands for agent or object etc And the attribution for example, may be in the form of meaningful utterance etc (Vyaktavak [3]

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1 Ya Ātmane padādbhedaḥ kvacidarthasya gamyate,
Anyataścāpi ladesat manyate tamupagraham (V P 3, 12-1)

2 3 Kvacitsadhanamevasau kvacittasya visesanam, Sadhanam
tatra karmadi vyakta vaca visesanam, (V P 3-12-2).

Now take the words Pacati, Pacyte, Bhūyate In the word Pacati, the Parasmaipada suffix 'Ti' indicates the agent In the word Pacyate, the Atmanepada suffix indicates the object and in the word Būyate, the Ātmanepada suffix indicates the impersonal action Thus in these three words the sense of agent, object and the impersonal action are called "Upagraha" These modes of expression are called Active, Passive and middle voice Thus these two kinds of suffixes imply three different notions Keeping this in view Panini enjoined two Sūtras "Bhavakarmaṇoh" (P 1 3 13) Svaritañitaḥ Kartrabhiprāye kriyāphale (P 1 3 73) to enjoin Ātmanepada suffix after the root and another Sūtra "Seṣāt kartari Parasmaipadam" (2 3 78) to append Parsmaipada suffix to roots where the Atmanepada suffix does not have scope

Before going into further details, we have to note a few things here Panini divided all roots into three groups (1) those which always take Parasmaipada suffixes (Parasmaipadins) (2) those which always take the Atmanepada suffixes (Ātmanepadins) and finally those which take both the suffixes (ubhayapadins) as the case may be Normally a root of one group does not take the suffixes of another group unless some special purpose in the form of suggesting some distinct meaning or different shade of the meaning of the root is to be served This is possible in two ways Sometimes by adding a prefix (upasarga) to the root This upasarga influences the meaning of the root and causes the change of suffix In such cases, this special meaning conveyed by the presence of the Upasarga, which effects the change of the original suffix (Ātmanepada, or Porsmaipada) into the other is not considered as Upagraha But many times the roots take the orther kind of suffixes to suggest a peculair notion or sense independent of upasarga All such special mean -ings or noitona which are indicated by the change of the kind of suffix alone but not due to the influence of an upasarga, are called upagraha

Attribute as Upgraha

Keeping these things in view, now let us see how an attribute is considered as upagraha For example take the

words Brāhmaṇāḥ Sampravadante Here the root Vad (to speak) is normally parasmaipadin But when it denotes an attributive to the agent, the root takes Ātmanepada suffix The above sentence (Brāhmaṇāḥ Sampravadante) means "these brahmins who have an intelligible utterance speak together" This intelligible uttara-rance is a qualification of (an attribute to) the agent 'Brahmaṇaḥ' It may be noted here this special notion (intelligible utterance) is not the meaning of the upasargas Sam or Pra or both put together but exclusively that of the Ātmanepada suffix This idea is con-veyed by Panini in the Sūtra P 1 3 48 [1] Hence this "intelligible utterance" is upagraha Thus even an attribute becomes an upagraha

Meaning of the root as Upagraha

Similarly in some cases activity, the meaning of the root, itself is considered as upagraha [2] That is a particular root which normally takes a particular type of suffix (Ātamanepada or Paras-maipada) to denote a particular sense, takes the other type of suffix to denote something different from what it normally means For example let us take the sūtra P 1 3 32.[3] The root 'Kṛ' norma-lly takes the Ātmanepada suffix when the fruit of action accrues to the doer and the Parasmaipada suffix when the fruit is enjoyed by others But it (the root Kṛ) always takes Ātmanepada suffixes only where it (the root) gives the meaning of "to divulge', or tease, revile, serve use violence, cause change. . etc , irrespective of the fruit of the action being enjoyed by the agent himself or by other person

Another example is the case of the root 'Nī' The root 'Nī' takes Ātmanepada suffixes only when used in the sense of "to guide, so as to render a person guided worthy, to lift up, to make

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1 P 1 3 48, Vyaktavacham Samuccaraṇe

2 Dhatvrathastadviśeṣaścapyuktaḥ kvacidupagrahaḥ, Dhatva-rtho gandhanadiḥ syat vyatiharo viśeṣaṇam (V P III-12-4)

3 Gandhanavakṣepana sevana, sāhasikya, Pratiyatna prakatha nopayogeṣu kṛñaḥ (P 1 3 32)

one a spiritual guide......... etc 1 no matter even if the fruit of the action is enjoyed by others We can cite a number of instances where the roots always take only a particular type of suffix 2

Vyatihāra as Upagraha :

Sometimes two or more persons may exchange their work to be done and discharge it Or at times one may discharge the work of another person, which he is not expected to do i e a work not worthy to be done by one may be done by one All these ideas are known as 'Karma Vyatihāra'. For example one cuts grass which work is to be done by the servant (Vyatilunīte') This idea "that one is discharging the work of the others" is indicated by the Ātmanepada suffix This notion also comes under Upagraha 3

Mutuality as Upagraha ·

The idea of mutuality (one with the other, amone themselves) also is indicated by the Ātmanepada suffix though the root normally takes the Parasmaipada suffix When these notions are to be indicated the Parasmaipada suffix is replaced by the Ātmanepada suffix For example Sampraharante Rājānaḥ=kings fight among themselves

Here one may question whether the preposition and the root put together give the changed meaning of the root In other words the expression of the idea has a lexical rather than a morphological significance But whatever it be, the traditional view is that the particular notion is revealed through the Ātmanepada suffix Thus all these special ideas or notions such as means, or

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1 Sammananotsanjana caryakaraṇa jñānabhṛti vigaṇana vyayeṣu Niyaḥ (P 1 3 36)

2, Spardhāyamānaḥ (P 1 3 31) etc

3 Kartari karma vyatihāre (P,1 3 14) Also Dhātvarthastadviśeṣaścāpyuktaḥ kvacidupagrahah, Dhātvartho gandhanādiḥ syāt vyatihāro viśeṣaṇam (V P III-12-4)

action, or attribute of action etc are indicated only in the presence of the Ātmanepada suffix Hence they all come under upagraha

Samvidhāna as Upagraha :

Sometimes the Ātmanepada suffix indicates Samvidhāna, means 'making arrangements' to perform a certain action to achieve the concerned fruit or result which is intended to be enjoyed by the agent himself, which idea normally and in short is given in the Pāninian Sutrā 'The fruit of the action accruing to the agent' This aspect is governed by Panini's Sutra P 1 3 72 [1] As lready mentioned Pānini enumerated about two thousand simple or pure roots (suddha Dhātavah) I prefer to call them as simple roots because in the following chapters we discuss about the complex roots (Sanādyanta dhātavah) which involve complex formation (vrtti) and also integration of meaning (Ekārthibhāva) These two thousand roots are divided into three categories (1) Those which always take the Parasmaipada suffixes (2) those which always take the Atmanepada suffixes and lastly those which take both the suffixes as the case may be Now it is a matter to be considered, as far as the Astādhyāyi is concerned, whether these two words viz , Ātmanepada and Parasmaipada are used in their etymological sense[2] or purely as technical terms, to differentiate the two groups of verbal endings, Tip tas jhi, Sip, thas, tha, mip, vas mas on the one hand, and Ta ātam jha, Thas, Āthām, Dhvam Id vahim Mahin on the other hand Again what is a technical term? It is that which is used to indicate or express a special sense, generally, other than its etymological sense, or a sense which is different from the popular one as conceived by the people When we examine the above two thousand roots, from this nbgle we arrive at the conclusion that the said two words viz , Ātmanepada and Parasmipaca are purely technical

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1 Svaritañitah kartrabhiprāye kriyāphale (P 1 3 72)

2 Parasmaipadyate Yasmat tat parasmaipadam smrtam, Atmanepadyate Yasmāt tadevātmanepadam (Katantra Vyakarana 3-7-79)

Otherwise let us accept temporarilly that these words are used in their etymological sense Then it results that an Ātmanepada suffix is enjoined when the fruit of the action is enjoyed by the agent himself And a parasmaipada suffix is enjoined when the fruit of the action goes to one other than the agent This being the case, let us extend it a bit further Now for every action denoted by the root there exists certain result also So all these two thousand roots have their own activities and also concerned results So there is a possibility for every root to take both kinds of suffixes i e the roots take Atmanepada suffixes when the fruit is intended to be enjoyed by the agent himaelf and Parasmaipaba suffixes when the fruit is to be enjoyed by others, in which case all these two thousand roots must become Ubhayapadins But it is not the case in Pāṇiniya, wherein only 140 verbas are classified as ubhayapadin and others are divided into categories as Ātmanepadi-roots and Parpasmaipadi-roots In classical Sanskrit unless and otherwise specified Atmanepada roots always take Atmanepada suffixes irrespective of the fact whether the agent enjoys the fruit or not Similar is the case with the Parasmaipada roots For example when one goes to a town to join a job i e the fruit of his going is to join the job which is enjoyed by himself only, there cannot be the usage Gacchate Pure roots which take Atmanepada suffixes are enjoined after them with Anudātta vowel or n-kara at the end as a mute letter[1] and ubhaya-padins are uttered with Swarita as mute or ñ-kāra as a mute [2] And the rest of the roots take the Parasmaipada[3] terminations Now the question before us is why did Pāṇini write two different sutras to enjoin the same Atmanepada suffixes to the roots, Is there any difference in the meaning suggested by the Atmanepada suffixes so enjoined by these two sūtras Then comes the answer in the affirmative The Atmanepada suffixes enjoined as governed by the sūtra P 1 3 12 (Anudāttanita ātmanepadam) cannot suggest this special meaning "Samvidhāna, while those roots which take Atmanepada suffixes

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1 P 1 3 12 Anudattanita Ātmanepadam
2 P 1 3 72 Swaritañitah kartrabhiprāye kriyāphale
3 P 1 3 78 Śesatkartari Parasmaipadam

following the sūtra P. 1 3 72 can suggest this special meaning through their Atmanepada suffix.

It may be asked from which words in P 1-3-72 this particular import is obtained It is answered that the two words 'Kartrabhiprāye kriyāphale' give this particular meaning, i e. for this particular group of verbal roots the Atmanepade suffix is enjoined when it is intended to convey the import that the agent "makes arrangements" for the performance of action with an intention to enjoy the resulting fruit there of for himself

And these roots take the Parasmaipada suffixes when they are not intended to convey that particular sense

Now it may be asked that since every action requires its own of arrangements on the part of the doer (Agent), then how is it that only a particular group of roots is said to convey this idea through the Atmanepada suffix and why not this Atmanepada suffix in the other group of roots It is replied that though every action requires arrangements on its part, only certain roots can convey this particular sense All roots are not capable of conveying this particular meaning Strictly speaking roots sometimes present action in such a manner as to imply that the agent makes arrangements so that the ultimate fruit accrues to himself, while at other time they present in such a manner as to imply that the ultimate fruit goes to somebody else This is due to the natural power of words (Śabdaśakti) which is not a matter of Logic [1] therefore Pānini has listed out such roots and marked them with Swarita or ñ-kāra as mutes [1]

Therefore every root cannot convey the notion of making arrangements through its Atmanepada suffix But wherever it is indicated, it is indicateb through the Atmanepada suffix only Hence Samvidh na comes under the scope of upagraha

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1' Ta eva vijñāsyamah, Yeṣam kartrabhiprayam akartrabhiprayam ca kriyaphalamasti tebhyah ātmanepadam bhavati Tathā jatiyakāḥ khalvacāryeṇa svaritañjitāḥ pathitāḥ ubhayavantaḥ (M B. on P 1 3 72)

Point of Interest :

It may be asked that be the intention of Pāṇini, then it would be sufficient to write kartṛbhiprāye kriyāphale without saying svaritañitaḥ Yes, it is true it would be sufficient to say "kartrabhiprāye kriyaphale" The Bhāsyakāra also has cleary accepted this stand 1 But one thing is to be noted that only a few experts in the science of language or those who are well versed in the nature of language (vṛttijña) alone can know which particular root is capable of conveying samvidhāna and which other is not, but what about a common man who is not an expert in the science of language but follows the words of the teacher (vachananusarinaḥ) Therefore it is to help such persons, who cannot themselves find out by examining which root is susceptable to convey and which is not, the learned sage Panini read all such roots either with a swarita accent or ñ-kara as mute [2] (at the end) Bhartṛhari also confirms this opinion [3]

Causal Nic and Upagraha - Samvidhhāna .

Another point we have to differentiate is between the meanings of causal ṇic and that of the atmanepada suffix indicating Samvidhana The whole problem is as follows -

A causative ṇic (hetumaṇṇic) expresses the sense of some one causing or inducing another to act and get a particular thing achieved Making arrangements or Samvidhāna also implies that somebody causes another to act, so much so, some confusion prevailed among scholars to the extent that causal ṇic and Ātmanepada of Samvidhāna are synonyms and are interchangeable 4

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1 Svaritañitaḥ iti sakyamakartum (M B on p 1 3 72)

2 Yuktam Punaryat vṛttinimittako nāmānubandaḥ syāt...
vṛttajño hyācāryo anubandhānāsajjate (M B ibid)

3 Kriyā visesa vacane sāmarthyamupasajyate, kesāmcit, Anyetu kṛtāḥ svariteto ñitāstathā (V P 3-12-11)

4 Kesāmcit kartrabhiprāye ṇicā saha vikalpate,
Ātmanepadmanyesām Tadarthāprakṛtiryataḥ (V P 3-12-6)

But as a matter of fact they are not synonyms and cannot be interchanged.

Now let us examine the imports we get from the two words Yajate and Yājayati From Yajate we understand that the agent (Karta) is making arraggements to bring Yajña into being, the fruit (Heaven) of which he wants to enjoy In the course of making arrangements he may appoint or order (cause, induce) some one to be the priest and perform Yajña for him Here the agent acts on his own intention and nobody induces him

From the word "Yajayati" we understand that someone is inducing another to bring about a sacrifice (Yajña) Here it is not known whether the instigator wants to enjoy the main fruit or the instigated one enjoys it Another fact is that Praisa (prompting or command) is the expressed sense of the causal ṇic while samvidhana is only a suggested sense of the Ātmanepada suffix

Here it is to be noted that besides the roots having Swarita or ñ-kara as mute, all ṇijanta roots are also ubhayapadins And from the Sutra Nicaśca(1 3 74) by reading the words kartrabhipraye kriyā phale into it, the whole sutra amounts, to saying "that these causal ṇijanta roots take Ātmanepada suffix when Samvidhana is implied, i e Yājate gives the meaning (import) that one is inducing another to bring about an action with an intention to enjoy the main fruit of the action for himself Similarly from the word "Yājayati we get an import that one instigates another to act, where in the main fruit is not enjoyed by the instigator

Thus causal ṇijantas, swaritets, and ñit roots are all udhayapadins and take Ātmanepada suffixes when Samvidhana is implied (suggested) Therefore the meaning of ṇic does not come under upagraha Some people being unable to make out this distinction between what a word expresses directly and what is suggested from the context, bring out this confusion, viz that the Ātmanepada termination and ṇic have the same scope and are interchangeable This whole confusion has arisen from misunderstanding the famous usages vapate, krimisiva, Dhatte Cinute etc These words depending on the context are interpreted as vāpayati

krapayati dhapayati, and cayayati respectively Here the causal sense is from the context but not what the ātmanepada suffix suggests As such nic and Ātmanepad are not synonyms that is why Bhartrhari expresses his displeasure at such confusion and says it as keshānchinmate'[1] Strictly speaking the above word means only Samvidāna If sentence context requires a causal sense, then the meanings should have been given as vapayate, dhapayate, chāyayate in which case there will be no confusion [2]

Suppose it is accepted that both nic and Ātmanepada are synonymous and are interchangeable then there result some irregularities This causal nic is enjoined after any root (Parasmaipada or Ātmanepada or even a complex root etc) to express the sense of causation But the Atmanepada suffix is enjoined after only certain roots A nijanta root takes both Ātmanepada and Parasmaipada suffixes, alternatively to convey either Samvidhāna or some other meaning Therefore if nic and Ātmanepada are synonyms the sūtra Nicasca[3] becomes redundant. Hence in view of the above impropriety it is to be accepted that nic and Ātmanepada suffix indicating Samvidhāna are not synonymous and also not interchangeable

We will now consider one more peculiar case and then wind up the discussion on the Upagraha' Consider the following sentence "The Employer and the employee are cooking" Here the employer is making arrangements to enjoy the food for himself and the employee is cooking to get his fee Thus the question before us is "Are we to use atmanepada suffixes after the root taking into consideration the action of the employer or to use Parasmaipada suffixes taking the action of the employee into consideration?" A root cannot take both the suffixes at the same time to express two different meanings.

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1 Kesām cit kartrabhiprāye Nicā saha vikalpyate (V P 3-1-26)

2 Krinīsva, vapate, dhatte cinoti cinutepica Āpta prayoga drsyante yesu hyarthobhidhiyate (V P 3-12 7)

3. Nicasca (P 1 3 74)

Bhartṛhari, answers this question suggesting two alternatives 1 (1) If the speaker's intention is to give importance to the employer's action then the root takes the Ātmanepada suffix (pachete) If speaker's intention is not to give importance to anybody's action, but is only to make a casual reference that they are working together then the root takes only Parasmaipada suffix, or even if the speaker wants to stress on the action of the servant, then also the root takes Parasmaipada suffix Then the sentence is "Swāmidāsau Pacataḥ"

Another altrenative is, because an employer is always superior to the employee, his action alone will be superimposed on the employee also and an atmanepada suffix is enjoined to the root as pacete Hari justifies this alternative by taking recourse to our daily usages as Chatriṇo yānti etc [2]

Conclusion -

Reviewing the above, we can say that upagraha is not the name of any particular root (meaning) It is the name given to the difference in meaning brought about by a change in the suffixes viz, Ātmanepada or Parasmaipada, as suggested by the termina-tions The several notions suggested may be enumerated as mens' action, attribute, Samvidhāna etc The Upagraha is always only a suggested sense of the Tiṅ suffix Also of the many ideas which come under upagraha some can be expressed by verbs only while some others e g the idea of somebody doing the action of somebody else or of mutuality of action etc can be exprssed by nouns also 3 These particular suggeted senses are called Aspect' by modern linguists

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1 Yatrobhau svāmidasau tu prārabhete sahakriyām,
Yugapaddharmabhedena dhātustatra na vartate, V P 3-12-19
Yatra prativìdhānārthaḥ pacistatrātmanepadam,
Parasmaipadamanyatra samskāradyabhidhayim V P 3-12-20

2 Samvidhatusca Sannidhyāddāsc dharmonuṣajyate, Prakṣasabdasya Sannidhyānnyagrodhe plakṣatā yathā (V P 3-12-21)

3 Rajānaḥ sampraharaṇam kurvanti.

It is not peculiar to Sanskrit verb only to have upograha as one of its meanings In many other languages in the world, grammarians have recognised that verbs denote many notions apart from the actual tense Jesperson, as quoted by Sri k A Subrahmania Iyer,[1] deals with this topic in his book 'Philosaphy of Grammar", where in he brought in the following notions under the 'aspect

1) The tempo distinction between the iorist and the imperfect 2) The distinction between conclusive and nonconclusive 3) That between duration or permanent and punctual or transitory 4) That between finished and unfinished 5) That between what takes place only once and what is repeated or habitual action 6) That between stability and change 7) Between the implication or non-implication of a result

Sri k A Subrahmanya Iyer, in his work Bharti hari-A Study of Vakyapadiya says to this list can be added the distinction between the result going to the doer or to somebody else, and upagraha may be looked upon as the Sanskrit word for "ASPECT

Here it may be concluded that Upagraha may be treated as a part and parcel of 'Aspect' as viewed by Jesperson

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1 Bhartihari-A Stady of Vākyapadiya, by Sri K A S Iyer P,353
2 Bhartihari-A Study of Vākyapadiya, by Sri K A S Iyer P 353 last few lines

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VIKARANA SUFFIXES

Of the various suffixes that are enjoined after a verbal root, some twenty one suffixes are grouped and named as Vikarana suffixes The word Vikarana is etymologically explained as one which causes change or modification in the verbal root to which it is appended [1]

Pāṇini did not name these suffixes as Vikarana suffixes In fact he did not use this word at all in his Astadhyāyi This is a technical word used by the predecessors of Pāṇini Though Pāṇini used many technical words of his predecessors in his work he did not make use of this particular term, but simply enjoined the respective suffixes It is the Bhasyakāra who used this word in the Mahābhāsya[2] and since then all the later grammarians of this school used this word to represent those twenty one suffixes

Now it should not be argued by pointing out that in the present Dhatupatha at the end of every gana we find the word "Iti Sabvikaranān, Bhvādayah, Syan Vikarna Divadayah" etc, so Pāṇini used the word ',Vikarana'' These sentences at the end of the gana pātha are not those of Pāṇini, but of later grammarians who added them for clarity Not only these sentences but even the meanings of the roots are read along with them by later grammarians like Bhīmasena etc just to facilitate an easy and clear understanding to the students [3] Thus' Vikarna is a technical word used by the predecessors of Pāṇini and was later adopted by the Paninian school of grammarians to denote a certain type of suffixes

Patanjali gives us a clue to understand the nature and the position of Vikarana suffix While commenting on P 3 1 31[4] he says that the suffix 'Ām'' falls in between the root and the suffix (Tin) like a Vikarana [5] From this we understanb that the Vikarana

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1 Vikaroti vikārayatīti vā vikaranah
2 P 3 1 31, Āyadaya Ārdha dhātuke vā
3 Vide Bhūshana Kārika ''Sarvanāvyayādīuām'' (Kārikā 10)
4 P 3 1 31 Āyādaya Ārdha dhātuke va
5 Ām madhye Patisyati yathā Vikaranastadvat

suffix is one which follows the verbal root Here the root means either a primary root or a derivative or even a secondary root

The suffixes which go under the name of Vikaraṇa are enumerated here under, 1 Śap, 2 Yak, 3 Sya, 4 Tās, 5 Śip, 6 Ām, 7 Chli, 8 Sic, 9 Ksa, 10 Caṅ, 11 Aṅ, 12 Ciṇ, 13 Śyan, 14 Śnu, 15 Śa, 16 Śnam, 17 U, 18 Śnā, 19 Śānac, 20 Śayac, 21 Ak

Vikaraṇa Suffixes-Meaningful or not

Now let us consider whether these Vikaraṇa snffixes have any meaning or not The whole issue is discussed in Mahābhāṣya on the sutra "Sārvadhatuke yak"

Vikaraṇas are expressive of Sense -

Some scholars are of the opininion that these Vikaraṇa suffixes are meaningful and they express the sense of Agent etc In support of their argument they quote the very sutras like 'Kartari Śap' 'Sārvadhātuke Yak', 'Bhāvakarmaṇoḥ Yak" etc, They bring an analogy of the interpretation of the Sūtra 'Kartari Kṛt' which is explained as the kṛt suffix comes in the sense of Agent On the same analogy the sūtra 'Kartari Śap is to be explained as 'the suffix 'Śap' comes in the sense of Agent' Similaraly the suffix 'Yak' is enjoined in the sense of Bhava or object (Karma) when the root is followed by a Sarvadhataka Lakara The words Kartari, Karmaṇi' Bhave in the Sutra Lah Karmaṇi ca (P 3 4 69) do not give the sense of agent object etc The meaning of the Locative is 'in the context of (Viṣaya Saptamī) Therefore the Vikaraṇa suffixes 'Śap' etc are meaningful and they denote the agent object etc And this is the reason why in words like gaccha, vada, brūhi etc, wnere tne Tiṅ suffixes are not seen, the sense of agent etc is denoted by the Vikaraṇa Suffix and the Tiṅ suffix denotes other meanings number, Tense, Person etc In places where these Tiṅ suffixes are elidod the sense of Tense etc, are understood by recalling that suffix Of course in places where the Vikaraṇa suffix is not at all enjoined i e in Liṅ and Liṭ, the sense of agent etc., is expressed by the Tiṅ suffix, but in

dara a suffix is ended, there again by the pro- ... the sense of agent etc,' is understood And ... to accept that the agent, object etc are the ... of the Lakara, then the inconsistency of the ... of the suffix arises Therefore the Vikarana su- ... and have semantic importance in the import

... significant -

... stated above emphasising the denotative ... suffixes, are weak and unstable They ... in the following way.

... see what this "meaning" is, or, to be more ... to decide that a particular sense is that of a ... is often done by the method of positive and ... (Anvaya Vyatirekabhāvah) i e if a parti- ... by the presence of a word and if that know- ... the absence of that particular word, then we ... is the meaning of that particular word'

... we examine the Vikaranas applying this technique ... do not have any definite meaning of their own, ... meaning of the verb word is found to be independent ... The presence or absence of a Vikarana ... not cause any special import Normally by ... we get a knowledge of Agent or Object ... This knowledge is not effected whether ... the Vikarana suffix or not For example ... roots belonging to the second and third ... forms of any root do not have any ... get the import of subject, person, number ... verb forms 1 Similarly we get the same import ... have the Vikarana suffix 2 Thus it is

... a, Canvat etc

evident that either the presence or absence of a Vikaraṇa suffix does not obstruct the knowledge we get from a verb word

And if we were to accept the interpretation of the Sūtra 'Kartari Śap' as given above, then there will be no coherence between Laḥ Karmaṇi Ca and Kartari Śap It is clearly stated in the Bhāṣya that the agent, object etc are the meanings of the Lakāra itself and it is also asserted there that we cannot do away with the Sūtra Laḥ Karmaṇi etc. Therefore the word Kartari in the Sūtra 'Kartari Śap' does not mean "in the sense of agent"

Hence the Vikaraṇa suffixes do not have any meaning of their own to express

The View of Patañjali

This question of the denotative potentiality of the Vikaraṇa suffixes, is thoroughly discussed by him while commenting on the Sūtra "Sārvadhātuke yak". The Bhāṣyakāra states that instead of accepting two suffixes viz. Vikaraṇa and Tiṅ to express the agent etc, at different places' let there be only one suffix (to express the agent etc) in all the verbs and also let that one suffix be Tiṅ only [1] In fact this simple statemet contains a rich arguement It may be explained as follows

1 Neither the Vikaraṇa suffix nor the Tiṅ suffix is present in all the verb words Though the absence of the suffix due to elision is same in both cases, the Vikaraṇa suffix suffers from an additional defect that it is not at all enjoined in certain Lakāras (Liṅ and Liṭ)

2 In the case of elision a recourse to the recalling of the elided suffix, is inevitable in either case

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1. Idam Vicāryate Bhāvakarmakartāraḥ sārvadhātukārthāḥ vā syuḥ vikaraṇārthāveti. ...Evam ca kṛtvā ekapakṣibhūta meve-dam bhavati, Sārvadhātukārthā eveti (M.B. on P.3.1.67)

So if we accept that Tin suffixes alone are expressive of tl agent etc, at least we will be free of the defect of non-enjoi ment of the suffix in certain Lakāras

In Lin and Lit, the opponent also has admitted, that it the Tin suffix which denotes the agent etc

Hence taKing breivity into consideration it can be con trued that the Bhāṣyakāra clearly affirms that the Vikaraṇa suffix are not significant

The Views of Bhattoji and Kauṇḍabhatta

Bhattoji and Kauṇḍabhatta are of the view that the Vikarar suffixes are suggestive but not expressive This is made clear i the Vaiyakaraṇa Bhuṣaṇa (and Bhusaṇa Sara) and that Vaiyākaraṇa matonmajjani They too agree that Kartṛ Karman or Bhava are th expressed meanings of Tin suffixes, but, when a doubt arrise whether, in sentences like Devadattaḥ pacati, the Tin suffix expi esses Kartṛ or Karman etc, then to clarify the position these Vikā raṇa suffixes help us If Śap is the Vikaraṇa suffix, then we hav to know that Kartā is expressed by Tin and if yak is the Vikaran then it is Karma or Bhava that is expressed b Tin. And in place where the Tin suffix is elided e g Gaccha Piba etc, the sense c agent is expressed by recalling the suffix. Such possiblity o recalling the Vikaraṇa Śap, Yak, etc, is not possible in Lit and Lir They further opine that, at the most, when the Tin has to expres the agent, the fact is indicated (suggested) by Śap It is the sam case even with other suffixes like Yak, Cin etc They are onl suggestive[1] (Tatparyagrahakāḥ)

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1 Phala vyaparayostatra phale taṅ yak ciṇādayaḥ, vyāpare śap śnamadyā stu dyotayantyāśrayānvayam (Vai-Bhu Karika-3).
Tatha ca sarvadhatukasya kartṛtvā vasyakatve, śabādīnām dyotakatva mātram kalpyate lāghavāditi (ibid)

THE VIEW OF NĀGEŚA

According to Nagesa, the Vikarana suffix limits the expressive sense of the Tin suffix Normally a Tin suffix denotes either agent or object or even an impersonal sense Thus in a sentence like 'Devadattah pacati', the Vikarana suffix restricts the meaning of the Tin suffix and allows only the sense of agent to be denoted by it and not the object Thus the Vikarana suffixes are indicative by restricting the meanings (Agent, object impersonal sense) of the Tin suffix [1]

Nagesa continues his argument that the Bhāsya 'Sārvadhātu kārthāḥ Kartardayah' means that the Agent etc (i e object, impersonal sense Bhāva) are merely suggested by it (i e. by the Sārvadhtuka affix) And in that case the Vikarana suffixes are only to grant grammatical correctness to the word Nāgesa says that, if we accept that Vikaranas are meaningful, then they are meaningful to the extent of suggesting them, but not expressing them (Agent object etc) [2] He saya both the theories are valid, since they are only indicative. After all it is due to (the nature of the power of) the word (Sabdasakti) that in some places (in some words) the suggestion of the meanings is made by the Sārvadhā-tukas in association with the Vikarana sufrix And in some words this Sarvadhātuka suggests it even without the Vkiarana suffix [3]

Thus in the view of Nāgesa Vikaranas are either to grant simply grammatical correctness of the word or to be meaningful through their suggestiveness

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1 Dyotakatvam caisām tinsu kartrtrādhyartha matra niyāmaktvena bodhyam (Brhat sabdenudu Sekhara Vol 3, P1593)

2. Sārvadhatuke yak iti sūtrasthasya Sārvadhātu kārthāh kartrādaya iti Bhāsyasya taddyotyā ityevārthah Vikaranastvatrapakse sādhutvārtha eva Vikaranārthā iti pakse vikarana dyotyā api (Laghu Mañjusā (k k) P I, P 780, P 1)

3 Tatra sabda sakti svabhāvat kvacidvikarana sahitasya taddyotakatvam Kvacit tatsahāyyenārtha Pratīteh arthavatvayavahāropi. (ibid P'781).

The purport of all this is that neither the Sārvadhātuka nor the Vikaraṇa denotes the meanings of agent, or object etc They can only suggest them which are, really speaking, the meanings of the root itself

REVIEW

Regarding the meaning of the Vikaraṇa suffixes it is observed that there are three theories (1) Vikaraṇas have no meaning except for the fact that they are for grammatical correctness of the word (2) Vikaraṇa denotes Agent object etc (3) The Agent, object etc , are the meanings of the Sārvadhātuka and the Vikaraṇa is a dyotaka in the absence of the Tiṅ suffix

Now after a close examination of the various arguments putforth by the respective scholars, it can be observed that each has some point and logic in his argument But of all the theories, it seems the first one is more logical Vikaraṇas do not have any expressive meaning The sense of agent, object etc , are the meanings of the root alone but not of the Sārvadhātuka or of the Vikaraṇa suffixes [1] The reason is that we get the import of the agent etc , even in the absence of Vikarana or Tiṅ suffix in some cases or when even both are preset

It is also not sound to accept that in places where these suffixes are dropped, the import of the agent etc is caused by recalling the dropped suffix (i e by a Lupta Smaraṇa dvāra bodhaḥ) This argument as stated by Nāgeśa, is refuted by Bhāgvan Patañjali in the Mahābhāṣya [2] The reason is that a man who does not have a knowledge of this "lopa' and "Lupta Smaraṇa"

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1 Tatra "kutsite (P 5 3 74), Bahuṣu bahuvacanam (p,1 4 21) ityādi sūtrastha bhāṣye pañcaka pakṣasyaiva siddhāntitatvena suptiṅām dyotakatva pakṣa eva Bhāṣya sammataḥ (P 290- Tattvadarśanī)

2 Lupta smaraṇadbodhaḥ iti tu ekaśeṣa sūtre pratyaya lakṣaṇa-kāryasiddheḥ lopaphalatvam vadatā Bhāṣyakāreṇa tiraskṛtam, Lopamajānatām tathā bodhānāpatteḥ (Lagh Mañjūṣa (k k) Part 2, P.719)

etc also gets the same import as one who has this knowledge Hence in getting the knowledge of the agent etc neither the suffix (existent or dropped) nor a recalling of it (smaraṇa) is the cause It is purely due to the natural power inherent in the word (Śabdasaktisvabhāva) Hence it is reasonable to accept that all the meanings i e agent or object activity time, person and number are the meanings of the root alone, and the suffixes simply reveal or indicate them Hence the arguments of Nāgeśa are laudable and are close to the reality 1

Jagadīśa, the author of the Śabda Śaktiprakāśa also is of the same view that Vikaraṇa suffixes are not having any meaning 2

Thus it may be established that the Vikaraṇa suffixes do not have any meaning of their own

Now it may be a point of interest to know why they are used if they do not have any meaning or in what way they help us To this we reply they serve in contributing to the grammatical correctness of words (Pada Sādhutva Sampādanārthaḥ), and secondly these Vikaraṇa suffixes from Śap to Śna help us in dividing the roots (about two thousand) into different conjugations

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1 Tatra sabdasaktisvabhavat Kvacidvikaraṇasahitasya taddyotakatvam kvacidkevala sārvadhātukasyapiti (ibid P 781)

2 Śap syan ādi vikaraṇo numadyagamasca prakṛtyadīnam sahayopi svārthosthitidvara yena tamadaya caturadi vidhaḥ sārthopsthitidvāra yena tamādaya caturādi vidhaḥ sarthakaḥ syāt (Śab Śak Pra under Karika-6)

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TENSES AND MOODS

Interoduction

In the last chapter we arrived at the conclusion that there is something called 'time' with reference to which we can differentiate actions as past, present, future etc [1] This time element is denoted by the verb word as an attributive to the action denoted by it The Indian Grammarians adopted a system to convey besides this time element, some additional knowledge i e the mental state or mood of the person speaking Thus each of these notions of time and mood (or modality) is conveyed through a different suffix called Lakāra' enjoined after the verbal root Though Time is unitary in itself, it is spoken as distinguished like past, present, future etc by superimposing particular actions on time The pastness etc exists only in activity Thus when an activity has its means nearby and its emergence is expected, then time having such an activity mentally conceived and super imposed on it is called Future time Similarly when there is an action which has been begun and completed, and when it is super imposed on time, the particular time which is the substratum of such an action is called past time Likewise the present is the time which is the substratum of an action which has begun but not completed [2] Thus Time having activity as its superimposition becomes past, future, present etc This division is purely a mental concept Time, though broadly divided as past present and future, in daily life people are found to use eleven types of time division in describing the various activities This fact is recorded by Bhartṛhari who says that past is of five kinds, future is of four kinds and present of two kinds Thus altogether there are eleven divions of Time [3] How is this possible? It is explained as follow

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1 Kriyabhedaya kalastu samkhya sarvasyabhedika V P 3 9-2

2 Kriyopādhisca san bhūtabhavisyadvartamanatāh,
Ekādasabhirakarair vibhaktāh pratipadyate (V P 3 9 37)

3 Bhutah pañca vidhastatra bhavisyamsca caturvidhah,
Vartamāno dvidhakyāta ity ekādasa kalpanāh (V P 3 9-39)

One type of broad division of Time is Adyatana Anadytana and Sāmānya

Adyatana

Adyatana means 'Today' i e the day in which the person speaking exists Generally speaking it is a period of twenty four hours Of course there exists difference of opinion as regards the concept of Adyatana Some scholars are of the opinion that Adyatana means a period from Sun-rise to Sun-rise Some are of the opinion that Adyatana denotes the period beginning with the period beginning with the latter half of the previous night and including the first half of the following [1] Some other scholars define Adyatana as a period beginnig with the last quarter of the previous night and ending with the first quarter of the following night [2] Thus Adyatana in general means the day on which one is speaking or acting

Anadyatana

From the very word it is clear that what is not Adyatana is Anadyatana i e the period exclusive of the day in which one speaks or acts Hence Anadyatana does not mention specifically whether it is past or future, it may be either, but what it specifically denotes is "not the day when one is speaking or acting ," Hence there can be Anadyatana Bhaviṣyat (Future exclusive of today)

Samanya

It refers to the time where a specific mention of the time aspect i e Adyatana or Anadyatana, is not made That is, the

1 Ahna inubhayatoidharatrameṣo'dyatanah kalah (Padamanjari under Sutra P 3 2 15)

2 Ekasya ratrescaturtho yamo divasca sarvo
Dvitiyayasca ratreh prathamo adyatana ityāhuḥ.
(Pradipa on M B under P 3 2 110 3)

speaker does not attatch much importance to the particular period but to action only refferring to future or past in a casual (or general) way Thus when we apply these differences to past, present and future, there result elven kinds of time divisions The eleven divisions are explained by Helārāja as follows ,

1 Past in general (P 3 2 110) 2 Immediate past (Adyatana bhūta) 3 Past exclusive of today (Anadyatana bhūta P 3 2 111) 4 Combination of the two previous one (Adyatanānadyatana samudāya P 3 2 110) 5 Future treated as past P 3 3 132) 6 Future in general (P 3 3 13) 7 Immediate-future (adyatana bhavisyat P 3 3 164) 8 Future exclusive of today (Anadyatanabhavisyat P 3 3 15) 9 Combination of the two previous kinds (P, 3 3 13) 10 Present actual (real) (P 3 2 123) 11 Near Future or past treated as presesent (gauṇa, P 3 2 131) Thus all these divisions of time have been mentioned only to explain the tense distinctions mentioned in the science of grammer

Of these eleven divisions Adyatanabhūta is generally denoted, not by a lakāra but by Niṣṭhā suffix vide P 3 2 102 Adyatana bhaviṣyat is denoted by a mood suffix Liṅ vide P 3 3 164 The remaining time divisions are denoted only by five different suffixes called lakāras Besides these time divisions with respect to the past exclusive of today (Anadyatana bhūta) there is another subdivision as unwitnessed by the speaker (Parokṣa, anadyatanabhūta) as governed by P 3 2 115 This is denoted by a separate suffix Thus there are mainly six types of time denoting suffixes (Lakāras)

Besides these six lakāras denoting the Time, the Sanskrit Grammarians accepted another four lakāras which, mainly refer to indicate the mood of the speaker, i e whether he commands, requests, anticipates, gives benediction etc Of course all these four Lakāras more or less, relate to future tense only, but the importance is not for the time element but to the mental state of the speaker In all these four types a mild sense of desire appears in common Thus in Sanskrit verbal system there are six time -denoting and four mood-denoting lakāras totalling to Ten Lakāras

Each Lakāra is differentiated physically from the other by adding some special mute letters which have some special operational purpose in grammar These ten Lakāras are named as 1 Lat, 2 Lit, 3 Lut, 4 Lrt, 5 Let, 6 Lot, 7 Lan, 8 Lin, 9 Lun, 10 Lin Of these the fifth one i e Let is used only in Vedic language and as far as classical language is concerned it is obselete But the Lin suffix is sub-divided as Vidhi lin and Āsirlin, Thus again in the classical language, by omitting Let and accepting two Lin suffixes, again the total number of lakāras comes to Ten With this back-ground now let us study each lakāra in detail

LAT :

Panini enjoins this suffix Lat after a verbal root to denote present tense of the action denoted by the root [1] When the action is in the present tense, the Suffix Lat is used but not when the result denoted by the root or the agent is in present time If the time notions are with respect to the Agent, then whenver the cook is present (available) even without any act of cooking we have to use the present tense as "He cooks" (Pacati). And similer is the case with respect to result expressed by the root This reasoning applies even to the past tense or future tense Hence if we can decide what is meant by 'present time we can decide the other two times i e past and future Let us expamine what is meant by presentness (Vartamānatva) of time

The Bhāsyakāra dealt with this topic while commenting on the Sūtra P 3 2 123, Hari in the Vakyapadīya-kālasamuddesa verses 81 to 102, Kaundabhatta in the Bhūsana-Lakārāratha nirnaya, Nāgesa in his Laghumañjusā-Tinarthavada All other disciplines also discussed the matter in their works

Normally a student of Grammar when asked to define Vartamānatva says "the fact of being begun but not yet completed This is how Kaundabhatta defines it, i e when an

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1 P 32.123, Vartamane Lat

activity is commenced and is being continued till the result is produced (or not complered) we say it is the presentness 1 For instance let us examine common experience A boy starts going to school and studying at the age of six and contiunes till he gets a degree if any one questions him what he does, he replies 'I am studying' Similarly an employee says he works in the office from say ten a m to five p m In all these cases neither the student sticks to his books always reading without taking rest, meal, sleep etc nor does the employee from Chit-chat-ting with co-workers or going on short relief for tea etc Yet we use the present tense only in such cases e g "he studies (is studying)' etc We do not consider the intermediatory activities as separate activities which cause breaking the main activity of studying Here the presentness is justified because as the Bhāsyakara says the result has not been achieved 2

Now the opponent raises an objection that in such cases as above (one studies etc) we should not make use of the present tense because the main activity is broken and also because when an intermediatroy action begins, the previous action ends So in all such cases only a past usage is to be made and present tense is to be used only in instances where present action actually exists (i e with out any break) such as one writes, or eats etc

This is replied in two ways One is already explained that all the intermediatory activitives such as taking bath, dressing, eating, sleeping etc are but parts of the main activity 'study' Further these intermeadiatory activities are aids in helping continuance of the main action till the result is obtained Similarly what the opponent thinks as a real present action, without breaks, such as eating, writing etc is not a single action The opponent must note even the action of eating consists of many intermediatory actions such as drinking water, Chit-chatting with

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1. Prārabdhaparisamāptatvam vartamānatvam (Vai Bhu under verse 22)
2 Nyayyatvesā vartamānakalata, Kutah? Ārambhanapavargat (M.B on P 3 2 123)

action of falling has ceased' And similarly the conception of time as future arises only when the action of falling is about to happen Consequently the conception of present time results when the action of the thing is perceived as going on at the time Further if a man does not have the knowledge of an action as going on at the time, he can conceive nothing as having ceased or as going to happen Another important thing is that both in past and future the object is devoid of action but in the present we apprehend the actual existing conception of the object and action Thus unless wa have this conception of the object actually associated with action (i e present) the conception of other two types of time (Past and future) would not be possible [3] Hence the existence of present time established.

We find a similar argument in the Mahābhaṣya also There the Kṣaṇabhangavadin argues that time is of the form of kṣaṇa In this universe, matter exists in its state only for kṣaṇa and perishes in the next kṣaṇa Hence there is nothing as Vartamānakala i e an activity of the present time, becauses matter perishes in every second kṣaṇa as such there is no inherent cause (samavaya karaṇa) as a result no activity can be produced Similarly another intelligent Mīmāmsaka also says though we accept that matter is permanent i e does not change at every moment one cannot explain the existence of present time of action He says Time is of the form Kṣaṇa Thus only a single Kṣaṇa is actually perceived but not the previous one (which has already lapsed) nor the following one (which has not come into being). Thus Anupalabdhi is the authority in establishing the absence of presentness of action and hence of the presentness

These two types of objections are replied to as follows Here the unity of activity is the aggregate of moments and this aggregate is achieved by mental fabrication.[4] To be more clear we say that the moments possessing the regular priod-posterior relation and producing a result are called activity. Due to

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1 Vastyāyana's N B. on II 1 40

2 Helārāja on V P. 3.9-89

the hand from the plate to the mouth and eating And as such there is no real activity which is But, just as in the case of the load to be carried third man who gets in there by chance is also ne of the load carriers,[3] in the same way all these ictions are deemed to be a single unit and hence present tense is justified

opponent raises a very fundamental objection hing as presentness There is only either past-ss, because a thing may be either existent or Hence there is no possibility of the third alterna- across a similar discussion in the commentary on is There Vātsyayana the commentator of the futes the madhyamika theory which says that nt time apart from the past and future Here the es that if the past is defined as that which sent and the future as that which succeds it, then past or future even, because there is nothing as the Grammarian tries to define past and future present such definitions are not possible For ler an object falling When the object falls we ken by it traversing a certain distance and the n by it in traversing the remaining distance, and vening distance which the object can be said to resent time, Thus the space traversed gives the e and the space to be travelled gives the idea of ch there is no third space which could give rise me [1]

the objector raised the objection intelligently ooked a fact that time is manifested by action but dhva) Vāstyāyana establishes present time as nception of time as past arises only when the

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V P 3-9-84

the difference in the result we differentiate activities too It is immaterial whether the moments are both existent and non-existent because we define presentness as the incompletness of a commenced activity The aggregate of moment alone is capable of producing an effect, Thus activity or presentness etc is to be inferred from the fact a person being at one place now exists at another place after some time Thus both activity as well as the time are the results of mental abstraction or fabrication This is one way of establishing the presentness of time and action as a pure mental fabrication The Bhasyakara now proves in a different way that there exists real present time and activity [1] He says that there is real present time and activity in a subtle state, It cannot be perceived due to its subtlity just as one cannot see the movement in the Sun at every moment but can infer that he moves Becauses he reaches the other extreme point (from east to west) Further if it cannot be perceived it is due to some impediments like distance, or minuteness etc Because a thing cannot be perceived (due to the defect in a person) it is not logical to argue that the thing itself does not exist, For instance observe a dry lotus stalk It has fine threads inside, we Know it Now if the stalk is burnt one sees the external stalk burning but cannot see the inside threads burning It does not establish that all the fine threads are unburnt - Thus though it cannot be seen there exists real time and activity Hence the presentness of activity is defined as an action which has been begun but not completed And the substratum of it is called present time

Nagesabhatta deffines present time as the substratum of activity begun but not completed.[3]

The Mīmāmsaka defines Vartamāna as a time non-different from the time expressing the Lat suffix.[4] The Logician also defi-

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1 Astivartamānakālah Ādityagativannopalabhyate etc (M B on P 3 2 123)

2 Bisasya nāla iva dahyamānā etc (ibid)

3 Prārabdhāparisamāpta kriyāsrayatvam vartamanatvam

4 Laduccarana kālābhinna kālatvam (Bhā. Rah.).

nes present tense in a similar way that present time is one which is the substratum of the utterance (of the Lat sufffx)[1] Thus in order to express this present time, the suffix Lat is enjoined after a verbal root

The Mahābhāsyakāra, alternatively defines presentness as one different from the pastness and futurity Some scholars like Pancoli commentator on the Bhūsaṇasāra etc are of the opinion that this definition is not free from faults, because it suffers from the fault of mutual dependency[2] It is like this When one is asked to define presentness the answer is in terms of the other two (i.e pastness, and futurity) Similarly when one is asked 'what is pastness' the reply is in terms of the other two (i e present and future) Similarly futurity also is defined Thus there is the fault of a mutual depency in the definitions. Hence Kauṇḍabhatta prefers the other definition viz Prārabhdāparisamāpta kriyātvam vartamāntvam This contention of the scholars is untenable The alternate definition offered by the Mahābhāsyakara is free from any fault Here we define the pastness as "the property of being the counter-positive of consequent absence at the present time or it can be defined as" the property of an action which the coonter positive of the absence existing in the present[3]

Similarly the future tense also can be defined as "Having the the property of coming into existence in a time which is the counterpositive of the prior absence existinq in the present[4] Thus definition given by the Mahābhāsyakara is free of the fault i e mutual dependency

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1 Vartamānakālasca tattatsabdaprayogādhikaraṇa kālarūpah (Vy Vā)

2 Atra vāsabdo'nāsthāyām (Anādare) Pūrnoktāpeksayā asyaiva gurutvāt Kimcaivam bhūtatvāderapi vaktum sakhyatayā anyonyāsrayāpattiḥ (Prabha on Vai Bhū Sā)


3 Vidyamāna dhvamsa pratiyogitvam bhūtatvam or Vartamāna dhvamsa pratiyoigriyopalaksitatvam bhūtatvam

4 Vartamāna prāgabbhāvapratiyogisamyotpattimatvam

Futther the present tense suffix, as opined by Gāgabhatta is used after a verbal root to indicate a habit, continuity of action, in the sense of near ruture of past etc 1 The last type of presentness is from a secondary signification However this type of present usage i e in instances where the state of this present time is extended to the nearby future or past time, is ratified by Panini sutra P 3 3'131 2 Thus present tense, as already stated is of two types

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1. Apravittau parścaiva vittau Vtrata eva ca Nityaḥ pravittah samipye vartamanascaturvidhah (Bhā Cin)
2 Vartamanasāmīpye vartamanavadvā (P 3 3.131).



LIṬ

This suffix Liṭ is enjoined after a verbal root to indicate a time (associated with an action) which is past, and exclusive of today and not witnessed by the speaker (parokṣa).[1] This suffix Liṭ excludes the other two suffixes used to indicate past time exclusive of today Thus to use the Liṭ suffix three conditions are laid down' Omission of any of the three results in the fault of over application of the definition on other times If the first condition i e, that it should express past, is omitted out, it will also apply to future exclusive of today If the second condition i e exclusive of tody, is dropped out then it would also apply to past pertaining to today If the third condition i e not witnessed by the speaker, is not there then it would apply to past witnessed by the speaker also Thus all the three conditions are necessary to give the precise use of Liṭ

Adyatana as alreday explained is the day accompanied by
(a) of the night that is past + 1/2 of the night yet to come or
(b) 1/2 of the night that is past+1/3 of the night yet to come or
(c) from sunrise to sunrise

As regards the Parokṣatva (imperceptibility) the Bhāṣyakāra records many views such as (a) one hundred years ago (b) one thousand years ago (c) two or theree days ago or (d) even obstructed by a wall etc ,[2] However "not being witnessed by the speaker' is a common factor among all these different alternatives Kau labhaṭṭa defines Parokṣatva as "the property of not being the object of knowledge" such as " I perceive " that resides in the mind of speaker [3]

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1 Parokṣe Liṭ-P 3 2 115
Bhūta anadyatana parokṣartha vṛtterdhātoḥ Liṭ syāt

2. M.B on P 3 2 115

3 Parokṣayatvam prayoktṛvṛtti sākṣātkaromi ityetādṛśa viṣayatā—ālijnāna aviṣayatvam (Vai. Bhu P 75)

The other disciplines[1] also accept the use of the Lit suffix as governed by P 3 2 115 Thus the sentence 'Caitraḥ papaca' gives us an import that the activity of cooking is past, and is not a matter of to day (Adyatana) and that the speaker also did not witness the agent while cooking Thus to put in other words that knowledge (that Caitra cooked something sometime exclusive of today) possessed by the speaker is not obtained by direct perceptian but through some other agency

Now let us examine the import of the sūtra There it is said 'when activity is not witnessed by the speaker, as one of the conditions for the use of Lit suffix' Here are doubts whether action is visible at all It is made clear by the Bhaṣyakāra at many places that action is so minute that it cannot be seen but is to be inferred[2] Further the activity denoted by the root has many interemediatory activities of which each exists one or two moments only Thus no real activity is denoted by the root, but it denotes the total of such intermediatory activities mentally fabricated as a single unit Hence when the activity is not at all perceptible the use of the phrase 'Parokṣe' is purposeless

To this objection Kaṇḍabhatta author of the 'Vaiyakarana Bhusana' gives a two fold reply He interprets that Parokṣtva refers to the agent associated with the action Thus thoug action is not perceptible its substratum is percetible Hence the word Parokṣatva means "when the agent associated with activity is not actually witnessed by the speaker (Sādhanaparokṣatva)' However he does not feel satisfied of this reply He fears of the fault of prolixity because in such a case the word Dhatoḥ' is to be explained as of the substratum of action which is denoted by the root" But if he can explain Parokṣa as referring to activity then there

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1 Liṭarthopi bhūtānadyatanatva visiṣta parokṣarūpaḥ (Bhā Rah) and Atītyam anadyatanatvam parokṣatvam ca Liṭarthaḥ (vyu Va)

2 Kriyānāmeyamatyantāparidṛṣta ṣakyā pindībhūta nidarsayitum Sāsā vanumānagamyā (M B on P 1 3 1)

will be brevity in explaining the word 'Dhātoḥ as of action expressed by the root

Hence he prefers the interpretation that "when the action is imperceptible" 1 Now one may ask about the objection raised in this connection So Kauṇḍabhatta replies that the words of the Bhasyakara are to be carefully understood The Bhasyakara means that ' mentally conceived as a whole the individual constituent activities arranged in a temporal sequence, conceived as whole is not visible, but the individual component is perceptible in its component form Otherwise the stament Pasya Mṛgo dhavati (Behold the animal runs), cannot be justified In the above sentence the object of verb Dṛs (see) is the action of running Though "running ' as a whole is not visible its component parts such as moving fast both the legs neck etc. can be visualised Thus though activity as a whole (Samudayakriya) is not perceptible it is perceptible in its constituent parts (Avayava kriya) So taking this into account, we can justify the use of 'Paroksa in the sūtra Thus Kauṇḍabhatta prefers Kriyaparoksatva to Sadhana Paroksatva

There is another reason for Kauṇḍabhatta to accept Kriyāparoksatva This facilitates an easy 'Jstificatiation of the usage of Lit in the first person Since it is decided that Lit is to be used only when the action or the means of achieving that action is not perceived by the speaker it becomes evident that Lit cannot be used in the first person Whatever one does must be perceptible to oneself and thus the condition of impercceptiblity is not fulfilled But Kauṇḍabhatta does not totally accept this version One may not be aware of what one does when the one is absorbed in something i e under the influence of liquor, erotic intoxication etc Thus there is scope for one not to perceive ones own activity and then is inferred from its result Thus the famous usage in Sisupālavadha is justified 2

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1 Idaṃ tvavadheyam Kriyayā eva parokṣye liḍityartho lāghvāt (ibid P 75)

2 Bahu jagada purastattasya mattakilahaṃ (Sisupālavadha 11 39)

Nāgesa says that the root 'Dṛs' has the meaning of know-legde in general (jñāna sāmanya) but not perceptiblity with eyes (Cākṣuṣa pratyakṣa) He suggests that the root 'Dhāvi' denotes only result but not activity, in which case the objection of the opponent can be set aside Otherwise this objection cannot be answered because any action whatever it be (Avayava or samudāya) is in turn a group of smaller components only and as such it cannot be visualised 1 If any one says he is perceiving an activity, it is not the activity that one perceives but constituent parts of the result continuously brought into existence by the activity in a temporal sequence, which finally remains as a substance or only a mental impression Bhartṛhari also confirms the view that there is no pure activity that can be seen and every thing has still parts in it self 2 And in this case of Pasya Mṛgo dhāvati the real object is running (Dhāvana) but the animal gets the objective case being a perceptible means (substratum) of the activity of running 3

Now there are certain instances where the action cannot be admitted as unseen by the speaker but he (the speaker) uses Liṭ in the first person For instance Udayana, author of Kiraṇāvalī says "Vyātene kiraṇāvalīmudayanah" Here Udayana being the author of the Kiraṇāvalī cannot say that his work is unperceived by him In such cases how is to justity the usage of Liṭ in the first person

To this question excepting a few persons like Vardhamāna, Upāyakāra and his followers, other scholars like Nāgesa justify the

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1 Avayava rūpeṇa samudāya rūpeṇa ca apratyakṣetyarthaḥ, Pasya mṛgodhāvati ityādi prayogaḥ tatphala samyogadarsanābhiprāyeṇa Dṛservā jñanasamanye lakṣaṇā (Uddyota on P 3 2 102 Vartika 3)

2 Na ca vicchinnarūpopi Soviramānnivartate, Sarvaiva hi kriyānyena samkīrṇaivopalabhyate (V P 3 9-83)

3 Na hyatra mṛgaḥ karma Dvitīyāprasangāditi saranakriyaiva karma Tasyāsca sādhana pratyaksatāyām pratyaksatābhimānāt 'Pasya' iti darsanakriyopattiḥ (V.P.3.8 51, Helārāja)

Nagesabhatta, who always strictly follows the Mahabhasya-ara, does not agree with the theory of "Kriyaparoksya" propo-nded by Kaundabhatta Kriya is always imperceptible, be it in s component form or its aggregate singleness What one means component part of the main action has, in turn, many compo-ent parts in it Thus if one goes on analysing what is thought of an Avayavakriya' it, in turn, becomes a samudayakriyā with spect to the component parts in such an 'avayavakriyā' ence no activity can be perceived That is why the Bhāsyakara ys "action, totally imperceptible (Atyantaparidista) is not ssible to show". Further if a constituent part of an action is ible the Bhasyakāra would have not said "Sasāvānumanaga-'a i e an action is always to be inferred from its result' Hence en intermediatory component parts of an action are not at all ible

Further the Bhasyakara says that Paroksatva is an attribute to result Though activity is not perceptible the result is percep-le So as it is generally admitted that if the result is not wit-sed it amounts that activity which produces that result also is witnessed Thus Lit can be used after a verbal root in the ins-ces where the result is not actually witnessed by the speaker is the Sūtra amounts past, exclusive of today, result not nessed When the result of past action exclusive of today is not nessed by the speaker, then to indicate that sense the Lit ix is enjoined after the verbal root [1]

Thus Bhasyakara does not make any mention of the non nessing of constituent activities (Avayavakriya) As such, esa contends that Kaundabhatta is mistaken in his conclusion imtvavadheyam etc "

Now one may question how Nāgesa can justify the usages hold' the animal runs (Pasya Mrgodhāvati)

M B. on Parokse Lit P 3 2 115.

usage accepting the superimposition of imperceptiblity [1] They accept superimposition because they explain the intention of Udayana as to convey the ease, quickness etc with which he has completed the work (i e with such a speed) that he (Udayana) himself feels it as unperceivable Thus he completed the act of writing the book

Vardhamana and others do not accept it and they justify the first person usage on the jñāpaka of the sūtra P 7 1 91 [2] That is Pāṇini says that in Lit the first person suffix behaves optionally like a Ṇit Therefore if Lit is always to be used in Parokṣa, then this sūtra becomes purposeless But it is not admissable that Pāṇini writes purposeless Sūtras Hence these scholars define Parokṣatva as 'having agent-hood different from that of the speaker But as the Sūtra Naluttamova accepts Lit usage in the first person also, it is said to remind us that Lit is possible to be used even if there is no Parokṣya as defined above [3]

To justify the usages of Lit in the first person on the plea that P VII 1 91 reminds us of such usages, is not correct A sūtra reminds us of something when it becomes inapplicable (Vyartha) But in the present cases the sutra VII-1-91 has its utility in many other places where Lit is justified without any restriction of Parokṣatva, e g Atyantapahnave ca [4] And in the case of Luṅ, and Laṅ, Lit also is enjoined by the Sutra P 3 4 6 [5] So in all these instances the Sutra "Naluttamo vā" applies Hence we cannot take recourse to jñāpaka presuming that the sutra becomes purposeless Thus in the instances Vyatene kiraṇāvalīmudyanaḥ, we have to justify by accepting superimposed imperceptiblity (Parokṣatva) But Bhuṣaṇakara does not justify the usage and says 'Ayuktameva' (it is irregular)

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1 Vyatene kiraṇāvalīmudayanassattarke Tejomayīm
2 P 7 1 91, Naluttamo va
3 Kecit vaktṛbhinnakartṛkatvameva parokṣatvam (Vyu Va).
4 Vārtika 5 on P 3 2.115.
5 P 3.4.6, Luṅ Laṅ Litaḥ (Chandasi)

—'o—

LUṬ

his suffix Luṭ is enjoined after a verbal root to denote action expressed by the root is neither past, nor present fers to a time exclusive of today (Anadyatana) We have xplained the words Adyatana, Anadyatana, Vartamana, ind Bhaviṣyat

he word 'Bhaviṣat (future)' is defined as "having the of coming into existence in a time which is the counter of the prior absence existing in the preaent [1] Thus the ə 'Svo gantā' means an activity (of going) which comes ıg tomorrow Thus this suffix excludes that particular) futurity which may be like this One may say in the 'my father comes in the evening' Evening is a future th reference to the morning time Hence this suffix Luṭ t speak of such futurity but expresses futurity exclusive

his suffix Luṭ is enjoined after a verbal root on the autho- āṇini Sūtra P 3 3 15 [2] Further this suffix is used where yatana anadyatna future is mentioned as in sentence vo vāgamiṣyam" Thus it denotes two types of future

LṚT

his suffix Lṛt is enjoined after a verbal root to indicate "the general" That is here the speoker is not concenred the futurity belongs to this day or not He just wants y the futurity of the action Thus Lṛt can be used to future pertaining to this day And it is also used after a xpress future when there is action That is why Kauṇḍa- ays "future in general"

amāna prāgabhāvapratiyogi samayotpattimatvam (Vai karikā 22) 2. P 3 3 51, Anadyatane Luṭ

Panini enjoins this suffix after a verbal root through a Sūtra P 3 3 13 1

However sometimes Lut is used in the sense of Lrt when the speaker wants to convey worry or disgust For instance[2] a lady is walking too slowly Then one may exhibit his worry "at this rate when will she reach" meaning when she would reach the goal Here no reference is to the particula futurity but Lut is used Such cases are justified on the authority of the Vartika "Paridevane Svastani Bhavisyantyarthe" [3]

L E T

This suffix Let is enjoined after a verbal roo to indicate the same sense to express which, Lin is enjoined after a verbal root The suffix Lin[1] is enjoined after a veroal root to indicate injunction (Vidhi), assigning a duty [nimantrana), accord permission to do as one likes (Āmantrana), a respectful command (adista), request [Prarthanā] etc The Lin suffix expresses inducement The separate mention of the four meanings is just for the sake of clarity of the basic meaning

This suffix Let is enjoined on the authority of the Sūtra P 3 4 7 5 The use of this suffix is limited to the Veda only and in classical Sanskrit the usage of this suffix is not found

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1 P 3 3 1 (Lrt Sese ca)

2 Iyem nu kadagnta yaivam padau nidahaati

3 Paridevanam = anusocanam Svastanī is the technical name of old Grammarians what Pānini now calls Lut Similarly Bhavisyanti is synonymous to Lrt

4 P 3 4 7 Linarthe Let

5 Vidhi nimantranamantranadhista samprasnaprarthanesu Lin P 3 3 161 The meaning ef Vidhi is separately discussed in the following pages.

LOṬ

The suffix Loṭ is enjoined after a verbal root in the same sense as the suffix Liṅ i e Vidhi etc and also Benediction (Āsiḥ) Benediction means the wish of the speaker that a certain 'good may happen' This suffix is enjoined by two sutras i e P 3 3 173[1] and 3 3,162.[2]

LAṄ

It has been already explained that the suffix Luṭ is enjoined after a verbal root to indcate the future exclusive of today Now this suffix Laṅ is its counterpart in the past tense It is enjoined after a verbal root to indicate "the past exclusive of today" (Anadyatna bhūtakāla)

As already said pastness is the nature of being the counter-positive of consequential absence of existing in the present time[3] This pastness refers to action and not to the locus of that action Thus interpreting we can modify the definition of pastness as the nature of an action which is the counter-positive of the consequential absence existing in the present time[4] Thus this suffix indicates the pastness exclusive of today on the authority of the Sutra P 3 2 111[5]

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1. P 3 3 173 Āsīsi Liṅloṭau
2. P 3 3 162 Loṭ ca
3. Vidyamānadhvaṃsa pratiyogitvaṃ bhūtatvaṃ
4. P,3 2 111 Anadyatane Laṅ.
5. Vartamānadhvaṃsa pratiyogi kriyopalakṣitatvaṃ bhūtatvaṃ

* * *

LIN (VIDHI—VĀDAH)

(Meaning of the Potential Mood)

In this world we find that, when a person wants another to act, he conveys his intention in the form of either an order or a request In Sanskrit Language this order or the request is conveyed by using a verb word ending in a potential mood affix or an imperative mood affix etc As already established, this order or request is not the meaning of the verbal root hence it is of the suffix The medium of conveying this intention is of two types i e with the help of classical sentences or Vedic injunctions Whatever it be, it is further observed that immediately on hearing such a verb-word one does not act It is only in certain cases he acts and in some other cases he does not For example, when we order a person "to eat poison-mixed food, or to bring the Moon, or run through the streets, one does not act, but when we order or request for a cup of water, or to read a book or to perform a certain yāga, one may act immediately So it is evident that a mere hearing of a verb-word ending in a potential mood affix or imperative mood affix is not the cause in inducing a person to act Besides this, there is something which actually causes one to act Now "what is that something" is the question which engaged the attention of many scholars belonging to various disciplines particularly Tarka (logic), Mīmāmsa, and Vyākaraṇa (Grammar) Now in this chapter we will examine their arguments and conclusions briefly

LOGICIAN'S VIEW

Usually we find on hearing a verb word ending with a potential mood affix, one is induced to act In so getting induced, the hearer must necessarily possess three types of knowledge, viz, (1) that the particular object (for which one induces him to act) is capable of being achieved through effort, (Kṛtisādhyatva) (2) that the particular activity (to perform which one is induced) is the means to attain the desired end (iṣṭasādhanatva) (3) that (the particular activity) does not entail any serious untoward effects (Balavadaniṣṭānanubandhitva) For instance when we say

"'Bring the Moon" the hearer does not act, because he does not have any of these knowledges To be clear, he knows pretty well the it is not within his capacity to bring the desired object (the Moon)· he does not have the means to achieve it, and also he knows that many untoward serious evils may result even if he tries to bring the Moon Hence he does not act Similarly when we order 'Eat the poison-mixed food" one does not act because he knows well that such an act (eating the posion-mixed food) brings him an untoward effect or undesirable evil effect (death) Therefore the Logician is of the opinion that a knowledge of inducement to act has a three-fold meaning i e the knowledge of the fact (1) of not entailing any serious evil effects (2) of capability to attain the desired object by effort and (3) of the means to attain the desired end [1]

All these three types of knowledge are the signified potentialities of the Lin affix This suffix has the denotative capacity simultaneously in all these three meanings in the same way as the word "Puspavantau" signifies both the 'Sun and the Moon' simultaneously We can not decide due to lack of a deciding criterion, which of the three meanings is principal and which is attributive. Therefore the Logician accepts that all these three meanings are signified simultaneously by the potential mood affix Of course this is the generally accepted theory of the Logician But there are many Logicians who differ from this view So we will examine some of their views in the following pages.

General View

Now it may be argued that the desired objects, say heaven (svarga), food (odana) etc., are many and the means to achieve them, say sacrifice (yāga) cooking (Pāka) etc are many in number. So if we accept signification to this suffix in each of these, then it will be a matter of prolixity and also there prevails confusion. Therefore the common characteristic of the nature of "being the

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1 Balavadanisṭānanubandhitvam, kṛtisādhyatvam, iṣtasādhanatvam ca vidhyarthaḥ

object of desire (iṣṭasādhanatva) and desiring to be attained by effort (kṛtisādhyatvaṃ) are treated as the meanings of the Liṅ affix. And the nature of not entailing serious untoward effects is also denoted by the Liṅ suffix. It is but judicious to treat the same as the meaning of the affix and not the individual objects of the desire or the individual means to achieve objects.

Of course one may question, because the Liṅ suffix denotes iṣṭasādhanatva in general, how the specific object desired and the means to achieve it are known from a sentence like 'swargakāmo yajeta'? And also why an irregular import, as swarga is the desired object and Pāka is the means to achieve it, is not caused. In reply to this the Logician says that no such sort of wrong import is caused, because, normally the meaning of the root after which the Liṅ affix is added indicates the means to achieve the desired object. And the noun word nearer to it (i.e. from the compatibility) gives the object desired[1]. Thus from the sentence Svargakāmo yajeta it will be evident that svarga is the desired object and the means is the activity in which the sacrifice is the object. Similarly in the sentence "Udbhidā yajeta paśukāmaḥ" (one desirous of cattle should perform Udbhid yāga), the desired object is Paśu (cattle) and the means is the activity in which the sacrifice called 'udbhid' is the object (iṣṭasādhanatva) is also the meaning of Liṅ affix.

Now, are we to accept all these three as the meanings of the potential mood affix The Logician replies in affirmative He justifies his stand as follows

Here is a sentence "Maṇḍalaṁ kuryāt" (Make circle) This is a sentence of Buddnists who normally sit in a circular form to contemplate on God But to those who are not Buddhists, to pray or to sit in a circular form is not the desired object nor is the means to achieve anything So on hearing that sentence we are

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1 Iṣṭatvaṃ samabhivyāhṛta padopasthāpita-
Kāmanā viṣayatvaṃ (Vyu Vā).

not acting due to lack of iṣṭasādhanatvam But on hearing a sentence like 'Bhojanam Kuryat' one acts because he has the knowledge of iṣṭasādhanatva Thus from concomitance in agreement and its absence (Anvaya vyatireka) we have to admit that iṣṭasādhanatva is the meaning of the Liṅ affix Similarly from the fact one does not act on hearing a sentence like "Bring the moon" or Eat the poison mixed food" it becomes evident that the other two types of knowledge i e kṛtisādhyatva and Balavadaniṣṭa ananubandhitva" are also to be accepted as the meanings of the Liṅ affix

In sentences like "Swarga kāmo yajeta" the Liṅ suffix denotes all the three meanings i e Swarga-the desired object and Yaga is the means of the achievement of the desired object, the fact that it is also capable of being produced by effort (Kṛtisādhya) and it does not entail any untoward evil effect Therefore one, being equipped with the knowledge of the above three types, naturally, acts on hearing 'sentences like swargakamo yajeta" And all these three meanings agree with the meaning of the verbal root

Again in sentences like 'Śyenena yajeta" the Liṅ suffix denotes only two meanings i e' iṣṭasādhanatva and kṛti sādhyatva and these two meanings agree with the meaning of the verbal root It does not signify the third meaning, because, by killing another person, one gets sin which is an entailment of serious untoward evil So it cannot be accepted as the meaning of the affix in inducing a person to act

Now let us take a negative prohibition like "Na kalañjam bhakṣayet" (one should not eat kalañja) The Liṅ suffix does not signify all the three meanings in this case but only one that is "Balavadanista ananubandhitva" And this one meaning agrees not with the meaning of the verbal root but with the meaning of negative particle Nañ On the other hand if we are to accept all the three meanings as the denotations of the Liṅ affix, the negative particle has to express the absence of all these three meanings But as far as Kalañja bhaksaṇa is concerned, it gives satisfaction (Tṛpti) the desired object, and is also achievable So we

cannot speak of their absence Therefore, in order to prevent one from eating Kalañja, the Liṅ denotes only Balavadaniṣṭa ananubandhitva[1] which agreeing with the meaning of the negative particle Nañ, gives an import of the absence of the same In other words it causes the knowledge of entailing a serious untoward effect So one desists from acting (i e eating Kalañja)

Some Logicians are of the opinion that, in the case of negative injunctions, both iṣṭasādhanatva and Balavadaniṣṭa ananubandhitva are the expressed meanings of the Liṅ affix and the former is qualified by the latter And the verbal import will be of the form Balavadaniṣṭa ananubandhitva viśiṣṭa iṣṭasādhanatva abhāvavat" But Gadādhara does not accept this He says there is no criterion in treating one of the meanings qualified [2]


Thus the potential mood affix denotes three meanings in sentences like "Swarga kāmo yajeta" two meanings in sentences like Śyenenābhicaran yajeta and one meaning in the negative injunctions like 'Kalañjam na bhakṣayet Thus we can conclude the Logicians' views in general with respect to the denotation of Liṅ suffix

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1 Na Kalañjam bhakṣayet ityādi niṣedha vidheḥ prāmṇyānurodhataḥ balavadaniṣṭa ananubandhitvasya vidhyarthatva praveśaḥ (Vyu Vā)

2 Vastutastu viśiṣṭaśaktau viśeṣya vśeiṣaṇa bhāve vinigamanāvirahāt pṛthageva balavadaniṣṭa ananubandhitayaḥ vācyatvam. (Vyu Vā)

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THE VIEWS OF JAYANTABHATTA

Jayantabhaṭṭa who belongs to the section of the old Logicians explains the meaning of Lin affix in a different way According to him Vidhi, the meaning of the Lin affix, is an activity otherwise called Sābdībhāvanā, conveyed by the Lin affix'1 The character of 'Vidhi' is to exhort a person to work (Apravṛtta pravartanam) Of course various doubts such as 'whether the word form Lin itself exhorts or the activity or kṛtisādhyatva or iṣṭasādhanatva etc have been raised Hence Jayantabhatta says that by the grace of Vidhi alone the relationship between the desired object and its means is made known to us 2 This relationship is made known by stating such and such is the fruit for such and such an action Thus Vidhi exhorts a person to act As regards the non-applicability of this postulation, i e inspite of exhortation of this nature we observe people do not act Jayantabhatta replies that those who have implicit faith in the Vidhivākya do act What is meant by ' Exhorting a person to act" is just to produce a knowledge in him that he is directed to act one may actually act to achieve the fruit, or may not act due to other impediments such as shortage of funds etc Similarly in the negative sentences the Lin suffix causes the knowledge that doing such and such an action produces evil effects Of course we find many people indulging in such prohibited acts without caring for the evil results Hence it may be doubted that 'Vidhi' can neither make one to act nor can it prevent one So much so Jayantabhatta pleads that having that knowledge is different from performing the induced action He claims that the Lin affix causes the knowledge that such and such an action results in such and such a result Once such a knowlege is understood by the hearer it

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1 Linarthāvagame satitpravṛttirdṛsyate iti tatrāpi Lin vyaparah prabhavati, sa cāyam linādivyāpārah sabdabhavanā nāmadheyo vidhirityucyate sa eva ca pravartakah (Nya Man)

2 Tasmadeṣa viśiṣṭhah sādhya sādhana sambandhaḥ vidhiprasāda labhya eva bhavati. (ibid)

means he is exhorted by 'Vidhi' to work Whether he actually gets himself to work or not is a different thing but he has the knowledge that he is induced to work Thus to have such an understanding is different and performing such an action[1] is different

Here some people may argue that a person, suffering from hunger, eats a particular thing only on knowing it satisfies his appetite One desirous of good health, on knowing from the doctor that Āmalaka gives good health, eats Āmalaka Thus from these instances it is evident that it is the knowledge of Istasādhanatva alone that exhorts a person to act To this Jayantabhatta replies that the opponent is thoroughly mistaken Strictly speaking it is the 'word' which conveys that such and such is the means to attain a particular result, actually exhorts a person to act By the word 'word' in the previous sentance, it is not the mere word form In causing knowledge a word is an instrument (Karana) An instrument is a kāraka Karaka means one associated with a certain activity And this activity known as Sābdībhāvanā, subsisting in the Lin affix, is called Vidhi, and it alone exhorts one to act Thus according to Jayantabhatta the Lin suffix means a particular (Sabdi) activity which can exhort a person to acti

THE VIEW OF UDAYANA :

Among the old Logicians, Udayana is the most powerful He is recognised as the last among that generation and also a source of inspiration to the beginning of a new generation According to Udayana "Vidhi" means the intention or desire (icchā) of the speaker He does not accept any of the said three meanings (i.e Istasādhanatva etc), either individual or as one qualified by the other two, to be the denoted potentiality of the Lin

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1 Anyohi pravartanāvagamaḥ, Anyasca bāhyo vyāpārah.
Evam vidhivasadeva sādhyasadhanabhāva dhīḥ,
Sā hi prathama nirvrtta preranājñānapūrvikā
(Nya Man),

suffix He opines that the said three meanings can be presumed or inferred, on knowing the intention of the speaker Udayana presents many detailed arguments in the fifth chapter of his work 'Nyāyakusumañjali' He puts forth five reasons to reject the Iṣṭasādhanatva etc as the denoted potentiality of Vidhi [1] According to him (1) this Iṣṭasadhanatva is inferred through the knowledge of the speaker's desire or intention (2) This knowledge of Iṣṭasadhanatva etc is already known from Arthavāda passages like "one gets relieved from death or Sin by performing Asvamedhayaga' etc Therefore no additional purpose is served by accepting Iṣṭasādhanatva etc as the denoted meaning of the suffix Liṅ (3) And also there are usages as ' because it is the means to achieve my desired end, I do it etc both in the first person and second person (4) We observe that the intention of the speaker alone is made known to us by this Liṅ suffix Either in a command (Ājñā) honour (Adhyeṣaṇā), permission (Anujñā) question (Samprasna) request or benediction (Prārthana) we find that the intention of the speaker is made known and no Iṣṭasādhanatva etc is understood (5) The fifth object is that in the instance of prohibitive or vikalpa injunctions Iṣṭasādhanatva etc cannot be the meaning of the Lin affix, e g take the sentence Brāhmaṇam na hanyat (one should not kill a Brāhmin) If we accept Iṣṭasādhanatva as the meaning of Lin affix, then from the above sentence we get an import to the effect that "act of killing a brahmin, is not the means of achieving the desired object but never do we get an import of the form 'the act of killing a brahmin is the means to some undersired end (Aniṣṭasādhanam) It cannot be said that whatever is not Iṣṭasadhana automatically becomes Aniṣṭasādhana

Another objection as pointed out by Udayana is--if Iṣṭasādhanatva is the denoted sense of the Liṅ suffix and one acts only on having such a knowledge, one should act on hearing even a sentence like 'sacrifice is the means to achieve Heaven (Yagaḥ

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1 Hetutvāt anumānācca madhyamādau viyogataḥ,
Anyatra Klpta sāmarthyāt niṣedhanupa pattitah (Nya. Ku. V. 14)

svargasādhanaṁ).' But no such inclination is found on the part of the hearer of that sentence. Henca Iṣṭasāhanatva cannot be the meaning of 'Vidhi'. Udayana gives very lucid, strictly logical arguments, refuting the theory of Iṣṭasādhanatva as the meaning of the Liṅ affix.

Thus taking all these points into consideration, Udayana rejects Iṣṭasādhanatva or in fact any other meaning such as Kṛtisādhyatva etc. as the denoted potentiality of the Lin affix. So we can canclude that according to Udayana, the Liṅ affix denotes the 'Desire' of the speaker in the form of inducing a person to act in certain cases or to prevent him from acting in some other instances. And the so called Iṣṭasādhanatva, Kṛti sādhyatva etc. are inferred from this 'Desire' of the speaker.[1]

The Views of Gangeśa, Pakṣadhara Etc. :

The neologicians like Gangeśa, Gadādhara, Pakṣadhara do not accept the above views of Udayana or Jayantabhaṭṭa, Nor do they admit that the Liṅ suffix denotes all the three meanings (i.e. Iṣṭasādhanatva etc.) simultaneously. They think it is a matter of prolixity. Further they do not accept that the Liṅ suffix denotes each meaning individually, because in such cases we can get only a particular knowledge, devoid of other meanings at a time. Hence they suggested to accept only two meanings, the third being an attribute to Iṣṭasādhanatva. Hence Gangeśa defines Vidhi as "being the means of achieving the desired end in conjunction with the meaning of not producing a strain more than that which inevitably accompanies it (the desired end), as well as being capable of being achived by effort.[2]

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1. Vidhirvaktrabhiprāyaḥ pravṛtyādau Liṅdibhiḥ,
Abhidheyonumeyā tu karturiṣṭābhyupāyatā. (Nya. Ku.).
2. Kṛtisādhyatve sati iṣṭotpatti nāntarīyaka duḥkhādadhikaduḥkha ajanakatvaviśiṣṭeṣṭa sādhanatvaṁ. (TTV, Cin).

Similarly Paksādhara Misra, with a slight modification in the definition of Gangesa, states that Vidhi is "being the means of achieving the desired end in conjunction with the meaning of not producing a strain which is not necessarily associated to the production of the desired end [1]

Gadadhara, who closely follows Gangesa defines Vidhi on similar lines According to him Vidhi means "Being capable of being achieved by effort" as well as 'being the means of achieving the desired end' in conjunction with the meaning of not entailing any untoward effect [2] Thus these scholars prefer a qualified potentiality to the Lin suffix

Now when we try to explain the sentences like Na Kalañjam bhaksayet ' etc in accordance with any one of the definitions, there results a fault of the meaning of word Nañ agreeing with a part (syntactically connected) of the meaning of the Lin affix, i e Balavadanista ananubandhitva a part of the meaning of the Lin affix with the meaning of the word Nañ. But Paksadhara Misra replies to it, that is not a fault so much to worry about, because such type of partial agreement is seen in many instances as Caitramatā, Caitranaptā etc. [3] Gadadhara also is of the view that there is no partial agreement at all In the verbal import we do not get any knowledge which speaks of ' the absence of not entailing any untoward effect" Here also the meaning of Nañ being substantive agrees with the total meaning of the Vidhi suffix and which in turn qualifies ' Eating" [4] Thus the verbal

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1 Krtisadhyatve sati istotpattyanantarī yaka duḥkha ajanakatva visistesta sadhanatvam

2 Krtisadhyatvam balavadanista ananubandhitvasahitm istasadhanatvam ca (Vyu Va)

3 Caitranaptā ityadau caitrasya pautravacaka naptrpadarthaikadesena putrena Caitraputrasya putre ityevamanvayasya ca darsanāt (Tar Tan Vol II)

4 Balavadanistānanubandhitvasyesthasādhanatva visesanataya vācyatve visistābhāvasyaiva sābdabodhebhānam....etc. (Vyu. Vā,).

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the Vidhi suffix, of course all individually;[1] but not a qualified knowledge of any of these three in any way

Now Jagadisa criticises the theory of accepting a qualified potentiality in the Lin affix The opponent may argue that by accepting such a qualified potentiality in the Lin affix the invalidity of sentences like 'One should beat water'' (jalam tādayet), etc can be proved But this is not a proper argument because here one has to create six types sf Karyakāraṇa bhavas to justify the six types of potentialites which results by changing the three meanings as attributives and substantives alternalively And even if it is admitted that ''justified prolixity is not a matter of fault'',[2] still an injunction like ''Syenenabhicaran yajeta'' cannot properly be explained. And it cannot also be maintained that in such cases the Lin suffix denotes the meaning of Istasādhanatva alone through implication.[3] Therefore Jagadisa reaffirms that the Lin affix has denotational potentiality in all the three meanings individually And whichever meaning suits the particular context, that meaning alone should be considered as the expressed sense of the Lin affix in the particular instance [4]

The Views of Vyāsatirtha

Vyāsatirtha differs from all the afore said scholars He argues that Istasadhanatva alone, without being qualified by any other attribūtes, is the meaning of the Lin affix [5] He does not accept Krtisādhyatva and Balavsdanistānanbuandhitva as the

1 Thus to him Yajeta signifies yāgah krtisādhyah istasādhanam Balavadanistāananubandhī ca However, Krishnakānta, the commentator on the Sabdasaktiprakasa defines Vidhi as ''Pravartaka cikīrsajanakatvāvacchedaka prakāratasrayatvam, (ibid)

2 Pramānikam gauravam na dosāya bhavati

3. Na Vidhau parassabdārthaḥ

4 Yadrūpen nvayadhīḥ tanmātraprakaraka saktijñānatva apekāayā laghutvena tatprakāraka saktijnānatvenaiva tatra hetutvat (Sa Sa Pra)

5. Kintu Istasādhanatvameva (Tar Tan Vol Vol-3)

meanings of the Liṅ suffix. He does not admit the desire of the speaker (icchā) as the meaning of Vidhi He refutes the various arguments put forth by Udayana in refutation of Iṣṭasādhanatva etc as the meanings of Vidhi

Vyāsatīrtha says that, if the intention of the speaker (Vakt -urabhiprāya) is the meaning of Vidhi, then there are many intsta -nces where one does not act even on knowing the intention of the speaker, because he has no interest, And interest comes only from the knowledge of iṣṭasādhanatva If it is argued that one acts after presuming the knowledge of Iṣṭasādhanatva etc from the intention of the speaker (as in the case of son taking food on the desire of the father), then better accept Iṣṭasādhana -tva as a direct denotation of the Liṅ affix instead of presuming it from something Any way, it is an admitted fact that one acts only after possessing the knowledge Iṣṭasādhanatva, but the ques -tion is whether this knowledge of Iṣṭasādhanatua is obtained hrough presumption from the intention of the speaker or directly from the denotation of the Liṅ affix This being tae position it is always better to have it through direct denotion rather by pre- sumption

And now as regards the five main arguments put forth by Udayana to negate Iṣṭasādhanatva, Vyasatīrtha says that the same argnmeuts can be advanced against his (Udayana s) theory as well The arguments can be summarised briefly as under

1 Hetutvat

Udayana points out that whenever a question is put as "Why do you do it, the reply that is generally given is of the form ' because it is the means to achieve my desired end" (iṣṭasādhana -tva) Thus 'iṣṭasadhanatva' is a reason which is outside the meaning of the Liṅ affix and not included in its body of denota- tion

If Udayana advances such a reasoning, with a similar reaso -ning one can negate the "Desire" as the meaning of the Liṅ affix When we put a question "why do you do it the reply is

in the form of "because it is intended (or desired) by my wel-wisher (idam kartavyam aptabhipretatvāt) Hence 'Desire' also cannot be the meaning of Lin suffix as istasādhanatva is for Udayana

2 **Anumānacca**

Udayana's second objection is that the said Istasadhanatva is already understood from Arthavada passages like 'one gets relieved from death or sin (Brahmahatya) on performing an Asvamedha sacrifice " Hence there is no need to accept Istasādhanatva as the meaning of Lin affix

In refuting this argument, the opponent says, even so argued "Desire" also can be understood or inferred on the same lines, from the Arthavada passages

3 **Madhyamadau Viyogatah**

The third objection of Udayana is that there are usages as "This is the means to achieve my desired object " Let me do it etc So in such cases it is not possible to sav the Lin suffix in first person (Kuryām) and second person (Kuryāḥ) denotes Istasadhanatva And it is only the desire of the speaker that one understands from the verbs 'Kuryām' and Kuryāḥ' So much so the Lin affix does not express istasādhanatva

This objection is replied to like this In the case of first and second person also there is nothing improper in the Lin suffix denoting istasādhanatva, to achieve one's own desired end

4 **Anyatraklptasāmarthyat**

The fourth point in favour of Udayana is the Paniniyan aphorism Vidhinimatranāmantranādhistasamprasnaprārhanesu Lin (P 3.3 161), in which all the various meanings denote a sort of the desire of the āpta (of the speaker) in common There is no valid reason to over look this common character and accept only istasadhanatva as the meaning of the Lin affix

To this objection Vyāsatīrtha rejoinds that just as he (Udayana) includes Āptatva in the potentiality of the Liṅ affix, he (Vyāsatīrtha) also would include icchā in the meaning as such there is nothing wrong with his definition

5. Niṣedhānupapatti

We have seen Udayana arguing that in injuctive sentences prohibiting a person the Liṅ suffix cannot denote Iṣṭasādhdnatva

Vyāsatīrtha does not accept this contention He replies that in the negative injunctive sentences he would likes to accept Lakṣaṇā as "being the means of producing an evil end" and as such there is nothing fallacious in accepting Iṣṭasādhanatva as the meaning of potential mood affix [1]

Thus Vyāsatīrtha concludes that the Liṅ suffix denotes "means of achieving the desired end"

Now as regards the qualified potentiality of the form "being the means of achieving the desired end by effort in conjunction with the non-entailment of an untoward evil effect" scholars opine no special purpose is served by such an acceptance It, in no way, helps in inducding a person (to act) to perform Yāga and the like The knowledge of iṣṭasadhaanatva itself serves the purpose Nor can it be argued that, to ward off the entailment of untoward serious effects, such a qualified potentiality is to be accepted, because it cannot be established that the performence of Yaga results in an untoward evil effect Further it does not pave way for the prohibitive injunctions like "Na Kalañjam bhakṣayet" because such a knowledge can be had even by other means such as arthavada sentences etc... Nor does it (the knowledge of qualified potentiality) help in preventing a person, who is fully aware of the evil resulting from adultering due to lust etc., from indulging in such activities

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1. For further details Tar Tan Part 2 etc

Further it is not the means which induces one to act but it is the knowledge of being the means to achieve one's desired fruit No one acts even if one has the knowledge of the means by which others get benefited 1

Now as regards the kṛtisādhyatva as a meaning of the Liṅ affix, it is not necessary to consider it as one of the meanings The capability or incapability to achieve a particular thing rests in the person and it cannot be made known by the Liṅ affix We find many people desiring svarga and also knowing the means to achieve it, do not act for various reasons such as shortage of funds etc i e incapability which cannot be made known by the Liṅ affix

Similarly the other one i e Balavadaniṣṭānanubhndhitva also cannot be the denoted sense of the Lin suffix because this can easily be inferred from previous experiences etc Thus Vyasatīrtha concludes that the Lin affix denotes iṣṭasādhanatva but not other meanings

Thus the various views prevailing among the various Logicians regarding the denotational potentiality of the Lin affix can be summarised as under

1 Logicians Jagadīśa and his followers accept signification to the Lin in all the three meanings viz Iṣṭasadhanatva, kṛtisādhya tva, Balavadaniṣṭananubandhitva,
2 Jayantabhatta and his followers accept Vyāpara of the form of Śābdibhāvana as the signified potentiality of the Lin affix
3 Udayana and his followers are of the opinion that the Lin suffix signifies mere intention of the speaker.
4 Gangesa, Gadādhara and others accept only qualified potentiality to the Lin atfix
5 Vyāsatīrtha firmly pleads that Iṣṭasādhanatva only is the signified potentiality of the Lin affix

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1 Pareṣṭasadhanamiti jñānepyapravṛtteḥ. (Tar. Tan. Vol 2).

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MEANING OF THE LIṄ AFFIX

MĪMĀṂSA SCHOOL

As among the Logicians, so among Mīmāṃsakas too, there prevails a diversity of opinion regarding the meaning of the Vidhi affix

Maṇḍana Misra advocates Iṣṭasādhanatva only as the denoted sense of the potential mood affix

Pārthasarathi Misra, though he finally falls in line with Maṇḍana, advocates Abhidhābhāvanā as the meaning of the Liṅ affix

The Prabhakaras enunciate that Kāryatā Apūrva or Niyoga is the meaning of Liṅ

Khaṇḍadeva tries to establish Pravartanatva or icchatva as the meaning of the Liṅ affix

Thus there prevails diversity in deciding the meaning of the Liṅ affix Hence in the following pages we will examine them in detail

Kumarilabhatta is the first among the Mīmāṃsakas who opined that Iṣṭasādhanatva is the meaning of the Liṅ affix, but not kṛtisādhyatva or Balavadaniṣṭānanubandhitva This theory is followed by Maṇḍana who devoted an entire booklet "Vidhiviveka" to prove this or to justify Kumarila Of course every one admits that Liṅ denotes pravartanā only but what is the nature of this pravartanā is the question To this Kumārila and Maṇḍana propound that it is Iṣṭasādhanatva only Because it is generally found people act only after possessing the knowledge of iṣṭasādhanatva And people do not act in the absense of such

knowledge 1 Thus by the process of Anvaya-vyatireka we can establish the meaning of the Lin affix, to be Istasadhanatva only The details of arguments are more or less similar to those of the Logicians who argue Istasādhanatva as the meaning of the Lin affix This knowledge of Istasādhanatva is conveyed by the elders in non-vedic sentences But since Veda is Apauruseya' there is no person to convey this knowledge and hence it is conveyed by the Lin affix

Parthsarathi Misra, takes a different stand He opines that "Abhidhābhāvana" is the meaning of the Lin affix by which Istasādhanatva is inferred 2 Abhidhā is nothing but the significative capacity of the Lin (affix) which signifies pravrtti or the effort for achieving some object This Abhidhā is also called Bhavanā because one gets the incentive to act on hearing the verb word ending with Lin affix The Lin words in Veda express this significative force by which pravrtti or Arthabhāvana is known. However in his Nyāyaratnamālā Parthasarathi Misra changer his openion and finally accepts istasādhanatva only as the meaning of the Lin affix 3

The View of the Prābhākaras :

Prabhākara Misra enunciates that verbal knowledge is obtained by youngsters only through conversation Let one command the others to do some thing The youngsters, who

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1 Pumso nestabhyupāyatvāt kriyāsvanyah pravartakah pravrttihetum dharmam ca pravadanti pravarthnam, Karturistābhyupāye hi kartavyamiti lokadhīh, viparīte tvakartavyamiti tadvisaye tatah (Vi Vi Karikas 29, 30)

2. Abhidīyate ityabhidhā pravartanā, Saiva ca purusa pravrttim bhāvayatītī Bhāvanā māhuriti (Nyā Rat)

3 Tadidam kartavyatārūpam pravartannrupam va samīhitaSadha natvameva Lin adibhirabhidhīyata ityetavadevaramanīyam (ibid). Also vide Sās Dip. 6-1-1.

observe the elders to command the other to do something and when the others thus commanded act accordingly, they learn that particular activity is the meaning conveyed by the sentence Thus the meaning of the Lin in that sentence is learnt by youngsters as Kārya (that which is to be achieved by duty) since people do act on hearing the words with Lin affix used by elders This is otherwise called Niyoga, because one gets oneself engaged (Niyukta) in performing the action, thinking " This is my duty, so I have to get myself engaged in doing it" This Niyoga or Kāryatā cannot be known by any other pramāna hence it is called Apūrva also [1] Thus in the Prabhākara school the meaning of the Lin affix is Kāryatā or Niyoga or Apūrva all of which are synonyms

This theory is further explained very lucidly by Salikanataha in his 'Prakarana pancika' from which we can have a very clear ideaof this kāryatā[2]

Salikānātha says one acts after possessing the knowledge of Kāryatā only Istasādhanatva is different from Karyatā Now the question is what is this Karyatā or what is that which actually induces one to act. Is it Istasādnatva or Kāryatā The knowledge of istasādhanatva cannot be a cause in inducing a person to act, because this knowlege of istasādhanatva exists in related even to the past or future things That is why a person who took his meal doest not eat immediately though he has the knowledge Istasādhanatva of the form 'Taking meal satisfies one's apetite'

Further Krtisādhyatva also is not the meaning of the Lin affix, because we do not find people, eating the food mixed with honey and poison, though there exists krtisadhyatva It is due to the absence of the knowledge of istasadhanatva Here the person

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1 Tacca pramānāntarāpūrvatayā apūrvamitica, svātmani purusam niyunjānam niyoga itica khyāyate. (Nyā. Rat.)

2. Also Vide explanatory notes of A. Subrahmanya Sastry (Pra. Pan. P 431, 432)

does not have a knowledge of Kāryatā. One looks for the means, only after deciding that he has to do a particulart hing Because on hearing the Lin-word, he understands there is Kāryatā in it Thus Iṣṭasādhanatva is only a means while Kāryatā is the end Hence the means and the ends cannot be one and the same Therefore Kāryatā is the Happiness[1] which, one gets on performing certain action, which is different from iṣṭasādhanatva which helps one to bring in the action into being

It may be argued that normally one feels, a knowledge of iṣṭasādhanatva itself is the knowledge of kāryatā It is true that is how one looks at iṣṭasādhanatva But there lies some defference between the two As already said one is the end, the other is the means It is only after knowing the Kāryata that one thinks of the means to undertake that particular action Thus it is the knowledge of happiness that is otherwise called Kāryatā[2] We observe people acting after possessing the knowledge of the quantum benefit or happiness they get by performing a particular action and then only decide whether it is worth doing or not This worthiness of activity (kṛtyarhatvam) is the Kāryatā And this knowledge is caused by Lin Hence it is its (Lin) meaning Thus Śālikānātha refutes the view that iṣṭasādhanatva is the meaning of the Lin affix Kṛti is nothing but 'effort' existing in a person So this Kāryata is that which can be achieved through this effort and also it must be primirely be that for which this effort is used[3] This character of primiriness is mentally cognised, wheras the final result is directly perceived[4] So the knowledge of Kāryata is arrived

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1 Sukham hi sarvaḥ kāryatayā avaiti,
Na tasya phalasādhanatām apekṣate. (Pra. Pan)
(and also Explanatory notes on P. 429)

2 Ataḥ samīhita sādhanātiriktasya sukhasya kāryatā.
(Ibid P 429)

3 Tathā ca kṛtisādhyatve sati kṛtinirūpitoddeśyata śālitvamiti kāryasvarūpam pariniṣṭhati (Pra Pa 432).

4 Sa ca (Kṛtipradhānatvam ca) mānasapratyakṣa vedya iti viśiṣṭa prayojanatapi prayatnasya pratyakṣa vedyaiva,
(Pra. Pan P 431,).

by means of manasopratyaksa and anamana put together Thus Sālikanātha, having refuted istasādhanatva, krtisādhyatva, and the Balavadanistānanubandhitva, proves that Kāryatā is the denoted potentiality of the Lin affix

Refutation of Prabhākara's theory

This theory of the Prabhākaras is unfortunately put to severe criticism by one and all Salikānatha has adequately replied to all the possible objections, still his theory could not gain much popularity. It cannot be estalished that one acts only after possessing the knowledge of Kāryata If by Karyatā is meant krtyarhatā then it is generally observed that people say "we do not know whether it is worthy to do or not, but we act due to this doubt only 1 Thus it is clear that Kāryatā cannot be the cause in inducing a person to act

Further even if it is accepted that Krtyarhatā is Kāryatā, yet of what from is it? Naturally it assumes that form for which one strives i e Happiness or at least absence of unhappiness If it be so Pārthasārathi Misra says that in sentences like "Bring the cow" (Gāmanaya) there is nothing like that happiness or the absence of unhappiness in bringing the cow for which he strives Hence in these sentences the Vidhi (Lin) denotes istasādhanatva only. Therefore even in the Veda also Lin denotes istasādhanatva only 2

Now Pārthasārathi Misra refutes that Apūrva also cannot be the meaning of the Lin affix He brings a very peculiar argument Apūrva is only an intermediatery state, just like the flame We say the firewood is the means of cooking We never say the flame is the means As a matter of fact the atoms of flame enter

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1 "Na vidmaḥ kimidam kāryamakaryam va" iti vadanti Sandehādeva Pravartamahe' iti (Nya Rat)

2. Tathā ca vede apyapūrvasya .. apūrvamabhidadhāna Lin samhita sādhanatāmeva abhidadhyāditi ..Kalpanīyam syāt Nya Rat).

the rice and cause Viklitti. So it is argusd that firewood is not the means for cooking Such a contention contradicts the popular usage,[1] kāsthaiḥ pacati etc , Hence it is better to accept istasādhanatva only as the meaning of the Lin affix and Apūrva is only an intermediatory action [2]

Vyāsatirtha, author of the 'Tarkatāṇḍava' puts some fifteen questions enquiring what is meant by 'Kāryatva" [3] And refutes every possible reply, His firm contention is that 'Kṛtisādhyatva of any type "cannot be the Kāryata which is said to be the meaning of the Lin affix

Every scholar like Dikshita, Kauṇḍabhatta Nāgesa refuted and said that Apūrva or Niyoga cannot be the meaning of the Lin affix Now according to the Prābhākaras 'only the means which directly precedes the desired object and is not the same as the desired object, can be the goal of action" Thus only Apūrva which is a means directly preceding Heaven (Svarga) in the link of causation (i e sacrifice-apūrva-Heaven) can be a goal of action and therefore it is the meaning of the Lin Kouṇḍabhatta now objects to this argument of the Prābhākaras on the basis that there is prolixity involved in this Further he says that it is more simple to say that just a knowledge of the property of being a means to the desired end" is suffficient as an instigator Hence the additional tagging 'only that means which directly precedes the desired object" is unnecessary [4] And it has no support Thus

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1 Sarvaloka prasiddhi virodhāt, Kāsthaih pacatiti nirvivādo prayogadarsanat (Nya Rat)

2 Tena sambhava tyeva apūrvasya karmavāntara vyapāratvam (ibid)

3 Tar Tan Vol 2, on words Here the comentary runs as "Kimidam kāryatvam Kṛtisādhyatvam va, svakṛtisādhyatvam va..... Tadeva vā iti panca dhavikalpyadyam nirahakāryatvam hi ityādinā". (ibid)

4 Na tu avyavahitatvāmsa jñānam tatha, Gauravāt, Mānabhavā -tcca

Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa, Vyāsatīrtha Pārthasārathi, Maṇḍana, Kumārila etc are of the opinion that Liṅ denotes only Iṣṭasādhanatva The knowledge of it only induces or engages a person to act

The Views of Khaṇḍadeva

Khaṇḍadeva does not admit the Liṅ affix to denote Iṣṭasādhanatva Kṛtisādhyatva and Balavadaniṣṭānanubandhitva as its potentialities He fears the fault of prolixity Further in engaging ones self to perform sacrifice or cooking, the knowledge of entailment of an untoward effect (Balavadaniṣṭānanubandhitva) is only an impediment in ones own way to act And the absence of such an impediment by its very existence is the reason in engaging one's self in the act of cooking or performing a sacrfice [1] Further in explaining the verbal import from the injunctive sentences in the presence of a negative participle, we have to create as many as seven cause and effect relations which is a matter of high prolixity

Now Khaṇḍadeva takes up the word "Balavadaniṣṭa" and discusses its meaning He does not accept the Logician s explanation viz "Not producing strain which is more than the minimum required without which (strain) the desired object cannot be achieved' (iṣṭotpattināntarīyakadukhādhika dukhajanakatvam) He argues that Caitra, in spite of the fact of possessing the knowledge of Balavadaniṣṭaananubandhitva, may not act on hearing the sentence "Swarga kāmo yajeta' because of the fear of spending money or due to laziness This is a common experience Thus the 'knowledge of the fact of not entailing any serious untoward effect" cannot be a cause in invariably engaging in action Similarly the knowledge of Balavadaniṣṭatvam cannot be a cause in making one desist from action (like Kalañjabhakṣaṇa or paragamana) We find people are indulging in sinful acts though they

1. Ato balavadaniṣṭānubandhitva jñānam pravṛttibandhakam, tadabhāvasca svarūpasanneva kāraṇam (Bhā Rah)
2 ibid Para-2

are aware of the serious untoward effects such as going to hell etc In this way, the Mīmāmsaka, both by the affirmative and negative inference argues that a knowledge of Balavadaniṣṭā-nanubandhitva need not be accepted as the meaning of the Liṅ affix

Further Khaṇḍadeva explains the word "Balavadaniṣṭa" as that which is 'the object of great aversion' And this aversion is not directly perceptible since it is a particular genus which can be inferred from the result alone 1 This aversion is the result of his actions in his previous birth. Therefore some one may engage himself in performing yāga and some one does not inspite of all the possibilities Similarly in the case of eating Kalanja or in performing the Syena sacrifice one does not act if he has aversion; but where such an aversion does not exist one naturally gets induced in performing such sinful acts Since this knowledge of Balavadaniṣṭa has failed in prohibiting a person from indulging in sinful acts, we need not accept potentiality for the Liṅ affix in it (Balavadaniṣṭānanubandhitva)

Now the Logician apprehends that unless Balavadaniṣṭa-nanubandhitva also is accepted as the denoted meaning of the Liṅ affix, even the classical sentences like Tṛptikāmaḥ alañjan-bhakṣayet" become valid and contradicts the Vedic injunction 'Na Kalañjam bhakṣayet" If Balavadaniṣṭānanubadhitva is not accepted as the denoted potentiality of the Liṅ affix, then the suffix denotes only the remaining two meanings These two meanings i e Kṛtisādhyatva and iṣṭasādhanatva' are easily explained in the case of the non-vedic sentence said above hence the sentence 'Tṛptikāmaḥ kalañjam bhakṣyet' becomes Valid and authoritative But it contradicts the vedic injunction So the Logician argues this Balavadhaniṣṭānanubandhitva is to be admitted as the denoted potentiality of the Liṅ affix To this Khaṇḍa-deva replies that the Logician apprehends such an incongruity

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1 Ato aniṣṭe balavatvam-utkaṭadveṣaviṣayatvam, Autkaṭyam ca jātiviśeṣaḥ. phalaikonneyaḥ (Bhā. Rah.)

from his stand point i.e. taking it granted that the Liṅ suffix has denotational potentiality in all the three meanings. However, since the Mīmāṁsaka (Khaṇḍadeva), does not admit any of these three as the meaning of the Liṅ affix, the fault pointed out by the Logician does not arise in his theory.[1]

According to Khaṇḍadeva the Liṅ suffix denotes Pravartanā (action of inducing), i.e. the action of inducer conducive to undertaking of the person engaged. And this knowledge of "Iṣṭasādhanatva" is only an inferential one. In injunctive sentence like "Svarga kāmo yajeta" etc. where Iṣṭasādhanatva is not known through any other means, the same is conveyed by this Pravartanā through inferences. In the case of prohibitive sentences, this pravarthana in conjunction with the meaning of Nañ conveys "Aniṣṭasādhanatva" (property of being the means of achieving the evil ends) through implication.[2] And also in certain cases this pravartanā does not imply either iṣṭasādhanatva or aniṣṭasādhanatva but conveys the absence of aniṣṭasādhanatva, as in instances "Hutāyāṁ vapāyāṁ Dīkṣitasya annamaśnīyāt". Thus the Balavadaniṣṭānanubandhitva cannot be the meaning of Liṅ affix.

Khaṇḍadeva now refutes the argument that "Kṛtisādhyatva is the denoted potentiality of the Liṅ affix, because this can be known through other means such as experience (Lokataḥ) or presumption.[3] For instance the meaning of the root say 'pac' (in pacati) agrees with kṛti denoted by the suffix "Ti" by the relation of Anukūlatva (congeniality). Kṛtisādhyatva is also cognised in pāka by presumption (Samāna saṁvit saṁvedyatayā). Thus the knowledge of kṛtisādhyatva is secured by presumption but not by direct denotation by the Liṅ affix.

1. Pravartanā Vidhyarthavādimate tadanāpatteḥ. (Bha Rah.)
2. Ato na tāvad balavadaniṣṭānanubandhitvaṁ liṅarthaḥ. (Bha. Rah.).
3. Nā pi kṛtisādhyatvaṁ Tāsya Liṅādivāsyatva 'anupapatteḥ. (Ibid.)

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